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# WHEN THE U-BOATS CAME TO AMERICA

BY WILLIAM BELL CLARK

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

Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*The U–117, as it appeared when brought to this country in 1919 and used in the Victory Loan*

# WHEN THE U-BOATS CAME TO AMERICA

*By*

WILLIAM BELL CLARK

*With Illustrations*

BOSTON
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY
1929

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Published September, 1929

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

# FOREWORD

HERE *is presented a calm recital of the German submarine operations on our coast in 1918. That the author has written it without heat or the employment of useless adjectives is much to his credit as an historian and leaves us with a perfectly clear picture of an important phase of the World War. This part of enemy operations has, in the mind of the public, been passed over far more lightly than its significance warrants. Two hundred thousand tons of shipping and four hundred twenty-one lives lost in six months directly and indirectly as a result of the operations of submarines sent from a distance of three thousand four hundred miles is a graver omen than we are apt to think it. It will be seen that only for a comparatively brief time were there as many as three submarines acting at once. If the enemy had possessed more long radius submarines and detached them for this service, the rate of toll would have vied with that exacted from allied shipping as a result of the intensive submarine operations in European waters. There lies in this history a warning to us not to withhold in time of peace the preparation of means to avert this threat.*

JOS. STRAUSS
*Rear Admiral U.S.N.* (retired)

# PREFACE

HEREIN I have aimed to present an authentic history of the operations of German submarines in the Western Atlantic during the last six months of the World War, together with a comprehensive account of their effect upon the United States. Beyond that point, I have not essayed. What the U-boats did in European waters remains for some one else to tell. That I have been able to present the facts accurately and, I trust, completely, is due in no small measure to the splendid coöperation of the Historical Section of the United States Navy Department. To the officers of the Historical Section and to Doctor Albert E. McKinley, professor of American history at the University of Pennsylvania, who read the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions for its improvement, goes my sincere appreciation.

WILLIAM BELL CLARK

*Evanston, Ill.*
March 1, 1929

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# WHEN THE U-BOATS CAME TO AMERICA

## CHAPTER I

# BEFORE THE U-BOATS CAME

THE futile efforts of German submarines in the last six months of the World War to harass at the source the increasing supply of men, munitions and food pouring across the Atlantic to France brought actual naval hostilities by a foreign power close to the American coast for the first time in more than one hundred years. Until the summer and fall of 1918, when submarines operated in the waters between Newfoundland and Cape Hatteras and sank more than one hundred sixty-five thousand gross tons of shipping, no fighting craft of an European enemy had invaded the waters adjacent to the eastern seaboard since the War of 1812.

The attitude of American naval authorities has been to disparage the U-boat raids in American coastal waters as minor incidents of the great conflict.[1] Opinions so rendered are based entirely upon military values and, from this viewpoint, the submarine activities fall no doubt into the category of futility. Were history to be written purely

[1] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 16. Also Sims' "The Victory at Sea", p. 319.

from the aspect of decisive engagements, however, it would lose the brilliant and stimulating records of self-sacrifice from Thermopylae to Cradock at Coronel. Vain efforts, undertaken frequently with the pre-knowledge that they would fail, have enriched the pages of the past. The Continental cruisers that roved the English Channel during the Revolution had little more effect upon the conclusion of the struggle for independence than the German U-boats off the Atlantic coast had upon the armistice of 1918. Yet, to forget the exploits of John Paul Jones in the *Ranger* and the *Bonhomme Richard* because of the absence of military value would be to deprive this country of a picturesque and heroic phase of its naval traditions.

Following the same thought, to decry the submarine raids because they failed of their purpose is to belittle as well the hardihood and courage of the men of the American Merchant Marine and the Naval Overseas Transportation Service. They refused to be driven from the sea. The brunt of the raids was borne, not by the convoyed transports nor the vessels of the fighting forces, but by plodding cargo boats, unguarded tankers, coastwise schooners and fishing smacks. Almost all of the tonnage losses off the American coast fell upon these classes. Throughout the course of the raids the best traditions of the sea were maintained by the unfortunate crews. Their experiences under fire or adrift afterwards in small boats afford many of the thrills which readers of naval history have heretofore gathered from the single ship actions of the days of the wooden double-deckers or the more modern sea fights between fleets of ironclads.

Out of the submarine raids has arisen a vital problem, but will the lessons it propounded be studied as they should? If six German submarines were able to destroy

one hundred sixty-five thousand tons of shipping off this coast, what might have been the result had the whole power of the submersible been turned upon us? What might be the result in future wars were we the sole enemy? As a matter of fact, the so-called futile U-boat raids were paramount lessons for preparedness. They showed the vital need of proper fighting craft — destroyers, sub-chasers, aeroplanes and submarines — to combat this comparatively new and dangerous offensive weapon; a navy construction program which should not be heavy at the top and weak at the bottom.

The naval authorities also, in rendering virtually technical decisions upon the raids, have overlooked the psychological effect at the time of occurrence. There is little need to dwell upon this theme, but it is possible to maintain that the single action of one U-boat in sinking the New York-Porto Rico liner *Carolina,* with the loss of thirteen lives, did more to awaken the " will to win " in this country than all the paid publicity of the Committee on Public Information.

In tracing the raiders from May, 1918, until the armistice, it is essential, therefore, to keep in mind not only the progress of the raids, but the many indirect results. Among the more important of these may be included collisions and other accidents caused by drawing shipping nearer shore and by forbidding lights, and also tragedies arising through trigger-vigilance in which American naval craft were sunk or damaged by the guns of freighters fired at first sight of a suspicious object.

The story of the U-boat raids includes a considerable part of the history of the naval districts. It was from these tactical centers that the convoying of coastal shipping and the work of air and sea patrols and mine sweepers were

directed. The efficacy of the work is demonstrated clearly after the first and most successful raid and the achievement of the navy in this direction is deserving of far more praise than has thus far been bestowed upon it. It fell to the lot of some thousands of officers and men to be held on this side of the Atlantic when they would have preferred to be overseas. Theirs was a thankless task. The problem of locating a U-boat along a thousand miles of coastal waters was far more difficult than a similar problem in the confined areas of the war zone around the British Isles. Nevertheless, several contacts were made and the escapes of the enemy were due largely to luck.

While the total number of submarines sent to this shore was six, only five might be said to have conducted any serious raiding. The final visitor was recalled in October, 1918, when it was gaining the proximity of the coast. This last raider, the U-152, inflicted the most serious casualties, however, as before it fell the cargo-carrier *Ticonderoga*, in the Naval Overseas Transportation Service, sunk in mid-ocean with the loss of two hundred sixteen lives. Actual forays on coastal shipping covered a period of about five months, from May 25 to October 17, 1918.[2] The first raid was conducted by a single U-boat, the U-151. After its departure three others arrived and in August the trio, the U-156, U-140 and U-117, were harrying vessels simultaneously from Newfoundland to North Carolina. When, in September, the U-155 arrived, it confined its coastal operations to New England and Canadian waters.

Practically the only criticism made of the Navy Department's activities during the period of the raids has

[2] The schooner *Hattie Dunn*, the first victim, was sunk May 25, 1918; the U.S.A. Charted Transport *Lucia*, the last, on October 17, 1918.

been upon the system of censorship. This has been criticism of policy rather than operations, although the claim has been advanced that, when the first enemy submersible arrived, the Department's reluctance to admit its presence caused the censorship to interfere to a certain extent with the carrying out of prompt protective measures. Briefly stated, it has been contended that the Navy Department did not inaugurate the coastal convoying system until after the first U-boat had been operating off the coast for a week and that this delay was responsible for the loss of fourteen thousand tons of shipping, *i.e.*, the six vessels sunk on June 2, 1918, imperiling the lives of more than four hundred men, women and children, and causing thirteen deaths. Criticism made subsequent to any occurrence loses much of its weight, but there is no question as to the existence of a strict censorship during the raids. Whether it was overstrict and whether, as contended, it was responsible in a measure for the above losses, can be only a matter of opinion. Certainly no decision should be reached until the problem is studied from every approach.

Much has been said since the conclusion of the World War regarding the necessary lapse of time before a proper perspective can be gained of the magnitude of the struggle. With this belief, as regards diplomacy, and the strategy and the tactical maneuvers of great armies, there can be no dispute. The submarine raids, however, are not subject to the same delayed appraisal. They form a detached segment of the whole, took place under circumstances which beclouded no issues and have the necessary evidence on both sides to clarify every phase. If they are little known and less understood by the American public, it is because in their final stages the achievements of the American Expeditionary Force overshadowed them in the nation's

press and the navy censorship permitted only the barest details to be printed.

The reign of submarine terror along the American coast gave the United States a graphic illustration of the intense suffering of the Allies from the German U-boats. While it is our province to describe only the raids into the western Atlantic, it is well to remember that Great Britain, France and Italy suffered numerically in ships and lives lost far in excess of our own country, and that their annals are rich with the devoted heroism of the men who "went down to the sea in ships" during the long years after February 4, 1915, when Germany, by creating a submarine war zone around the British Isles, inaugurated its campaign, which, twelve months later, broadened into unrestricted warfare against all merchant vessels — the terrible period of "*spurlos versenkt.*"

The possibilities and probabilities of extensive raids by German super-submarines upon America's Atlantic coastal trade were fully weighed before the United States, in the spring of 1917, joined the long list of belligerents in the World War. The best thought of the Navy Department had been given to the subject during the period of diplomatic controversy with the German Empire, and the results became manifest in the naval appropriation bills as drawn up and approved by the First and Second sessions of the Sixty-Fourth Congress, both of which antedated the declaration of a state of war. Each bill made extensive provisions for coast defense. The phenomenal development of the submarine at the hands of the German Admiralty had demonstrated to this country, before and during the period of congressional deliberation, that the width of the Atlantic was no guarantee against its activities. The visits of the merchant super-submersible *Deutschland* and

the U-53 were too fresh in American minds to discount a reappearance of submarines once hostilities should begin.

Initial plans, formulated to protect the exposed eastern seaboard from enemy U-boats, followed closely after the first demonstration by Germany of the large cruising radius of its undersea craft. The much-heralded visit of the *Deutschland* was enlightening and but little more than a month after it reached an American port, its effect was apparent in the provisions of the Naval Appropriation Bill of August 29, 1916. Three clauses in this act might be said to have dealt exclusively with the subject of coast defense. They were: the creation of a Naval Coast Defense Reserve as a part of the Naval Reserve Force; the granting of executive power to the President for the transfer of the Lighthouse Service to the control of the Navy Department, and the inclusion of fifty destroyers and fifty-eight coast submarines in the building program to be undertaken prior to July 1, 1919. In addition, the bill reiterated the right of the Secretary of the Navy to take over the Coast Guard in case of war. The language of the act, as regards the Naval Coast Defense Reserve, permitted the laying of a groundwork upon which was based the ultimate nucleus of the patrol fleets. It provided:

Members of the Naval Reserve Force, who may be capable of performing special useful service in the Navy or in connection with the Navy in defense of the coast, shall be eligible for membership in the Naval Coast Defense Reserve.

Persons may enroll in this class for service in connection with the naval defense of the coast, such as service with coast-defense vessels, torpedo craft, mining vessels, patrol vessels or as radio operators in various ranks or ratings corresponding to those of the Navy for which they will

have qualified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy; Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy may be permitted the enrollment in this class of owners and operators of yachts and motor boats suitable for naval purposes in the naval defense of the coast; and is hereby authorized to enter into contract with the owners of such power boats and other craft suitable for war purposes to take over the same in time of war or national emergency upon payment of a reasonable indemnity.[3]

While the mobilization of the Coast Guard as a part of the naval establishment had been provided as early as January 28, 1915, the transfer of the Lighthouse Service from the Department of Commerce to the Navy Department was a more radical step and was, therefore, left at the discretion of the President rather than made mandatory. The act specified:

The President is hereby authorized, whenever in his judgment, a sufficient national emergency exists, to transfer to the service and jurisdiction of the Navy Department, or of the War Department, such vessels, equipment, stations and personnel of the Lighthouse Service as he may deem to the best interests of the country.[4]

The act of August 29, 1916, might be said to have been the answer of the American nation to the implied threat in the *Deutschland's* first visit. It was lost, however, upon Germany. That nation persisted in its efforts to impress the United States with the possibility of carrying the submarine warfare, if occasion demanded, to the Atlantic coast. German news bureaus saw to it that nothing regarding the vast scope of the U-boat's cruising area should be overlooked by neutral America. The initial appearance of the *Deutschland* at Baltimore, on July 9, 1916, was

[3] Navy Year Book, 1917–1918, p. 439. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 452.

heralded by the German embassy as a distinct feather in the German naval cap. The fact that the *Deutschland* returned in safety to her home port was also broadcasted from the Berlin wireless stations, and, to prove it was no idle vaunt, the merchant submarine made a second appearance here, this time at New London, Connecticut, on November 1, 1916, upon which occasion Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, paid an official visit to the commander, Captain Paul Koenig. In the meanwhile, on October 7, 1916, the U-53, a warlike unit of the German submarine fleet, emerged suddenly and without warning in the harbor at Newport, Rhode Island. Its commander, Hans Rose, elected to remain in port just three hours — sufficient for the feat to be transmitted to every part of the country and a bag of despatches to be shipped off to the German embassy at Washington — and then sallied forth into Long Island Sound. The next day, off Nantucket, the U-boat began operations. Six vessels, one of them a large British passenger steamer, were stopped by the raider, their crews ordered to the boats and the ships destroyed by torpedoes.[5] American destroyers, hovering around to guard against violations of neutrality, picked up the boats loaded with survivors.

Such lessons in the fall of 1916 were understood by Congress, which, in March, 1917, while passports were being exchanged and the nation rushing toward the inevitable breach, passed a supplemental naval appropriation bill. This act, of March 4, 1917, authorized the immediate building of a number of war vessels listed in the 1916 program, among them being fifteen of the fifty destroyers

[5] The victims of the U-53 on October 8, 1916, were the *Strathdene*, British freighter; *West Point*, British freighter; *Stephano*, British passenger liner; *Kingston*, British freighter; *Bloomersdijk*, Dutch freighter, and *Chr. Kmudsen*, Norwegian freighter.

and eighteen of the fifty-eight coast submarines. The same bill granted to the Secretary of the Navy authority to build twenty more of the coast submarines in addition to the eighteen made mandatory, and also bestowed upon the President the power to utilize an emergency fund of one hundred fifteen million dollars to enlarge the naval force. As from this latter sum several hundred destroyers and submarine chasers were constructed, it can be seen that no small part of the fund went into coast defense.

Before this time the Navy Department was preparing for war. On February 2, 1917, every navy yard in the country was closed to visitors and the various commandants were instructed to exercise every precaution in safeguarding government plants and vessels. Two days later, on February 4, orders were issued to send all information regarding the movement of naval vessels in code, and the next day the practise of reporting the positions of naval craft in the columns of the press was discontinued, not to be renewed for almost two years. As events marched toward the final break with the Central Powers, the Navy Department, through the Bureau of Naval Operations, sent a brief warning, on March 27, to all ships and stations, urging them to maintain "special bright outlook" for possible danger from enemy submarines.

All of the preparations as enumerated were carried on under the cloak of rigid censorship, yet the first published indication of naval activity came in the shape of a U-boat antidote. It was President Wilson's executive order of April 5, 1917 — the day before a state of war was declared — although it was not made public until eight days later. The order established "defensive sea areas" for the protection of all important coastal points and maritime centers and placed a barred zone around every harbor.

The forbidden areas extended for distances of from two to ten miles to sea. Regulations of the strictest nature were imposed in the order, which announced that "the Secretary of the Navy will be charged with the publication and enforcement of these regulations." Eighteen of the defensive zones, as prescribed, were along the eastern coast of the country. They guarded the mouth of the Kennebec River and the ports of Portland, Maine; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Boston and New Bedford, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; the eastern end of Long Island Sound; the main entrance to New York Harbor; the mouths of the Delaware and Chesapeake bays; the port of Baltimore; the mouth of the Potomac River; Hampton Roads, Virginia; Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia, and Key West, Florida. The published regulations governed the movements of friendly shipping in these zones and concluded with the warning: "The responsibility of the United States of America for any damage inflicted by force of arms with the object of detaining any person or vessel proceeding in contravention to regulations duly promulgated in accordance with this Executive Order shall cease from this date."

With the executive order, our "splendid isolation" became a byword of the past. Not that an attack by German battleships or battle cruisers was anticipated; the British Grand Fleet had held the German Navy impotent for more than two years and seemed capable of continuing the blockade indefinitely. What was feared was the deadly U-boat, whose depredations had already cost England a million tons of shipping, and whose potentialities so far from a home base remained to a large extent an unknown factor. To combat the U-boat, the coast defense steps went forward with rapidity. A second executive order, on April

11, 1917, mobilized the Coast Guard and Lighthouse Service under the control of the Secretary of the Navy. Plans for the immediate use of both had been laid long before. With the taking over of the Coast Guard, the Navy Department, according to the 1918 report of its Secretary, added to its equipment an extensive communication service embracing all stations on the Atlantic coast and comprising 2,327 miles of land line and 402 miles of submarine cable. The transfer of the Lighthouse Service from the Department of Commerce brought forty-six lighthouse tenders, four light vessels and twenty-one light stations, with their complement of eleven hundred and thirty-two employees, under the jurisdiction of the navy.

Acting under the power invested in him by the Coast Defense Reserve clause of the act of August 29, 1916, the Secretary of the Navy completed negotiations at once with owners of motor-power boats and pleasure yachts. Within two months many small craft had been added to the naval strength. In one district alone, a total of four steel and twelve wood submarine patrol boats were converted under requisition during April and May, 1917. Within the year this number was increased to thirty-one, and for the entire coast the submarine patrol fleet totalled in the neighborhood of five hundred. These small craft varied in length from thirty to one hundred fifty feet and ranged in speed from eight to twenty knots per hour. The majority of them were of value only for duty within harbor. Prior to the declaration of war, the Navy Department had designed and contracted for more than one hundred vessels of the class known as submarine chasers, small wooden vessels of about sixty tons displacement and one hundred ten feet in length.[6] These craft, an

[6] Sims' "The Victory at Sea", p. 198.

improvement over British types, were planned by Commander Julius A. Furer, Construction Corps, U.S.N., and Lieutenant Commander A. Loring Swasey, U.S.N.R., the latter in private life a Boston yacht architect. The emergency fund of one hundred fifteen million dollars granted the President in the act of March 4, 1917, and another emergency fund of one hundred million dollars, provided by Congress in the Naval Deficiency Bill passed October 6, 1917, were drawn upon liberally and eventually nearly four hundred of this type of vessel were put into commission.

Other means of frustrating submarines also were developed in the summer of 1917. One was the stretching of steel chains across the mouths of the more important harbors — New York, Boston, Baltimore, Norfolk and Philadelphia. The nets barring the four former ports were operated throughout the entire period of the war, but the one at Philadelphia, which had been located across the Delaware River from Peapatch Island to shoal water, was carried away during the severe winter of 1917–1918 and was not replaced. The most remarkable of these chains was the one protecting Baltimore and all other ports along the Chesapeake and its tributaries, including the National Capital. This was a heavy steel obstruction net, fifteen miles in length, stretched across the bay just inside the Virginia Capes. Lieutenant F. H. Jaeger, U.S.N.R.F., under whose direction the chain was fabricated and laid, was awarded the Navy Cross for the achievement.[7]

Another defensive measure was the establishment of naval aviation fields at strategical points along the coast

[7] Hearing Before a Subcommittee on Naval Affairs, U.S. Senate, Senate Resolution 285, "Award of Medals in the Naval Service", p. 102. Future identification of this reference will, for the sake of brevity, be "Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service."

where seaplanes could be despatched at the first alarm and, from advantageous altitudes, detect the presence of an enemy submarine. Elaborate plans called ultimately for regular air patrols of the entire coast, but aviators had to be trained before even occasional patrolling could be attempted. These naval stations were adjacent to the main bases of the naval districts, which had been formed during the first year of the war. The naval districts were strategical centers the purpose of which was to carry out problems involving patrol and defenses of the coast, mine sweeping, communications, information, etc. The First District, bounded roughly, embraced the Maine and Massachusetts shores; the Second, the Nantucket, Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, areas, marking the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound; the Third, New York and vicinity; the Fourth, Philadelphia and the South Jersey and Delaware coasts; the Fifth, Maryland and Virginia, and the Sixth, the Carolinas and Georgia and that part of Florida north of the mouth of the St. John's River.

While coast protection measures were under way, the Navy Department had heeded the advice of Admiral W. S. Sims in London and had despatched most of its speediest destroyers as well as some of the sturdiest and most seaworthy converted yachts and motor boats to European waters. Most of the sub-chasers were still building. Only with reluctance had the Secretary of the Navy finally abandoned a policy of keeping most of the fleet at home. He had expressed the policy of the navy in a letter of July 10, 1917, to Admiral Sims in which he stated in part:

First, the most hearty coöperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or other

waters compatible with an adequate defence of our home waters.[8]

From this position he had receded after Admiral Sims, in an answer dated July 16, 1917, had explained that the best way to protect the American coast would be to wage unrelenting war upon the submarine in the narrow confines of the North Sea through which it must pass in leaving its base. The Sims letter, although dated more than a year before the armistice, might be considered prophetic in the following paragraph:

In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent of our coast line, and the distance between our principal ports, it is a safe assumption that if we could induce the enemy to shift the submarine war area to our own coasts his defeat would be assured, and his present success would be diminished more than in proportion to the number of submarines he diverted from the more accessible area where commerce necessarily focuses.[9]

Whatever the trepidation of the Navy Department in sending its fleetest war craft overseas, the actual quietude off the American coast was reflected in the gradual air of reassurance upon the part of the public. The fact that submarines had not appeared in twelve months was taken as an indication that none would appear. A false security fastened itself upon the country and the war once more began to be considered as a strictly European affair in which it was necessary to go abroad to " get hurt." There were even those who scoffed at the measures of coast protection, who could see no occasion for any naval craft in eastern Atlantic waters and who insisted upon regarding

[8] Sims' " The Victory at Sea ", p. 391.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 396–397.

the unabating severity of the barred-zone as "playacting." With the exception of one scare, when, on April 17, 1917, the U.S. destroyer *Smith* fired on what it presumed to be a periscope about one hundred miles off New York, there had been no occasion to suspect the presence of enemy craft off the eastern coast during the first year of the war.

The Navy Department did not share in the general feeling of safety. From information received from Admiral Sims, it was aware that the immunity of the Atlantic coast from attacks by undersea raiders was due largely to the fact that the few cruiser submarines in the German Navy were concentrating their efforts upon shipping in the English channel. Admiral Sims, as early as April 28, 1917, had assured Naval Operations that the British Admiralty maintained fairly exact information on the whereabouts of every U-boat and that none were likely to forego the successful raids on the Channel entrance for an expedition into the western Atlantic.[10] With the success of the convoy system and the consequent diminution in sinkings in the winter of 1917–1918, the possibility of hostilities on the eastern seaboard of the United States seemed to increase, and, to forestall it, a special board, headed by Rear Admiral M. Johnston, U.S.N., was appointed "to formulate a plan of defense in home waters." This board convened on February 4, 1918, and two days later submitted a complete plan, which was somewhat modified on March 6 by Admiral W. S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations. The text of this report was lengthy. It was based upon a presumption that "a division of four submarine cruisers,

[10] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., "German Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and Canada", p. 9. This reference, for brevity, will in the future be identified as "Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N."

each armed with 6-inch guns, thirty-six mines, and sixteen torpedoes, and capable of at least one month's activity on our coast, may appear in American waters without warning." The recommendations were: that coast defense submarines be based at strategic points; that a coastal convoy plan be evolved, and war warnings be given by the navy only, save in emergency; that district defenses include nets, air patrols, listening stations, mine-sweeping service, limited off shore escort and patrol craft to answer rescue calls; and that intelligence work be extended and shipping be ordered not to use wireless for communicating instructions.[11] How these recommendations were carried out, the account of subsequent enemy operations will disclose.

Early in 1918 the naval collier *Cyclops* disappeared. Its loss, with all on board, is the most mysterious in modern naval annals. The *Cyclops*, with a cargo of manganese from Bahia, Brazil, arrived at the Barbadoes in safety and sailed from there on March 4, 1918. It was expected to reach Philadelphia on March 13. Somewhere between the West Indies and the port of destination it carried two hundred seventy-two men to a hidden deep-sea grave. When a week overdue, a feeling of apprehension swept the Navy Department. Every effort was made to find the vessel, but on April 14 the department gave permission to publish the few known facts about its disappearance. The search for the missing collier, which had begun a day or so after March 13, was continued with unremitted energy for more than a month. Its fate is still a sealed book and its name has been added to the list of sixteen other American naval vessels, which, since the days of the Revolution, have disappeared at sea, unheard of. It

[11] *Ibid.*

has been established that the vessel was not the victim of a submarine, although, when the disappearance was first reported, this possibility was widely advertised and discussed. The *Cyclops*, it is believed, was either lost in a storm, or else, as Senator Phelan of California declared before the Senate Mines Committee on May 2, 1918, was destroyed by bombs placed on board at Bahia, Brazil, before sailing. The Senator declared that naval men had told him the port of Bahia was " full of Germans from a cruiser and other ships interned there," and that there had been ample opportunity to place bombs in the hold. It is a question whether the loss of the collier forms a part of the submarine activities off the coast. It can be considered as such merely because the disappearance of the vessel was a forerunner to the arrival of the U-boats and the uncertainty arising from its fate sharpened naval eyes as to the anticipated raids.

This was the general situation up to May 1, 1918, on which date Admiral Sims cabled to the Navy Department that a German submarine had left its base on April 19 for a long cruise; that it was of the *Deutschland* type and that, according to all indications, it was bound for the American coast. A letter prepared by him on April 30, but not mailed until after the sending of the cablegram, gives an admirable idea of the success of the British information service. It stated in part:

As there are only seven cruiser submarines built, we are able to keep very close track of these ships. At the present time one of these vessels is operating off the west coast of Spain, en route home, two are in the vicinity of the Canaries, one is in the North Sea bound out, and three are in Germany overhauling. . . . At the moment the only one that might cross the ocean is the one now coming out

of the North Sea, as the other three have been out too long to make a long cruise likely.[12]

On May 15, having secured additional details, the admiral sent a second cablegram informing the department that the submarine, being well across the Atlantic, could be expected to begin operations any time after May 20. In this second message he gave the probable nature of the U-boat's cruise, although, fearing that the cable might pass through German hands, he was very guarded as to the submarine's destination. He knew that it carried a number of mines and that the intention was to lay them at the mouth of the Delaware. Rather than state this as a fact, he merely called the attention of the Navy Department to the vicinity of Five Fathom Bank Light, where ships from or to Philadelphia discharge or receive pilots, as an ideal place for an enemy to operate. With this definite news at hand and a tight hold on the censorship, the naval authorities embarked upon a system of suppression, which can be explained by the following paragraph from the cable of May 15:

There are circumstances which render it highly important that nothing whatever should be given out which would lead the enemy even to surmise that we have had any advance information concerning this submarine, even in the event of our sinking her, and that such measures as are taken by the department be taken as secretly as possible and without public disclosure of the specific reasons.[13]

Complying with the above, not a word was let slip about the Sims messages and the Department repeatedly denied that it had any news at all regarding a submarine

[12] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 13.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

off the coast. Nevertheless, at that time, the chief of naval operations drafted a circular letter to all shipowners, masters, customs officials and shipping agencies, advising them of the steps to be taken to protect shipping in the event of submarine activities in coastal waters. This letter was dated May 4, but did not reach those for whom it was intended until May 15.[14] The following day, May 16, the Navy Department broadcasted the following message to all naval districts and naval units in American waters:

Most secret — From information gained by contact with enemy submarine, one may be encountered anywhere west of 40 degrees west. No lights should be carried, except as may be necessary to avoid collision and paravanes should be used when practicable and feasible.[15]

One of the results of this was the sudden closing of the port of New Orleans on May 17. The Collector of the Port, when questioned, said he had taken the action because the navy had informed him there were submarines either in the Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico. The incident was not overlooked by the press, although the port was reopened the next day, and comparisons were drawn between it and the Department's previous denials. Naval authorities said nothing. Actual indications that the U-boat had arrived at last made it more imperative to act than talk.

[14] Letter from James T. Kernan, Secretary, Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, to C. F. McSorley, Manager, Maritime Bureau, Chamber of Commerce, Boston, June 12, 1918.

[15] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 23.

# CHAPTER II

## THE

## U-151 ARRIVES

The first of the German submarines destined for the American coast was the U-151 under command of Korvettenkapitan von Nostitz und Janckendorf, or Korvettenkapitan von Nostitz, Graf von Henchendorf, the former name being given by the Navy Department [1] and the latter by Captain Waldemar Knudsen, who interviewed him in Germany after the war. Sailing from Kiel on April 14, five days before the estimated date given in Admiral Sims' first cable, the U-boat passed through the North Sea, rounded the northern end of the British Isles and ran down the west coast of Ireland, being first sighted on May 2, 1918, in 46° N., 28° W., by an American steamer whose wireless call was intercepted by the British station at Kingston, Jamaica. True to Admiral Sims' prediction, the submarine crossed the Atlantic within the forecasted time and on May 15 made an attempt to torpedo the British steamer *Huntress* in 34° 28′ N., 56° 09′ W., a position about one thousand miles east of Cape

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 23.

Hatteras.[2] The *Huntress* notified all shore stations of the attack. Despite the knowledge that he had been detected, the German commander proceeded slightly west by north, approaching the coast between the thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth parallels of latitude. Shortly after noon on May 19, the American steamship *Nyanza* fell afoul of the oncoming raider and its "S.O.S.", caught by the Atlantic City, New Jersey, radio station was the first definite news that the submarine was nearing the coast. The *Nyanza* gave its position as 38° 21′ N., 70° W., and added that it was being gunned. The steamer escaped by means of forced draught, and the U-151, abandoning the pursuit, resumed its westward journey and encounterd the American steamship *Johancy* a few hours later on the same day. A torpedo, fired at long range, missed the *Johancy*, which at once took to its heels, filling the air with wireless calls. None of the shore stations caught the appeals, but the tanker *J. C. Donnell*, inward bound, picked up one message and at once scurried for the shelter of the Delaware capes. Arriving the next day, the captain of the tanker landed at Lewes, Delaware, and notified the section base there of the *Johancy's* "S.O.S." He gave the text as "Being torpedoed 150 miles off Winter Quarter Shoals." This placed the position of the marauder definitely as not far off the Maryland coast. It needed only the call of the British steamship *Crenella*, formerly the Canadian Government steamship *Montcalm*, upon the following day, May 21, to establish the exact location of the submarine at that time. The *Crenella* came into the path of the U-151 in 37° 50′ N., 73° 50′ W., at 11.15 A.M. of that day and for more than an hour was pursued until, at 1 P.M. it reported that it had escaped. The U-151 fired six times

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 23.

after the fleeing vessel but the shots went wild. Several hours later, according to the captain of the British tanker *Cheyenne*, the U-151 picked up his vessel and chased it for several hours, firing from a deck gun until the quarry gained the safety of coastal waters. The skipper of the *Cheyenne* reached the Delaware with a thrilling story of the encounter. He said that when first sighted by the submarine a torpedo had been fired at him but had missed. The tanker thereupon began to zigzag, heading due west for the coast. The *Cheyenne* replied, gun for gun, to the U-boat's salvos during the running fight which had lasted about two hours.

As a result of the numerous encounters, the Fourth and Fifth naval districts, as the two nearest the scene, took steps toward concerted action should the submarine enter their boundaries. All "liberties" of men were canceled from May 19 on and the patrol fleets were made ready for immediate action. Admiral Sims' warning that the mouth of the Delaware would be an ideal place for mine laying was not forgotten. There had been collected at the Section Base at Lewes, Delaware, during the first year of the war, a fleet of mine sweepers. It consisted of the menhaden fishing fleet, eight ancient, steam-powered wooden fishing boats of about two hundred gross tons apiece. These craft held the following imposing names in the naval register: *Delaware*, S.P. 467; *Breakwater*, S.P. 681; *Garner*, S.P. 682; *McKeever Bros.*, S.P. 683; *E. J. McKeever*, S.P. 684; *S. W. McKeever*, S.P. 1169; *Fearless*, S.P. 724 and *Annie Gallup*, S.P. 694. On May 6 they had been transferred across the mouth of the bay from Lewes to Cape May, New Jersey, and were held in readiness after May 21 for immediate mine-sweeping operations. Actual patrol duty devolved upon the five sub-chasers which at that time

were attached to the district — S.C's. 71, 72, 73, 74 and 144 — and the more powerful of the converted motor boats, among which were the steel-hulled *Emerald*, S.P. 177; *Georgiana III*, S.P. 83; *Miramar*, S.P. 591; *Sybilla*, S.P. 104 and *Suzanne*, S.P. 510. These latter craft carried on the harbor-entrance patrol and also patrols off McCries Shoal and Brigantine Shoal Buoy, just outside of the Delaware Breakwater.[3]

While the preparations to receive it were under way, the U-151 seemed to have disappeared completely. Nothing was heard of it for days after the final encounter with the *Cheyenne*, and, considering the known surface speed of eleven and one half knots per hour, the continual silence was neither reassuring nor gratifying to the naval authorities. For all the Fourth District knew, the submarine might be loitering in the vicinity of Five Fathom Bank Lightship, as Admiral Sims had warned, or it might be miles away, aiming at some entirely different section of the coast. Nor had the Fifth District, with its mine sweepers in readiness and its sub-chasers on patrol between the Virginia capes, any more information. When last reported, the enemy had been almost at the dividing line between the districts. He might turn either north or south. Unrelaxed vigilance was mandatory.

In the meantime, while the navy remained in the dark, the commander of the U-151 proceeded to deposit some of his supply of mines. Veering southward on the afternoon of May 21, he continued down the coast to Currituck Sound, on the lower shore of Virginia, and distributed several of the engines of destruction in the vicinity of False Cape. Proceeding northward, more mines were laid

[3] Manuscript narrative, Ensign Karl F. Knipe, U.S.N.R.F.

off capes Henry and Charles [4] and, finally, on May 25, the campaign off the coast was inaugurated.

The inoffensive American three-masted schooner *Hattie Dunn*, Captain Charles E. Holbrook, was the first victim of the enemy. The *Hattie Dunn*, of 435 gross tons, two days out of New York and bound for Charleston, South Carolina, in ballast, was about thirty miles from shore and midway between Winter Quarter Lightship and Cape Charles when a shell was fired at it from what the captain had taken to be a distant American sub-chaser. The explosion of the missile in the sea near his small craft did not shake his belief that it was target practise by naval reservists. It was not until a second shot burst a quarter mile astern and a third one struck just off the weather quarter that he realized something was amiss. The schooner was brought into the wind and by this time the crew could see that their strange visitor was a submarine. When a little nearer the submersible broke out two code letters — "A.B." (stop immediately) — and also released from a stern staff the flag of the German Navy, a black cross on a field of white. The U-151 ran up to within two hundred yards of the schooner and swung broadside, with the decks almost awash, while a small boat, manned by an officer and three seamen, put off from the side. The sea was smooth and the small boat soon made fast to the schooner. The officer came over the side and questioned Captain Holbrook closely in English. He was evidently disappointed to learn that the *Hattie Dunn* carried nothing more valuable than ballast and instructed the American skipper and his men to abandon the vessel within ten minutes. There was not even time to save their personal belongings. The schooner's crew, eight all told, launched the longboat and

[4] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 123.

one of the Germans entered it with them and ordered them to row to the submarine. By this time the remaining Germans had placed bombs against the amidship bulwarks both to starboard and port. Time fuses were lighted and the boarding officer and his men at once forsook the schooner, overtaking the American crew about midway to the U-boat. A minute later both bombs exploded simultaneously and the *Hattie Dunn,* staggering under the shock, listed far over to port, with its hull shattered, the masts down and fragments of spars and cordage littering the sea in the vicinity. The schooner appeared to be in a sinking condition when the captive crew was marshaled on the deck of the submarine and hurried below. The German commander, using excellent English, apologized to Captain Holbrook for the haste, but pointed to a schooner some distance to the northward as his excuse.

About five minutes later the U-151 sent a shell from one of its 6-inch guns screaming into the sea near the American schooner *Hauppauge,* a graceful steel vessel of 1,446 gross tons, en route from Portland, Maine, to Newport News. Captain John Sweeney of the *Hauppauge* was making an attempt to escape. He had heard the shots which marked the stopping of the *Hattie Dunn* and at 10.15 A.M. had sighted the enemy five miles to the westward. The schooner, disregarding the warning shot, continued to run away, making about five knots northwestward. The U-boat opened determined fire, the first shell passing through the ship's side about five feet above the water and the second dropping into the wake seventy-five feet astern. After that the *Hauppauge* stopped and the U-151 ran up within a hundred feet while an officer on board called out, "Leave your ship immediately." The eleven men, comprising the crew of the schooner, launched

a boat. They were ordered to come alongside the submarine and were taken on board. Captain Sweeney described what happened as follows:

The commanding officer asked me for the ship's papers, and when I told him they were on the ship he replied; "Well, we have to have the papers." Then they took me back to the schooner for the papers; they also took three bombs with them which they placed aboard the Hauppauge. We had just returned to the submarine when the bombs exploded and the Hauppauge sank at 11.30 A.M.[5]

The final victim of May 25 was the three-masted schooner *Edna*, a vessel of 325 gross tons, which had sailed from Philadelphia several days before, bound for Santiago, Cuba, with a cargo of oil. At one-thirty o'clock in the afternoon the *Edna* was about fifteen miles south of Winter Quarter Lightship, bowling along easily in a good breeze, when the U-151, moving eastward from its earlier "kills", sent three shots across its track. The peremptory command brought the schooner to a stop, but not before one of the crew had mistaken the German flag for the St. George's cross of England. The inevitable boarding party put out from the submarine and, midway to the schooner, the officer in the boat cupped his hands and commanded, "Put your ladder down. Throw us a line. We are coming on board." Enoch Roker, a member of the crew of the *Edna*, described the subsequent few minutes as follows:

We lost no time in obeying and the whole boatload of Germans came tumbling on board. The first thing the lieutenant did was to bawl out; "Lower that flag", pointing to an American ensign which was fluttering aloft. None

[5] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 27.

of us made a move so a German seaman was sent to haul it down. The young German officer seemed to be peeved. He turned to the captain and exclaimed; "You people don't seem to be very active. This is what you Americans need — something to stir you up a little bit. You need more U-boats on your coast.[6]

The German officer informed Captain Charles N. Gilmore, skipper of the *Edna*, that he had ten minutes in which to abandon ship, and then, as the latter was directing his men how to get their boat clear, told him to come below. Imparting his experience afterwards, Captain Gilmore said:

I suppose I acted as if I was in a hurry to get away from the ship, for when he got below the Lieutenant said, "Don't get excited, Captain. Take your time. We'll be around here an hour and a half." So I picked up everything I could think of that belonged to me, and when I got over to the submarine I found I'd left my new silk umbrella. After they blew up the schooner the Germans rowed back to the submarine and I found that besides the few things they had picked up for themselves they brought me my umbrella. They took but a few cases of oil.[7]

As in the case of the crews of the *Hattie Dunn* and the *Hauppauge*, the skipper and five men of the *Edna* were ordered into the U-151. The addition of the last half dozen made a total of twenty-six men held captive on the submarine, which, when considering the cramped interior of a submersible, made crowded quarters for both crew and prisoners. The German commander had taken all of this into consideration as his subsequent report shows:

[6] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, June 4, 1918.
[7] New York *Herald*, June 4, 1918.



*Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.*

*A fragment of the mine which damaged the U. S. Battleship* Minnesota



*Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.*

*Time fuse found on the schooner* Edna *and which confirmed the presence of submarines*

I went about my task and forthwith despatched three sailing vessels, from which I was able to disengage myself, as they were not equipped with wireless. I took the crews on board. The negroes were huddled together, the Europeans were put in another compartment. The captains were entertained in the officers' mess room. We experienced a merry reunion in the case of two of the captains. The captains described the attitude prevalent in the United States and were of the opinion that people were everywhere opposed to the war and that every one was shouting against it; that it was, merely, begun in the interests of the money magnates; that the press, however, was agitating strongly for it. The extermination of all that was German in language, etc. is being brought about there. All strikes, no matter where they occur, are being attributed to German intrigue. Thereupon, inquiries are being made to find out if the guilty party in any way be of German descent. In case such a one has been found guilty, he has often been assaulted and beaten to death by the mob. The appearance of the U-boat before their very coast will hardly tend to improve the morale of the Americans.[8]

This illuminating disclosure of the American attitude was presented to the German people in the Cologne *Volks Zeitung*, of July 31, 1918, after the U-151 had returned to its base. Long before that, however, the captives from the three schooners had been released and had given somewhat different versions of their experiences. The three captains were permitted the liberty of the entire ship except when the U-boat submerged, at which time they were compelled to remain in whatever compartment they happened to be. They used their eyes to good advantage with the result that later they were able to give the navy

[8] New York *Times*, September 14, 1918.

a complete description of the hostile craft. They found the submarine to be two hundred thirteen feet in length, twenty-nine feet in breadth, with a surface draught of fourteen feet and a displacement on the surface of seventeen hundred tons, and submerged, of twenty-one hundred tons. It had thirteen hundred horse-power engines, with a surface speed of eleven and one half knots and a speed submerged of eight knots. Its fuel storage capacity was two hundred fifty tons, sufficient to carry it seventeen thousand miles at a surface speed of six knots. The armament consisted of two 6-inch guns, two 22-pounders, one machine gun, six torpedo tubes, four in the bow and two in the stern, twelve torpedoes, four hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, and an equipment to carry and lay forty mines. The captives also were able to describe a strange device on the deck, which was later identified as a cable cutter. The complement consisted of eight officers and sixty-five men. The commander, who was known to the prisoner as "Captain Neustidt", said he had served five years as a gunner's mate in the American Navy, a statement which the Navy Department, after a consultation of personnel records, subsequently denied. He also professed reluctance to sink American vessels, but said he had no alternative as he "had been ordered by wireless from Kiel to get busy or come home." The engineering officer also claimed acquaintanceship with America, stating he had been an engineer on the passenger steamship *George Washington*, of the North German Lloyd Line, plying between Bremen and New York before the war. During the period of captivity on the U-151, the American captains and their men were given the same food as their captors. The provisions consisted mainly of black bread, poor coffee, stewed fruit and potato soup. How the

crews of the schooners were treated is best described by Enoch Roker, of the *Edna:*

During the long days and nights the Germans would amuse themselves by playing the phonograph. They played all sorts of patriotic airs, including those of the United States. I remember " My Country 'Tis of Thee " got on the nerves of one officer when it was reached in a medley and he jerked the record from the machine. The German sailors made themselves agreeable to us. They would teach us German in the evening and we would try to teach them English. When the weather was clear and there were no boats in sight we would go out on deck. But the moment a smudge showed on the horizon a young oiler's helper they called " Younger " (and could not have been more than thirteen years old) would come up and order us below. On the morning of our release the chief engineer told us to get ready to go home. Some of the sailors were very warm in their good-byes. Two or three insisted on giving us their photographs of the U-151. We had been able to get the identity of the craft from the numbers stamped on the bunks. The engineer would not permit us to carry these pictures, though.[9]

Several of the Americans, notably M. H. Saunders, mate of the *Hauppauge*, made an effort to trace the movements of their floating prison during the period of captivity. According to Saunders, the U-151 moved eastward on the surface after taking on board the crew of the *Edna*, proceeding at a rate of seven or eight knots an hour until 4.30 P.M., when, a steamer being sighted, the U-boat submerged. It remained beneath the surface for an hour and one half, traveling at four knots, then emerged and proceeded as before. During the night it submerged several times and, on the morning of May 26, being allowed on

[9] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, June 4, 1918.

deck, Saunders observed the position of the sun and decided that the U-151 was returning westward. At 11 A.M. the U-151 submerged to permit a vessel, which members of the crew said was a Norwegian steamer, to pass. During the balance of the day and night the prisoners lost track of direction. On May 27 the returning to the surface and submerging continued and in the afternoon the air became chilly and there was a smell of the fish fields around them. Saunders ventured the opinion they were near Nantucket and a sub-lieutenant named Kohler replied, " You ain't far from there." On May 28 the fog was heavy and the U-boat remained on the surface, frequently sounding its foghorn. The next day the submarine submerged in the afternoon to let another Norwegian steamer go by and on May 31 a steamer passed so near that the captives could hear the vibration of the propellers. No attacks were made on any ships during this period, nor did the U-151 molest any vessels on June 1, although several were sighted during the evening.

Nevertheless the U-151 was extremely busy during this period. It ventured in to within a short distance of the mouth of the Delaware on May 26 and planted mines near capes May and Henlopen. Then it detoured to sea and continued northward, placing more of the floating missiles near Ambrose Channel at the entrance to New York Harbor, and finally swinging downward again until on May 28, when sixty miles southeast of Sandy Hook, it began cutting cables. The first of these severed was one belonging to the Commercial Cable Company, and which connected New York and Canso, Nova Scotia. It was snapped at 12.35 P.M. that day, being severed at a depth of twenty-five fathoms. Captain Holbrook related afterwards how the submarine had given a sudden lurch and

listed on beam end on that particular day and attributed the maneuver to the effort to work the cable cutter. About three hours later, 3.30 P.M. to be exact, the U-boat performed the same feat on the Central and South American Cable Company's New York-Colon cable at a point twenty-eight miles south of the spot where the first cable had been cut. The second operation was not so well done as the first, but the damage inflicted was sufficient to make the wire fail in six hours.

## CHAPTER III

# A WEEK OF SUSPENSE

ALTHOUGH able to " disengage " himself because none of the schooners were equipped with wireless, the commander of the U-151 was not successful in hiding all signs of his handiwork. Wood-hulled schooners are usually buoyant and the pair bombed on May 25 were no exception to the rule. Each floated badly wrecked and serving as ominous warning. Likewise, undamaged water-tight compartments in the steel-hulled *Hauppauge* kept it afloat. About two hours after the *Edna* had been boarded and some twenty miles south of that spot, the Clyde Line passenger steamer *Mohawk*, northward bound from Jacksonville, Florida, steamed into 37° 24′ N., 75° 05′ W., and came upon a three-masted schooner, half submerged, with its bow down and the stern shooting upright out of the water. Four small fishing craft, either out of the Delaware or Chesapeake bays, were standing close by the derelict, apparently examining it, so the coastwise passenger ship proceeded on its way without inquiry. The wreck was what was left of the *Hattie Dunn*. Half an hour later and less than ten miles farther north, in 37° 27′ N., 75° 09′ W., the *Mohawk* sighted a second derelict. It was a large four-

masted schooner, floating with the starboard side up, and toward the bow there was a jagged hole more than four feet square and well below the water line. The steamer ran in close and made a hasty inspection. There was no way for those on board to identify it as the *Hauppauge*, yet such it was. Captain Edmund Kemball, of the *Mohawk*, decided it was useless to attempt to salvage the hulk and resumed his northward trip. Another half hour and a third schooner was met in 37° 30′ N., 74° 52′ W. It had mainsail and spanker set but was listing badly with the deck awash. As the vessel was still upright, an effort at salvaging was decided upon. P. W. Wilson, second officer of the *Mohawk*, volunteered to board the derelict, taking with him a watchman, a boatswain and two seamen. Upon reaching the wreck he discovered it to be the *Edna*. A tow line was bent to the bits on the forecastle deck and two hawsers were passed to the *Mohawk*. By this means the schooner was towed to the vicinity of Five Fathom Bank Lightship, off the mouth of the Delaware, when the towing bit gave way. The *Mohawk*, thereupon, abandoned further salvaging efforts and turned the derelict over to the tug *Arabian*, inbound. Unknown to the latter, the U-151 happened upon the scene shortly afterwards. Captain Gilmore, of the *Hattie Dunn*, told of this incident when released, saying the German commander had called him to the periscope, where the tug's efforts could be seen, with the remark, "That fellow doesn't know I am so close to him." The submarine made no effort to interfere and did not long remain in the vicinity. The *Arabian* succeeded in towing the *Edna* into the Delaware Bay and up the river to the mud flats off William Street pier, Port Richmond, where it was beached. An examination, conducted May 28, showed two holes in the vessel's hold just above the turn

of the bilge, evidencing an external explosion, and a time fuse whose end had been shattered.[1] There was every indication that the schooner had been abandoned in a hurry. Six life preservers and a small skiff, lashed to the deck, had been left behind.

The discovery of the three derelicts and the effort to salvage the *Edna* had been related by the officers and crew of the *Mohawk* upon their arrival in New York late in the afternoon of May 26. The story, with all of the mysterious elements well embellished, found its way into the newspapers of the country on the morning of May 27. Accompanying many accounts were conjectures as to the cause, the U-boat theory predominating. Attention was called to the similarity in damage wrought upon each vessel, to the disappearance of each crew, and to the indications that the schooners had been abandoned hurriedly. Likewise, the story of the attack upon the *Cheyenne* was recalled, and, opportunely, members of the crew of the *Crenella*, which had reached New York on May 22, were interviewed and told of their encounter with the U-boat. It was at this point that the Navy Department censorship laid itself open to attack. It had withheld all news regarding the *Nyanza*, *Johancy* and *Crenella* and now that the latter vessel's encounter became public property, it resorted to the following:

Washington, May 27. — Navy Department officials said tonight there was nothing to indicate the presence of enemy submarines on this side of the Atlantic. They thought the British craft which reported firing at a submarine 150 miles off the Virginia Capes, probably had sighted a bit of wreckage or some other floating object.[2]

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 24.

[2] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, May 27, 1918.

An Atlantic Port, May 28. — One of the several derelicts, the presence of which off the Virginia Capes gave rise to rumors that German submarines or raiders had been operating along the coast recently, was the wreck of a coastal schooner which crashed into another off Winterquarter Shoals, Delaware, last week. This was learned today at the office of the commandant of this naval district, where it was announced that the wreck had been destroyed by coast guard cutters. The fate of the crew of the schooner and the extent of the damage to the other was not made known.[3]

These two despatches might have served to allay the general fears of submarine attacks had not the evidence continued to pile up. On May 30 a Brazilian steamship arrived in New York, bringing with it the first actual news of what the Navy Department had long known — the sighting of a U-boat off Bermuda on May 15. The passengers on the Brazilian ship, one hundred fifty in number, expressed great relief at reaching port in safety. They had been in dread since leaving the Barbadoes, on May 22, and told how, on the evening of May 25, the vessel had altered its course and made a wide detour, during the twelve hours of which a double watch of stokers was employed to keep up a sufficient head of steam for the high speed maintained. All passengers had heard of the presence of a submarine, and one, Sir Leslie Probyn, formerly Governor of the Barbadoes, gave the following statement:

I heard previous to leaving the Barbadoes that German submarines were reported in the mid-Atlantic and near the vicinity of the Bermuda Islands. The information was that a British steamship and an American vessel had sighted two submarines on May 16.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 29, 1918.

An entirely new possibility was advanced by several on board. They expressed the opinion that the U-boats, instead of coming to the eastern shores of the Atlantic to prey upon commerce, were acting as undersea transports for reservists who had managed to reach Mexico. The sinking of Allied shipping, they believed, would come secondary, and would be accomplished in an effort to "destroy without a trace."

In the meanwhile, behind the cloak of the censor, the navy was "standing by" for further developments. The first of these came on May 28 when, at 11.45 A.M., the Cape May radio station picked up a wireless call from the American steamship *Adelheid*, stating it had sighted a submarine in 36° 45′ N., 73° 38′ W.,[4] almost due east of the mouth of the Chesapeake. The call was relayed to the Fifth District at Norfolk. At practically the same time the official report was placed in the hands of the department at Washington by the intelligence section of the Fourth District, regarding the damage to the schooner *Edna*. If anything more convincing was needed that the submarine was still lurking offshore it came at 12.35 and 3.30 P.M. the same day when the two cables, one to Canso, Nova Scotia, and one to Colon, Panama, went "dead." Incidentally, the positions where the cables had been cut, found subsequently to be sixty miles southeast of Sandy Hook, proved that the *Adelheid*, about one hundred fifty miles farther south at the same time, must have sighted something else and not the U-151. As this was the only instance of cable-cutting by the enemy, it can be dismissed at this time. The New York-Canso line was repaired on June 25 and the New York-Colon line on July 4.

After May 28 came another brief period of silence.

[4] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 29.

Vessels in the coastal trade saw nothing suspicious to report, but the absence of news caused no relaxation in the navy's watchfulness. Then, on June 1, naval operations received a real thrill with the receipt of a wireless message announcing that three of the Atlantic fleet, the battleships *Ohio, New Hampshire* and *Louisiana,* had been subjected to a torpedo attack off the Virginia capes. The three battleships had assembled off Hampton Roads prior to their return to base after target practise. At 11.10 A.M. the *Ohio* sighted what appeared to be the wake of a torpedo about twelve hundred yards distant and also what seemed to be a periscope beyond it. An alarm was sounded and the three ships at once separated and scattered at high speed. The *Ohio* had been towing a target. This was cut adrift and the battleship's 6-inch torpedo battery went into action, firing twenty-one shots at the suspicious objects. On the *New Hampshire*, after the alarm, lookouts sighted a supposed periscope abeam and standing toward it between the *Louisiana* and *Ohio*. A few moments later the wake of a torpedo approaching from the northward and eastward and across the bow of the *Louisiana* was thought to be seen. It passed astern and the *New Hampshire* also opened fire. All three ships ran at high speed toward the west for a dozen miles and then zigzagged to port. Later two sub-chasers searched the vicinity but found nothing. It would have been possible for the U-151, by exceedingly rapid movements, to have been in the vicinity on that day, but the absence of confirmation from the prisoners on board the sumarine at that time leads to the conclusion that the fighting ships did not encounter the enemy. The accompanying gunfire would have been heard by the captives and the necessary high speed to reach the spot would have been noted.

When the U-151 finally emerged from its secrecy, it was with a suddenness not anticipated. Late in the afternoon of June 2 several coastal vessels, among them the Merchants and Miners passenger steamer *Grecian*, caught a vague and indefinite wireless message stating that the schooner *Isabel B. Wiley* had been sunk by a submarine. This message was sent about 5.30 P.M. by the Ward Line steamer *Mexico* and stated further that fifty men were adrift in small boats off Barnegat, New Jersey. The *Grecian* had shortly before passed through the Delaware capes, bound for Boston, and disregarded the warning. The ship continued northward until shortly after six o'clock in the evening, when a second message sent it scurrying to the protection of the shoal waters off the Jersey coast. The same message had been caught elsewhere, by the radio operator at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and by the great navy wireless station at Arlington. It read, "S.O.S. Steamship *Carolina* being gunned by German submarine." Brooklyn answered; other stations chimed in, each requesting the position. None came. After the first call there was complete silence. And the *Carolina*, a New York and Porto Rico liner, was known to have at least three hundred passengers on board. From New York to Norfolk the news was relayed by means of the Coast Guard telephone service. Each station on the coast was warned to be on the lookout for either submarines or survivors. Each district was instructed to hold its patrol vessels ready for instant service and night came with only one clue as to the spot where the U-151 was then operating. It was a wireless call from the American steamship *Bristol*, stating that it had rescued the crew of a schooner, the *Edward H. Cole*, whose vessel had been sunk by a submarine off the New Jersey coast in the afternoon.

# CHAPTER IV

## SUNDAY,

## JUNE 2, 1918

Its mines laid where they might be most effective, its cable-cutting activity apparently at an end, the U-151 had no further reason for concealment. Its next objects were to inflict as much damage as possible upon coastal shipping; to impede the transoceanic flow of troops, munitions and supplies; and to intimidate the United States by a telling demonstration of what the submarine could do. The U-boat, therefore, emerged from obscurity about 7:50 A.M. Sunday, June 2, and inaugurated its most successful day by an attack upon the American schooner *Isabel B. Wiley*. This three-master of seven hundred seventy-six tons was bowling along southward bound from Princess Bay to Newport News and, eventually, Montevideo. It was brought to by a 6-inch shell which struck the water not one hundred yards away. Captain Thomas G. Thomason immediately ordered the crew on deck and began to lower the motor boat, recognizing his assailant at once as a hostile submarine. Larger prey, however, was destined to fall first victim of the day to the U-151. Before the U-boat could send a boarding party to the schooner, the American

steamship *Winneconne*, carrying 1,819 tons of coal from Norfolk, Virginia, to Providence, Rhode Island, came into view. Captain Waldemar Knudsen, master of the *Winneconne*, was the man who, after the war, talked to the commander of the U-151 in Germany and identified him as Graf von Henchendorf. Long before that, he had given the naval authorities the following account of the sinking of his ship:

I came on the bridge at 7:30 A.M. Sunday and heard that the third mate and chief officer had seen a schooner and a dark object which they thought was an American patrol boat lying alongside the schooner. At 8.10 a shot was fired and we tried to make for shore. At 8.12 they fired again and a shell burst about 200 or 300 yards ahead; the *Winneconne* hove to in 39° 26′ N., 72° 50′ W. The submarine came closer ready for action and then launched a small boat. An officer and two men came on board and gave orders to leave the ship immediately, as they were going to sink her. I asked him how long they were going to give us, and he said he would give us one-half an hour. . . . We launched the two boats and the crew got in. The chief mate and I were still on board and were under the impression that we were to go aboard the schooner, but he told us to launch the small boat and go alongside the submarine which we did. He placed four bombs on our ship, one on the foredeck, one on the aft deck, one in No. 1 hatch and one in No. 3 hatch. . . . About fifteen minutes after we left the ship we heard three explosions and the ship sank about 9.12.[1]

The imprisoned seamen of the *Hattie Dunn*, *Hauppauge* and *Edna* were witnesses, from the submarine, of both attacks. Telling of it afterwards, they described one

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., pp. 31–32.

incident which made an impression upon them. The submarine was within hailing distance when the steamer began lowering its boats. In their excitement the sailors on the ship were unable to swing out the first boat. The commander of the U-151, who was standing beside the conning tower, roared out a reprimand in plain and vigorous English for not maintaining proper discipline. By this time the *Wiley's* motor launch, with its crew of eight, was over the side and rowing away from the schooner. It was ordered alongside the U-boat where it was joined presently by the three boats from the *Winneconne*, containing twenty-six men. After the steamer was destroyed, the boarding officer turned his attention to the *Wiley*, which had drifted some distance away, and looted it of enough provisions to stock the U-151 for six weeks. When bombs were finally exploded on the schooner, it went down in 39° 10′ N., 73° 07′ W.[2] The U-boat now proceeded to rid itself of the twenty-six prisoners, who had been held on board since May 25. Captain Sweeney, of the *Hauppauge*, with the mate of the *Hattie Dunn* and nine seamen from the *Hauppauge*, were placed in the motor launch with Captain Thomason and his seven men, making nineteen all told. Captains Gilmore and Holbrook, with the remaining thirteen seamen from the three schooners, were divided among the three boats from the *Winneconne*. Third Officer M. B. Brewer, of the *Winneconne*, declared afterwards that the U-151's commander had "treated us decently." A supply of black bread was placed in the three boats, the German officer remarking that the bread had been baked in April. Captains Sweeney and Holbrook each had in their possession receipts for their schooners signed by "v. Nostitz, Korvettenkapitan", and Captain Hol-

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., pp. 31–32.

brook carried a number of letters written by the second officer, Lieutenant Kohler, and members of the German crew. Leaving the crews of the five ships to make shift for themselves, the U-151 proceeded slightly northward and about noon, while fifty miles east by south of Barnegat, ran across the four-masted schooner *Jacob M. Haskell*. The *Haskell*, of 1,778 tons, was bound from Norfolk to Portland, Maine, with a cargo of coal. Mate George H. Gilliatt, telling of the occurrence afterwards, said:

The first we knew of the presence of the Germans was at noon Sunday when a shot was fired across our bow by the submarine. At first we could see nothing, but a few minutes later Captain William H. Davis sighted the undersea boat. An officer and several men came aboard of us and we were told to leave the schooner at once. While we were putting a few cans of water and some tins of biscuit in our powerboat the Germans placed bombs on our vessel.[3]

An interesting account of the experience was given by Gustav Nelson, a seaman of the *Haskell:*

The German naval lieutenant went about his work in a business-like way. He spoke perfect English and was so polite that he got on our nerves. He ordered the American flag hauled down and wrapped it up in the papers. When the cook remarked, "You'd better take the food we have aboard before you sink this boat," the lieutenant snapped back, "We don't want your food. We have enough of our own. We don't want your lives either. We want your ships. Now get away from here. You have three minutes before the ship goes down."[4]

The *Haskell's* crew of eleven rowed over to the submarine in obedience to orders and were held alongside

[3] Philadelphia *Inquirer*, June 5, 1918.

[4] Philadelphia *Evening Telegraph*, June 5, 1918.

until the schooner had been disposed of. The U-151, after the bombs had exploded, fired several shells into the shattered hulk and the ship sank in five minutes. The U-boat left the schooner's crew with a parting direction from a German officer, "Good luck. The New Jersey coast is just forty miles away. Better go there." After the small boat was out of sight, the submarine continued to loiter in the neighborhood. Shortly before 4 P.M. it was rewarded by the appearance of the American schooner *Edward H. Cole,* northward bound from Norfolk with coal, as had been the *Winneconne* and the *Haskell.* The description of the sinking of the *Edward H. Cole* was related by Robert Lathigee, the mate:

It was just about ten minutes to four and the watch below had been called to be ready to come on deck at eight bells, when I saw a submarine come to the surface half a mile away on the port bow. — A Finn, who was steering, asked me why the submarine was moving around our ship at high speed. We both believed it was an American craft with some Naval Reserve cadets on board who were trying to have fun with us sailors of the merchant marine. I thought that it would be a good idea to have a little fun with our skipper who had turned in for a nap in his cabin, and I yelled down the skylight, "Tumble up on deck lively, Cap. There's a big German submarine close astern, getting ready to attack us." Then I took the marine glasses and looked through them at the stern of the U-boat, where her ensign was flapping limply against the short flagstaff. For a moment or two I could not make out her nationality, and then a gust of wind came and blew the ensign straight so that I could see it was the German flag, and then I shouted in earnest to Captain Newcombe, "It's no joke this time. By gosh, she is a German submarine."

After making three circles to be certain, apparently, that

we did not carry a gun, the U-boat came up to the starboard quarter and a tall, fair-haired officer on deck by the conning tower shouted in good English, " What ship is that? " I replied that it was an American schooner and thought he could read the name, Edward H. Cole, on the stern. This did not please the officer who repeated the question in quiet, business-like tones and I then told him. The watch on deck began to get a little anxious by this time, as some of the Germans were swinging the forward gun around in a careless manner.

The next hail we got as Captain Newcombe joined me on deck was to heave to and they would send an officer on board. This time the U-boat was fifty yards away and we saw the tall officer get into a dinghey with three of his men, carrying something in their hands. As the boat got alongside I had the pilot ladder rigged on the starboard quarter by the gangway and the Germans came on board. The officer, who wore gold shoulder straps and gilt buttons, and was the only one of the crew who was clean-shaven, spoke courteously to Captain Newcombe and after listening to the statements as to the name, tonnage, cargo and ports of departure and destination, he made a brief inspection of the ship. Then he came to where we were standing and said, " Now, Captain, get your crew together and tell them that they have ten minutes to leave the ship." . . . About 4.10 o'clock we pulled away from the Edward H. Cole and rowed hard with the two oars in the boat to get away from the expected explosion. There was no water or food in the yawl and no compass. The Captain brought his sextant and barometer with him. We saw the Germans, acting under orders from their officer, take four bombs and attach them, two on each side of the schooner, and light the fuses. Five minutes after they pulled away the bombs exploded and the Edward H. Cole started to go down by the bows. As she was settling the German submarine fired one shell from the bow gun

which struck amidship and in sixteen minutes the schooner had disappeared.[5]

The schooner's crew, as they rowed off, saw the submarine start after a small steamer and from a distance viewed the destruction of the latter. This was the fifth victim of the day, the small Shipping Board freighter *Texel*, which was taking a cargo of sugar from Ponce, Porto Rico, to New York. The *Texel* was overtaken, at 4.21 P.M., in 38° 58′ N., 73° 13′ W., after a brief chase. The first and second projectiles missed the steamer, but the third struck amidships, damaging the engine room and bridge. This third shot tore away a whole section of the pilot house five feet from where Patrick Huston, a seaman, held the wheel. He was showered with splinters but pluckily stood to his task until ordered by the commander to abandon the exposed post. Captain Kenneth B. Lowry, of the *Texel*, had a narrow escape as well. A hammock on the starboard deck he had forsaken upon the sound of the first shot was cut by the projectile which plunged into a lifeboat, dropped into the engine room and exploded. The U-151, its guns trained, ran in closer to the *Texel* and an officer on the forward deck called to the American ship to "heave to." Five minutes later a boarding party mounted the side of the steamer and the colloquy that ensued was repeated later by Captain Lowry:

I had piped all hands to quarters and I was certainly proud of the way the men responded. There wasn't a trace of fear or confusion. The German officer came right up to the bridge and extended his hand. It was certainly a funny way to capture a boat, but he looked friendly and I shook hands with him. But I was in for more shocks yet, when he said in excellent English, "I'm sorry I have to

[5] New York *Times*, June 4, 1918.

do this, Captain, but this is war, you know. Get your men off as quickly as possible. We are going to sink your ship." I gave orders to go ahead and clear the boat and meanwhile the German officer looked on and occasionally entered into conversation with me. He seemed to be apologizing for capturing me and I got the impression that he was ashamed that he had gotten only a little freighter instead of a transport.[6]

Valuable papers on the *Texel* were kept from the enemy by the presence of mind of the captain who dropped them overboard before the boarding party had arrived. Just before the last of the two boats put away from the side, Paddy Brannan, one of the seamen, remembered the ship's mascot, "Micky", a maltese cat which had been born on board and which boasted the distinction of seven toes on each of its forepaws. Micky was too important to leave behind, so, with the consent of the German officer, Brannan went back on board and retrieved the cat. In shoving away from the freighter at 5.10 P.M., Captain Lowry's boat narrowly missed stoving itself against the side of the U-151 and the German commander angrily ordered the American seamen to keep off. In the meanwhile, the boarding party had placed time bombs on the *Texel*, three at the base of each mast and others in the fire and engine rooms. They began to explode at 5.18 P.M. and the freighter sank in three minutes.[7] Unknown to himself and unknown to the public, the commander of the U-151, in destroying the *Texel*, had inflicted, even above a monetary loss of two million dollars, the most effective blow of the entire raid. The ship, after discharging its cargo at New York, was to be sent to Philadelphia to take on board

[6] Philadelphia *Evening Ledger*, June 3, 1918.

[7] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 35.

the first of the big railroad guns built at the Baldwin Locomotive Works for the navy, and intended for use on the French front. Because of the loss of the *Texel*, it was necessary to seek another ship, with the result that the weapons remained idle at the Philadelphia Navy Yard until June 29 when the steamship *Newport News* was secured finally to convey them overseas.[8]

The New York and Porto Rico liner *Carolina*, of 5,093 gross tons, carrying 217 passengers and 113 in the crew, the final victim of June 2, steamed into the path of the U-151 about forty minutes after the *Texel* had been sent to the bottom. No indication of the presence of a submarine had been found for three days after leaving San Juan, Porto Rico, on May 29, and it was not until five fifty-five o'clock in the afternoon of June 2, at a point about sixty miles due east from Cape May, New Jersey, that the vessel received a warning of any nature. At that hour H. W. Werner, the assistant wireless operator, caught a call from an unknown station stating that the *Isabel B. Wiley* had been sunk by a submarine during the day. The message gave the approximate position, which was only thirteen miles from the point reached at that time by the steamer.[9] Werner summoned the chief operator, E. W. Vogel, who, in turn, sent for Captain T. R. D. Barbour. "You'd better make headway," Vogel advised. "The 'sub' must be almost on top of us." Instantly the *Carolina's* course was changed. The ship veered more toward sea and began to zigzag. Lookouts were instructed to keep a sharp watch and to notify the bridge upon sight of the first suspicious object. The whole ship's personnel was at a tension, but the alarm had not yet spread to the

[8] "Navy Ordnance in the World War", p. 189.

[9] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 37.

passengers, most of whom, both first and second class, were below at supper. The suspense continued for five minutes while officers and men searched the sea with eyes that pictured a periscope in every whitecap. Strangely enough, it was a woman passenger, Mrs. Clarence S. Westbrook, of New York, who first saw the U-boat. She was sitting on deck, knowing nothing of the danger, when she spied a low hull on the surface of the sea. She spoke to a lady near her, saying, " There comes a submarine." Telling of the incident later, she said the sight had caused her no alarm as she thought it an American vessel. A warning cry from a lookout forward located the U-151 less than two miles away on the starboard quarter. A minute later a 6-inch shot was sent astern of the steamer. Vogel, the wireless operator, who had gone to supper after the receipt of the call regarding the schooner *Isabel B. Wiley,* heard the shot but noted that it escaped the ears of most of the passengers in the dining room. He slipped quietly to the wireless house and sent the relief operator to the bridge to get the position. What followed, as told by Vogel and corroborated by the commander of the U-151, forms an interesting story. Said the wireless man:

The relief operator returned shortly saying someone else was figuring out where we were and meanwhile I was " setting up " and forthwith shot out our first S.O.S., " S.O.S. Steamship Carolina being gunned by German submarine." I sent out a couple of times. Then I set my instrument for receiving. Within two minutes Cape May had picked us up and queried for our location. But just then the German operator butted in and said, " You dont wireless — we dont shoot." I could tell by the faintness of the vibrations that the Hun sender was geared to be heard not over a half mile away. On orders then from my

captain I replied that we were laying to. But I followed that by repeating the S.O.S. call. When I repeated the call for help the Huns sent over another shell, which whizzed some distance over our top. A third shot went to the rear and a fourth and last fell short. It seemed as though it was designed to. By this time everyone had rushed from the dining room and was trying to find shelter behind the deckhouse or below. I listened in again and caught repeated calls from Cape May and one from Brooklyn Navy Yard asking where we were. I hadn't our bearings from above yet, but knew approximately where we were. Just when I was rigging up to give this, Captain Barbour ordered, "No." [10]

Why the commander of the *Carolina* stopped the wireless can be understood readily. He had the exact position in his hand — 38° 57′ N., 73° 06′ W., — and it could have been broadcasted with ease. But he had also in his custody the lives of passengers and crew and he knew the futility of sending the message. There was slight chance that any naval craft could reach the spot before the U-boat's guns could sink the ship and German submarines had been known to shell unarmed passenger ships. He weighed the cost in lives against the probability of some war vessel being near and the risk was too great. That was why Brooklyn, Cape May and other stations queried in vain for the location of the attack.

After the fourth shot, an officer stepped on the deck of the U-151 and the "A.B." pennant was hoisted at the stern, ordering the abandonment of the ship. Unlike the previous encounters, the enemy made no effort to send a boarding party to the liner. The German seamen poured out on the low deck of the submarine and watched the

[10] New York *Times*, June 6, 1918.

launching of the lifeboats. There were ten of these, five on each side, one of those on the starboard being a motor launch. Only one incident of panic took place. A number of Porto Ricans from the engine room and stokehold had rushed on deck and attempted to leap into a boat already filled with women passengers. Christian Nelson, chief deck engineer, and a little group of seamen drove them back. In the meanwhile the passengers, seeing the U-boat intended no further shelling, recovered from their fears. All of them had been given positions in the lifeboats and had taken part in drills during the first few days at sea. As a result, the loading of the boats was carried on in an orderly manner. Women and children were placed first and then the men. Numbered among the latter were ten graduates of the Second Officers' Training Camp at San Juan, who, to avoid capture, exchanged their army drab for civilian clothing.[11] The precaution was well taken although Paymaster D. C. Crowell, U.S.N., and Captain Robert K. Wright, of the British Navy, wore their regulation white uniforms throughout and were not molested by the Germans.

The five boats on the port side were lowered into the water without mishap, but, on the starboard side, Boat Number 5 met with an accident which nearly proved fatal. One end was allowed to slip too rapidly through the davits and twenty-two passengers were thrown into the water. They managed to cling to the sides until it was righted and were then helped in. One of those thrown into the sea

[11] The ten Army officers were Lieutenants J. P. O'Toole, Clinton, Mass.; F. D. Carpenter, Maplewood, N. J.; R. J. Boyd, Syracuse, N. Y.; G. Goldsmith, Pittsburgh, Pa.; Bernard O. Weitz, New York City; M. Ortiz, New York City; G. Nagal, San Juan, P. R.; Leslie W. Arthur, Boston; William Redding, Meshanticut, R. I.; William M. Sides, Philadelphia — Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin,* June 5, 1918.



*The New York and Porto Rico liner* Carolina, *destroyed by the U–151*

*Photo by Public Ledger, Phila.*

*The crew who pulled life boat No. 5 of the liner* Carolina *into Atlantic City*

was Anita Cheney, nine-year-old daughter of Benjamin A. Cheney, of New York. Her father held her until rescued. Her presence of mind saved the boatload from another catastrophe a few minutes later when she discovered the boat plug was missing and water was gushing through the hole. She stopped the leak with a handkerchief until the plug was inserted. Captain Barbour and Vogel, the wireless operator, had been the last to leave the *Carolina.* They descended into a boat on the port side, Vogel first tearing up a naval code book and dropping other papers over the side in a silver water pitcher. Three of the boats on the starboard side had rounded the bow and joined the five to port, leaving the motor launch, known as Number 1, and the boat which had capsized behind them. The U-151 started to circle the stern of the liner at the same time and discovered a man dancing frantically on the after deck. A German officer shouted through a megaphone to the motor launch and at the same time the man leaped overboard. They pulled him into the launch and found he was one of the firemen. Seeing that a rescue had been effected, the U-151 continued on its course, approaching the eight boats to port. An officer hailed Captain Barbour with the question, " Is everybody off your ship? I'm going to shell her." Receiving an answer in the affirmative, he added, " Then pull for shore." Obediently the eight boats headed westward in single file, Number 6, containing the captain, in the lead.

Remaining yet on the starboard side were Boat Number 5, containing twenty-nine men and women, and the motor launch, with a complement of thirty-two. They had lost sight of the others. Lieutenant J. C. McClaren, chief engineer, in charge of Number 5, hailed the U-boat and asked what to do. Receiving no answer and seeing that no

harm was intended them, he finally started off in a westerly direction, trailing the motor launch. With the last boatload out of the way, the U-151 began to circle the *Carolina*. It was about dusk when the submarine opened fire. Three shells were hurled into the port side, one at the water-line, abreast the forward end of the houses, one amidships and one at the after end of the houses. All exploded inside the ship. The submarine then moved around to the starboard side and fired three more shells, the latter from a distance of fifteen hundred yards. After about twenty minutes the liner began to settle by the bow. It then turned over on the starboard side and gradually went down head first until it assumed a vertical position, leaving about one hundred feet of the stern straight in the air. It hung that way for ten minutes and then slowly disappeared. It was exactly 8.15 P.M. when the water closed over the spot. The *Carolina* had carried down with it a cargo of sugar and all the mail accumulated on the island of Porto Rico between May 25 and 28. This consisted of forty thousand letters, forty-two sacks of newspapers, fifty-four sacks of parcel post and three hundred seventy-six registered articles.[12] Paying no more attention to the ten boats, containing three hundred thirty-nine persons, the U-151 submerged. The commander of the raider, according to his own story, was under the belief, when he regained Germany, that two of the lifeboats had been capsized while being lowered, but that all the rest had escaped.

[12] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 11, 1918.

## CHAPTER V

# TWO EXCITING DAYS IN HISTORY

WITH the sinking of the *Carolina*, the U-151 had extracted a toll of 14,517 gross tons of American shipping in a single day. In addition, it had left behind it four hundred forty-eight persons adrift in eighteen lifeboats, all within an area about fifteen miles square. This figure includes the men from the three schooners attacked on May 25 and who were scattered among the boats of the *Winneconne* and the launch from the *Isabel B. Wiley*, as well as the crews of the vessels destroyed on June 2 before the passenger liner fell afoul of the submarine. Eleven of these, the crew of the *Edward H. Cole*, had heard the nine shots fired by the U-151 into the abandoned hull of the *Carolina*. Their small boat had been eight miles from the spot and they had no means of identifying the victim. Prior to that time they had sighted a steamer bearing down toward them and had attracted its attention by waving coats and hats. Around eight-thirty o'clock they found themselves on the steamship *Bristol*, bound from Boston to Norfolk, and a few minutes later saw a submarine in pursuit. Captain Walter Hart, of the *Bristol*, had expressed the utmost surprise

when the schooner's crew had told him of their experience. He had received no warning of German submarines off the coast. He lost no time in turning out of the dangerous neighborhood and the steamer was already headed northwest when the U-boat appeared off the starboard quarter some five thousand yards distant. At that time the *Bristol* was about thirty-eight miles southeast of Barnegat, New Jersey. The escape was described graphically by Captain Newcombe, of the *Edward H. Cole:*

For thirty minutes the submarine crossed and re-crossed our wake. Six of our men were sent below to help the day and night shift of nine men on the Bristol feed the furnaces, and the way we tore through the sea reminded me of the " nigger on the safety valve " in the old Mississippi days. The skipper said the Bristol could make only about eleven knots doing her best, but we got fourteen out of her, I believe, and the U-boat gave up the chase.[1]

Once clear of the pursuer, Captain Hart sent the wireless call telling of the rescue of the crew of the *Edward H. Cole* and continued northward along the coast. The vessel arrived in New York Harbor early in the morning of June 3, bringing to the Third Naval District the first authentic news of the activities of the U-151. The men from the schooner were interrogated and then released. They went at once to the headquarters of the United States Shipping Commissioner at the Barge Office, arriving before nine o'clock and encountering a sample of the skepticism with which the public heard of submarine raids. A Coast Guard sentry, pacing up and down before the office, told them they were too early, as the commissioner had not yet arrived. One of the seamen, Carl W. Toikka, remarked, " Well,

[1] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 4, 1918.

it's too bad. Me and my mates, we were torpedoed by a German submarine off Coney Island and we want our money." The sentry eyed him disbelievingly. "Is that so," he replied. "I suppose you were kept up most of the night." Even when the commissioner arrived it took a comparison of the men's signatures with the original names on the shipping articles to convince the auditors there was truth in their story. In the meanwhile, the maritime reporters of the New York dailies intercepted members of the *Edward H. Cole's* crew and gathered up the yarn. Within an hour every press wire in the country was humming to the account of the sinking of the schooner and the news was on the street in still damp "extras" of afternoon papers before the Navy Department made any statement. The accounts were but fragmentary; they coupled the loss of the *Edward H. Cole* with the mystery of the three schooners sighted on May 25 and pointed to the statements concerning firing heard subsequent to the attack as indicative that more ships had been sunk. Shortly before noon on that day, Monday, June 3, Secretary of the Navy Daniels issued the first admission by the department that a U-boat was operating off the coast. It was in the form of a statement which added two more vessels to the list of victims, and which read:

The Navy Department has been informed that three American schooners have been sunk off this coast by enemy submarines. The steamship Bristol, arriving at New York this morning, reported that the four-masted schooner Edward H. Cole was sunk by submarines at 6.30 P.M. Sunday, fifty miles southeast of Barnegat, N. J., and that the Bristol rescued the crew and brought them to port. It also rescued the crew of another sailing vessel which was sunk. The Bristol reported that she encountered a submarine

thirty-eight miles off Barnegat at 4 P.M. Sunday and that two submarines were operating in that locality.

The steamer Grecian reported that the schooner Jacob S. Haskell was sunk by gunfire by a German submarine in the same general locality at noon Sunday. The crew were rescued. It was also reported that the Isabel B. Wiley was shelled by submarines.

Captain Newcombe, of the Cole, stated that his vessel was attacked by a German submarine which boarded him, took away his papers and placed bombs on board. The captain and crew took to the boats. Captain Newcombe stated that the submarine which attacked him was about 200 feet long and carried two large guns, one forward and one aft, and a smaller gun amidships. He stated that he distinctly saw one other submarine besides the one which attacked him. The second submarine being in the near vicinity, submerged with her periscope showing.

The account, as given officially, was incorrect in a great many details, due probably to the haste with which it had to be prepared to meet the insistent demand for something authentic. Before the day had ended, Captain Hart, of the *Bristol*, stated that he had rescued only the crew of the *Edward H. Cole*. Likewise, Captain Newcombe said that he had seen only one submarine and that the report of two U-boats probably came from sleepy-eyed seamen who were called hurriedly to the deck at the time the enemy was circling the schooner. He also gave the time of the attack upon the *Bristol* as after dark and not at four o'clock in the afternoon. The official statement, brief as it was, removed the last vestige of doubt from the public mind and the nation literally held its breath, awaiting more dire word. It came the same afternoon when the Navy Department made the admission that the steamship *Carolina* had sent out a wireless appeal the preceding eve-

ning and that nothing had been heard from the vessel since. Before releasing this later and more serious information, the department had notified the New York and Porto Rico Line's main American office in New York. By afternoon hundreds of relatives and friends of the passengers on the *Carolina*, as well as those interested in the passengers on the *Brazos*, the companion vessel of the line which had sailed from New York for San Juan on Saturday, June 1, were besieging the steamship company for information. Scenes of a similar nature, but on a smaller scale, were enacted in the offices of the coastal passenger lines from Boston to Jacksonville. It became known that at least seven other large steamers, all with good-sized passenger lists, were at sea, if not in the vicinity of the known attacks, at least not far away. The Clyde Line offices at Jacksonville, Charleston and New York; the Merchants and Miners Transportation Company offices at Boston, Philadelphia, Savannah and Jacksonville, and the United Fruit Company's New York piers were thronged by anxious people. That part of Secretary Daniels' statement regarding the Merchants and Miners Philadelphia to Boston steamer *Grecian* allayed the worst fears regarding its fate, although the Boston and Philadelphia offices admitted they had heard nothing since the wireless call announcing the rescue of the crew of the *Jacob M. Haskell*. Three others of the same company's vessels, the *Dorchester* and *Cretan*, southbound, and the *Nantucket*, which had left Jacksonville on June 1 for Philadelphia, were as yet unheard from.

In the middle of that tense Monday afternoon, a widespread rumor was circulated that the Savannah Line steamship *City of Columbus* had been sunk. It had left Savannah on the afternoon of May 31, and, according to reckoning,

would, on June 2, have been in the vicinity where the *Edward H. Cole* was bombed. In the same manner, widespread fears were expressed for the safety of the Clyde liner *Huron,* northward bound from Jacksonville; the Clyde freighter *Mohican,* Norfolk to New York; the United Fruit Company's big liner *Sixaola,* West Indies to New York; the Mallory liner *Sabine,* Tampa to New York, and numerous other vessels including barges, tugs and coal carriers under control of the United States Railroad Administration, and fishing fleets from the New Jersey coast.

A garbled message, probably intended to add the schooner *Hauppauge* to the list of victims, was translated into the schooner *Samuel W. Hathaway,* with the result that both the *Hathaway* and *Hauppage* were thought to have been destroyed. The *Hattie Dunn* was also placed in the same category. While the center of submarine activities seemed to be the channel some sixty miles eastward of the south Jersey coast, early reports on June 3 insisted upon discovering a U-boat active further north. The loss of the *Isabel B. Wiley* was twisted into the *Ella M. Wiley* and a further unfounded report announced that it had been sunk by gunfire off Block Island. Chatham, Massachusetts, added to the swelling list of unfounded rumors with a despatch stating, " A report is current on the Cape that a ship has been torpedoed off Nantucket Shoals. No official confirmation of the report is obtainable." That same day a Norfolk despatch announced that five submarines were operating along the coast between Charleston and New York. It also quoted Rear Admiral Echteler, commanding the Norfolk Navy Yard, as receiving word that two submarines were sighted off the Virginia capes. The culminating sensation of the day was a despatch from

Lewes, Delaware, late in the afternoon, stating that a big tank steamer had been torpedoed a few miles off Cape Henlopen. This, at least, was partly true.

By this time the Navy Department had taken prompt steps to prevent shipping then in port from going to sea and falling afoul the enemy. Secretary Daniels ordered the ports of New York, Boston and Philadelphia closed to outgoing vessels, and the commandants of the various districts, using their own discretion, acted likewise regarding Norfolk and Narragansett Bay. New York remained closed for the entire day; Boston for one hour and Philadelphia for three hours. The department sent additional orders to the Coast Guard stations to be on the watch for further survivors, and, to reassure the guests at seashore resorts, notably Atlantic City, New Jersey, who were reported to be canceling reservations and departing in large numbers, the Committee on Public Information issued a statement from Secretary Daniels declaring that "The Navy Department is taking the necessary steps to safeguard shipping along the coast", and pointing out, unofficially, that shoal waters would prevent a submarine approaching within gunshot of the shore. At Washington, Chairman Padgett, of the House Naval Affairs Committee, called on Secretary Daniels, who assured him that the navy's defense plans were adequate and that it would be unnecessary to recall any ships from European waters.

The foregoing describes what the public learned, on June 3, from the newspapers. Behind the censorship, which had been lifted only twice in the course of the day, but which had been unable to function as thoroughly as might have been wished, the Navy Department threw all its efforts toward thwarting the enemy. The centers of activity were the four districts most affected; the Second, at New-

port, Rhode Island; the Third, at New York; the Fourth, at Philadelphia and the Fifth, at Norfolk. These four controlled the entire coast from the eastern extremity of Long Island to Cape Hatteras. The Chief of Naval Operations ordered them, on the morning of June 3, to inaugurate at once the convoying system as set forth in the circular letter dated May 4. The order read, "Assume control of coastwise shipping and handle traffic in accordance therewith." At the same time radio communication between merchant ships and owners was prohibited north of Jupiter, Florida. Before noon of that day a wireless message had been broadcasted from every high-power station to all Allied merchant vessels announcing the presence of the U-boat in the following words:

"Unmistakable evidence enemy submarine immediately off coast between Cape Hatteras and Block Island. Vessels not properly convoyed advised to make port until further directed."

A coastwise routing office was organized at Washington the same day and became a branch of naval operations.[2] The establishment of a coastal convoying system necessitated the employment of practically all the sub-chasers at that time available, so that "hunt squadrons", a navy plan as a U-boat antidote, could not be organized for work on June 3.

One destroyer, the U.S.S. *Preble*, based at New York, had put to sea with the first alarm, and, around noon, reported that it had encountered the U-boat in 39° 31′ N., 73° 31′ W., about twenty miles southeast of Barnegat.[3] Its wireless call was intercepted by the Cape May radio station and naval operations was notified. The destroyer

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 39.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

*Henley* was ordered to the *Preble's* assistance. Subsequently officers of the *Preble* expressed themselves as certain they had accounted for a submarine, but, as developments showed, the U-151 was far south of that point at the time of the supposed encounter. This affair reached the Third District and fragments of it slipped through the censorship with the result that New York despatches reported that "a rumor has reached the office of the Third Naval District here that a submarine operating off the coast has been captured by a United States warship. It is said that the U-boat is being towed to this port."

Just as the plan to organize "hunt squadrons" was not then practicable, because of an inadequate number of seaworthy patrol craft, so was the projected air patrol handicapped by an insufficient number of planes and trained aviators. If students were lacking in training, however, the instructors, American, French and Italian, were available, and these, with a few graduate ensigns, attempted aerial reconnaissances on the morning of June 3. Two hydro-airplanes that same afternoon discovered three small boats on the surface of the sea some distance off Beach Haven, New Jersey, but were unable to communicate with the occupants because of the noise of the motors. The aviators returned to the shore, landed at Beach Haven, and notified the Coast Guard station. The Third and Fourth districts were communicated with and patrol craft were despatched, but made a fruitless search. Another naval flyer, Ensign Allyn R. Jennings, dropped a bomb on what he took to be a U-boat about fifty miles off the New Jersey coast, but reported that he had missed his quarry. Farther north, Ensign Roleau and Mechanic Harrington, from the Nantucket flying field, were forced to alight on the sea in the course of a patrol and were rescued by the patrol

boat *Sadie* a few minutes before their machine sank, and Lieutenant Myers, from the Third District, was picked up thirty miles at sea in the same predicament by an inbound steamer.

Fifty miles off the Delaware Breakwater at ten o'clock that morning, the Atlantic Refining Company's oil tanker *Herbert L. Pratt* had received the navy's broadcasted wireless of the presence of submarines. Crowding on all steam, the tanker, laden with a cargo of crude oil taken aboard at Tuxpam, Mexico, headed for Philadelphia. At 2.35 P.M., when three miles off Cape Henlopen, something struck the forward plates near the bow with a terrific impact. The blow came from the shore side, throwing a deluge of water across the deck and hurling the crew from their feet. Captain H. B. Bennett ordered the navy wireless operators on board to call for help, and two minutes afterwards Cape May had caught "S.O.S. Pratt! S.O.S. Pratt! Torpedoed off Delaware Capes! S.O.S." Immediately afterwards the "abandon ship" order was issued and four boats were lowered. Three had pulled away from the ship when Captain Bennett, seeing no signs of a submarine and believing the tanker could be beached, recalled the men. He had also observed the harbor entrance patrol fleet hastening to his assistance. While the patrol boats — *Miramar*, S.P. 591; *Georgiana III*, S.P. 83; *Edorea*, S.P. 549 and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Morrell*[4] — circled the tanker, firing at any object that looked suspicious, the crew of the *Herbert L. Pratt* stoked determinedly and the vessel nosed toward shore. For fifteen minutes it made headway and then stopped. The crew had just time to get away for a second time when it sank. But the fifteen minutes had carried it over Hen and Chickens

[4] Manuscript narrative, Ensign Karl F. Knipe, U.S.N.R.F.

Shoal and, when it rested on the bottom, only the bow disappeared, the stern remaining high and dry above the surface. The commander of the patrol fleet questioned Captain Bennett after the ship had been abandoned and both were of the opinion that a mine had caused the damage. This view was subsequently corroborated by a naval board. Salvaging operations were begun that same day under the direction of Lieutenant Commander Walter N. Davis, U.S.N.[5] At 7.35 P.M. on June 4, the damaged tanker was towed behind the Delaware Breakwater and beached.[6] Long before that time, however, the story of the *Herbert L. Pratt* had been published in every daily newspaper in the United States. Incidentally, the perseverance of newspaper men from New York and Philadelphia, who had been sent to Cape May to "cover" the naval base, resulted in drastic action on the part of the Fourth Naval District, which, at eleven o'clock on the night of June 3, placed the seashore town under martial law and took over the control of the telephone system.

The final incident of what was the first of perhaps the two most hectic consecutive days in the course of the war, June 3 and 4, 1918, was the rescue of forty-one seamen from the *Hattie Dunn*, *Edna*, *Hauppauge* and *Winneconne*, who had been adrift in the latter's three boats since eleven o'clock in the morning of June 2. The *Isabel B. Wiley's* motor launch had left them on that afternoon to run ahead and get aid. It failed to reappear, so the boats started the long pull. The men rowed for hours during the hot sun of that afternoon, weathered a nasty thunder squall that night, and at daybreak, on June 3, were still hard at work. A naval airplane was observed overhead that after-

[5] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 262.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

noon — the same one which had returned to Beach Haven and reported three boats adrift. Late in the afternoon of June 3, the inbound American steamer *San Saba* sighted the boats and took the men on board, landing them at the Battery, New York, shortly before midnight to add their stories to those already related by the men from the *Edward H. Cole.*

Shortly after midnight on the morning of June 4, two lifeboats, containing thirty-six exhausted men from the freighter *Texel,* emerged out of the darkness off the foot of Vermont Avenue, Atlantic City, and brought with them the first news that their ship had been a victim of the submarine. They had rowed for thirty-two hours, from sixty miles at sea, and were in a physical condition permitting of little questioning until they had been fed and rested. The meager details in the morning newspapers heightened the alarm regarding the *Carolina,* and all other vessels still unaccounted for. When, later in the morning, the *Texel's* crew told of their experiences, they could add nothing more than the account of their own ship's loss. After the sinking of the freighter the two boats, one under Captain Lowry and the other under the first mate, had stuck together and started the long pull shoreward. Captain Lowry, refreshed by a night's sleep, told the story of the sixty-mile row:

We all knew just where we were after we started, so we naturally headed for Atlantic City. We figured it the best place to come. We had compasses and rations and our men, who knew how to handle the oars, were as bright and chipper as if they were on a picnic. We rowed all through the night and during the day it was mighty hot. It got so bad that I decided we would work in relays and while one crew rowed the others slept or took it easy. I

thank God we got here all right with nobody lost, not even Micky, the ship's kitten. You can't imagine what it means when you are drifting alone on the ocean to see a long line that to you means just one thing — land. You just want to get up and sing out to everybody and I'm pretty sure that some of my boys cried when they saw Atlantic City. I did not try to keep back a few tears of my own.[7]

The addition of the *Texel* to the list of known victims placed the total at eight with the *Carolina's* fate still in doubt. These figures included two freight steamers, the *Winneconne* and the *Texel*, and six schooners, the *Hattie Dunn*, *Hauppauge*, *Edna*, *Isabel B. Wiley*, *Jacob M. Haskell* and *Edward H. Cole*. It had been discovered that the schooner *Samuel W. Hathaway* was not a victim. Reassuring news was received almost hourly during the morning of June 4 regarding passenger vessels feared for the previous day. The *City of Columbus* put into Vineyard Haven, Captain J. H. Diehl relating how he had intercepted the *Carolina's* wireless call and had fled northward without lights, officers and men keeping news of the danger from the sixty passengers. The *Grecian*, with the eleven men from the *Jacob M. Haskell*, arrived at Boston at about the same time, describing how the crew of the schooner had been found adrift in their small boat Monday morning and taken on board. From Norfolk came word that the Mallory liner *Sabine* and the Merchants and Miners passenger ship *Nantucket* had entered the Virginia capes, the former reporting that it had encountered a submarine between Charleston and Frying Pan Shoals Lightship but had outdistanced it. Two Clyde liners, the *Huron*, with ninety passengers, and

[7] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 41.

the *Mohican*, with freight, and the *Ontario*, of the Merchants and Miners fleet, with sixty passengers, were reported safely within the Delaware capes, and two other vessels, the *Dorchester*, another Merchants and Miners boat, and the *Governor Cobb*, a United States Shipping Board training vessel with two hundred apprentice seamen on board, reached havens in Atlantic ports. Likewise, before the morning was ended, the United States Railroad Administration announced that the one hundred eleven vessels of its coastwise fleet were safe. This left unaccounted for, in addition to the *Carolina*, the *Brazos*, of the New York and Porto Rico Line; the *Sixaola*, of the United Fruit Company, and the *Cretan*, of the Merchants and Miners Line. Then, at noon, came the first word regarding the *Carolina* since the wireless appeal of Sunday night. It was a despatch from New York which read:

> A boat from the New York and Porto Rico liner Carolina, containing nineteen survivors, including two women, has landed at Lewes, Del. The message containing the foregoing was received by the New York and Porto Rico line today from the coast guard service.[8]

The same despatch told also of one of the lifeboats from the *Carolina* being picked up at sea, empty and showing unmistakable signs of having been shelled. The find had been made by the Danish schooner *Bryssel* at a point about sixty miles off Cape May at four o'clock on Monday afternoon. The boat, a motor launch, had been riddled. An air-tight tank was dented in two places, there was a break in the metal sheeting protecting the motor and one of the oars was splintered. This report aroused the gravest fears for the balance of the passengers, and

[8] Philadelphia *Evening Telegraph*, June 4, 1918.

the stories of the nineteen survivors at Lewes were awaited with eagerness. The earliest accounts hinted at a tragedy. All reports agreed that many of the original occupants of the boat had been drowned. The narrative of what happened came from Christian Nelson, chief deck engineer, who had left the *Carolina* in Boat Number 5, the one which had capsized upon being launched:

It was getting dark and a storm was brewing. We were in Boat No. 5 and we rowed up to Boat No. 1, which was motor driven, but the twenty-four persons in it were unable to start the engine.[9] I climbed aboard with my assistant and we finally started the engine and took No. 5 in tow. In this way we headed for shore in face of a heavy gale and with terrific thunder and lightning breaking upon us. The hawser to the other boat broke and we went back and picked her up. It broke again and we repeated the performance. The rope broke for a third time. We went back but could find no trace of the boat. All this time the storm was growing worse and finally our motor boat overturned. All were thrown into the water. One man grabbed for my neck but I managed to dodge him in order to give my assistance to a woman and he only grabbed my cap, then disappeared beneath the surface. Another man who was fast losing his strength as we clung to the keel finally let go and slipped into the water, stretching out his hand to me and said, " Bye, bye, mate! Here goes nothing."

After a great effort I righted the boat and then climbed aboard. Then, over the side came a young Porto Rico girl. Never in my life had I seen a woman take a man's place as she did. Neither of us could make the other understand

[9] The figure " twenty-four " is incorrect. There were thirty persons in the boat before Nelson and his assistant boarded it. This is shown by the official list of the lost, totalling thirteen, and the number saved by the Appleby, nineteen, or thirty-two in all.

but she knew what to do without being told.[10] The boat was half-filled with water and we bailed it out, working until nearly daybreak. Then we started to pick up those floating in the water. Some had lost their lifebelts and were clinging to the boat. We found, however, only nineteen. We were then adrift in a water-logged boat in which the engine would not work. We hung a shirt on a pole and a British tramp picked us up and brought us here.[11]

The " British tramp " was the freighter *Appleby*, which came upon the drifting craft, at one o'clock in the afternoon of June 3, and took the nineteen survivors on board. The captain of the *Appleby* then sent a seaman down the ladder with instructions to sink the motor launch. This man fired five or six shots into the launch and it was left floating astern to be picked up three hours later by the *Bryssel* and taken into New York, where it aroused the fears previously described. The *Appleby* ran in toward the Delaware and placed the survivors on a pilot boat which took them ashore. Not until several days later was it established finally that thirteen persons had been drowned from the boat. Eight were passengers. Those lost, the first victims of the submarine raids, were:

Passengers: C. B. Parker, Frederick Atkinson, G. V. Carpenter, Miss Providencia L. Cueto, Felix Delia, Domingo Pirasa, Dr. Rafel Virella and Domingo Gonzales.

Crew: George G. N. Mussenden, purser; Miss Margaret E. McHarvey, stewardess; G. Johansen, assistant engineer; Carlos Munoz, messman, and Alejandro Cordero, waiter.[12]

[10] The Porto Rico girl was Miss Edith Donato Virolo, of San Juan.

[11] Philadelphia *Evening Ledger*, June 6, 1918.

[12] Schedule A, Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

Two hours after the landing of the nineteen at Lewes had been announced, Boat Number 5, last heard of when the hawser holding it to the motor launch had parted in the storm of Sunday night, came riding into sight at Atlantic City. A vivid scene marked the rescue of the twenty-nine men and women in the boat. A parade of Knights of the Mystic Shrine, a band at the head, was passing along the boardwalk at the time and hundreds of bathers were romping in the breakers. No one had seen the boat until it was in line with the ends of the long piers, a white flag of distress whipping in its bow. The discovery was electrifying and the incident was described at the time as follows:

The band that had been playing "Where do we go from here," swung, as if on signal, into The Star Spangled Banner; halted in its tracks and faced the sea. Pleasure-seeking hundreds on the Boardwalk stopped, looked, caught the significance of the strains of music filling the air, then started with a rush for the beach. Bathers stopped romping. They gazed, spell-bound for an instant, then took up the shouts of welcome that burst from the crowd. Beach guards launched their boats and bent their backs to cut the combers toward the yawl. Excited Shriners, in the full regalia of their order, rushed waist-deep into the surf. Other visitors, fully dressed, were in up to their knees and never noticed it.

The guards swept alongside the craft, lifted out two women who had collapsed from the reaction and started back to shore. Others transferred some of the passengers into their boat and, leaving one man to take them to the beach, leaped into the yawl and tore the oars from the hands of the exhausted men who were battling gamely and pulled the others into shallow water. As the yawl shot upon the sand under the powerful drive of the lifeguards,

the strains of the music swept out with renewed vigor. Men and women stood with bared heads. A little girl, not more than twelve or thirteen, was first lifted ashore. She was dripping wet, but smiling and she blew a kiss to the crowds that cheered her as she was carried into the hospital tent. " I'm all right. Help those other people. Just give me a coat, I'm cold," she said. A big six-foot Shriner peeled off a gold-laced, trimmed green velvet coat that topped off his brilliant raiment, and flung it about her shoulders. She smiled her thanks. Two frail women, biting their lips in their determination to not give way to the strain that had them almost frantic, were carried in. They were dressed in heavy blue overalls and jumpers. One fainted as a sudden blast from the band carried the strains of the anthem to her. The other for the first time seemed to realize that she was in the hands of friends once more when she heard the music. " We're saved," she said simply, then fell unconscious into the arms of a physician.[13]

This dramatic scene was the climax of what had been a terrible experience for the occupants of the boat, eight of whom were women. Several of the latter had embarked in evening dress and had been drenched when the boat overturned while being lowered. Fortunately, near dawn of June 3, a bundle containing a dozen pairs of jumpers had been washed near them and retrieved with a boat-hook. They had donned the rough clothing, which, although water-soaked, warmed them after a night of exposure to wind and rain. That they had survived the night and the subsequent day and night of privation was due to the seamanship and courage of the *Carolina's* chief engineer, J. J. McLaren, who had been in command of the small boat. He, in turn, paid high tribute to the women, saying they had been " superb " throughout.

[13] Philadelphia *Record*, June 5, 1918.

Less than an hour after the spectacular rescue at Atlantic City, the Navy Department made public a radio message which lifted the suspense regarding the fate of the balance of the passengers and crew of the *Carolina*. The message came from Captain Barbour:

I am aboard the schooner Eva B. Douglass off (a certain light house). I have 150 passengers and ninety-four of the crew with me. Carolina sunk Sunday night by German submarine. Send tug immediately tow vessel to (an Atlantic Port). I am proceeding up coast. Tell tug to look out for schooner. Some of passengers are restless and poorly clothed. Everybody saved except two boats, motor launch and No. 5 lifeboat, with eighty passengers, separated from other boats and have not seen or heard from them. All saved that were with me.[14]

The navy censor had struck out "Barnegat Lighthouse" and "New York" from the message. The radio had been sent by Submarine Patrol Number 507, from the Third District, which had encountered the *Eva B. Douglass* as it drew in toward the shore. Later in the afternoon, the first and second officers and seven men of the *Carolina's* crew rowed into Barnegat City, to see if it would be possible to land the survivors at that point, but returned to the schooner about 6 P.M. with word that the best method was to continue up the coast to New York. The trip was tedious and it was not until 6.30 A.M. the next day that the schooner docked in Brooklyn. A recount at that time showed that there had been two hundred sixty-eight instead of two hundred forty in the eight boats. An example of their experiences was given by Robert F. Lebkicker, quartermaster of the liner, who said:

[14] Philadelphia *Evening Telegraph*, June 4, 1918.

We first tied our boats together. It was smooth then but after a while it began to blow and, afraid of being battered against each other, we cut our moorings and threw out our sea anchors. Then it began to thunder and presently a rainstorm set in which lasted, it seemed, for hours. We were drenched and suffered much from cold, but there were plenty of good-natured jibes about the steak and mushrooms and Neapolitan ice cream that the Huns had taken away from us with such inconsideration. That was along toward midnight when we were all getting pretty hungry. After nightfall, of course, we couldn't see where the other boats had gone but in the morning — it seemed ages before the sky brightened up — we were able to pick up all but two of them at various points. Then at about 8 o'clock we sighted the schooner that rescued us and her old square-rigging was the most welcome thing I ever expect to see. The second mate's boat went to hail her and at about noon we were all on board. They had accommodations for only about twenty-three men, but they stretched their hospitality until it almost cracked — the men shed their coats and hats and gave their bedding so as to make it as comfortable as possible for us. It was "Women and children first" all the way through.[15]

All but nineteen of the four hundred forty-eight men and women cast adrift in small boats during June 2 had been accounted for with the last of the *Carolina's* survivors located on the *Eva B. Douglass*. These nineteen were the crew of eight of the schooner *Isabel B. Wiley*, Captain Sweeney and nine of the men from the *Hauppauge* and the mate of the *Hattie Dunn*, all on board the former's motor yawl, which had started away from the *Winneconne's* boats on the afternoon of June 2. These nineteen, however, had been the very first men saved, a fact which

[15] New York *Times*, June 6, 1918.

was not known until later. They had been picked up by the southbound Ward Line steamer *Mexico* at 5.30 P.M. June 2. Immediately afterwards the *Mexico* sent the wireless call regarding the sinking of the *Isabel B. Wiley*, a call which for several days had been regarded as a mystery. On June 3 the *Mexico* hailed the Mallory Line steamer *Santiago*, northbound, and transferred them at sea. They landed in Hoboken on the night of June 4, twenty-four hours after the arrival of the men they had started out to save.

While the public on June 4 was most interested in the rescue of passengers and crews from the victims of June 2, the Navy Department was seeking for further word regarding the U-151. Although assured by Admiral Sims that only one submarine was operating off the coast — he cabled on June 4, " It is practically certain that there is but one submarine on Atlantic coast, which is probably U-151 "[16] — naval authorities were taking no chances, particularly as vague stories came from some of the survivors of two or more U-boats seen. On the possibility that there were two raiders, each radio station was instructed to make every effort to intercept any messages exchanged between enemy craft.

The disaster of June 3 to the tanker *Herbert L. Pratt* was followed by extensive mine-sweeping operations off the Delaware the same afternoon and for a number of days subsequent. The former menhaden fishing fleet swept first the main ship channel and then extended operations both to north and south.[17] Three of the deadly missiles were destroyed by gunfire on June 3, the final one almost proving fatal to S.C. 144 which missed striking it by inches

[16] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 10.

[17] Manuscript narrative, Ensign Karl F. Knipe, U.S.N.R.F.

while patrolling off Hen and Chickens Shoal.[18] A fourth one was destroyed on June 9, which, including the one exploded by the tanker, accounted for five laid by the U-151 in the vicinity of Overfalls Lightship.[19] They were all of one type, about nineteen feet, one-half inch in diameter and four feet nine and one-half inches in length, exclusive of the horns, and had charges of approximately two hundred pounds of trinitrate of toluol. Most of them were of the four-horned variety with a single mooring.

At Washington, on June 4, Secretary Daniels had made several statements to the effect that no additional advices of submarine activities had been received and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, assured the nation that "everything that can be done is being done. The navy has been expecting just such an affair and was adequately prepared. We needn't worry one bit about what is being done to cope with them." Nevertheless, Congressman J. Hampton Moore, of Pennsylvania, carried the question to the floor of Congress that afternoon by declaring that the submarine attack was a threat against the ship-building industry on the Delaware and denouncing the error of Congress in not supplying an adequate inland waterway for just such an emergency.[20] From Washington came much talk of U-boat bases in Mexico, the interviews on the subject being in every instance anonymous and it was apparent that but little credence was placed upon this possibility. From the National Capital also came an article by Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary, U.S.N., retired, pointing out the possibility of seaplanes being launched from an enemy

[18] Manuscript narrative, Ensign Karl F. Knipe, U.S.N.R.F.

[19] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 138.

[20] Congressional Record, Vol. 56, Part 7, 65th Congress, 2d Session, June 4, 1918, pp. 7353–7354.



Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*Mine damage to the hull of the tanker* Herbert L. Pratt

submarine to bomb the large cities, and this, with a similar statement from Alan R. Hawley, president of the Aero Club of America, brought about drastic action in New York, where the police authorities issued an order forbidding all display lights at night until further notice. Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Staten Island and Coney Island went dark on the night of June 4 and stayed dark for thirteen nights. Several near-by New Jersey towns adopted similar measures but they were not uniformly carried out. On June 5 New York placed siren horns at intervals of thirty blocks and controlled them electrically so that twenty-minute blasts would herald the coming of enemy aircraft and repeated five-minute signals would announce that the danger was past. Stringent fire regulations were also issued. Later the authorities became convinced that dimming New York's lights made it a black bull's-eye in a brightly lighted area and, hence, a better target than before the order went into effect. Admiral Sims, in minimizing the U-boat danger, remarked after the war, " When one of those picayune submarines came over to this side, they darkened New York for fear they were carrying airplanes with them." [21]

[21] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Navy Service, p. 661.

## CHAPTER VI

# THE U-151

# OFF VIRGINIA

In the period during which the *Carolina's* survivors were battling with the sea, while American coastal vessels were scurrying without lights for the nearest ports and the tanker *Herbert L. Pratt* had struck a mine off the Delaware Breakwater, the U-151 was not remaining idle. Following its pursuit of the *Bristol* on Sunday night, the submarine headed southward down the coast. It proceeded without encountering any ships until on the evening of Monday, June 3, when, in 38° 08′ N., 73° 38′ W., it ran across the American auxiliary schooner *Samuel C. Mengel.* The schooner, of 915 gross tons, was bound from the West African coast to New York with a cargo of peanuts. At 6.30 P.M. that day Captain H. T. Hansen, of the *Samuel C. Mengel,* observed an object, which, in the mist, he took for a tug. He had received no warning of a submarine, not being equipped with wireless, and labored under this misapprehension until the supposed tug was near enough to make out two guns on deck and a signal " M.H." (heave to, immediately) flying from a short staff. When an officer on the submarine called across the water, " Ease ship ",

the skipper of the schooner realized that no American commander would have given the order in those words. A boarding party consisting of an officer and six seamen, crossed to the *Samuel C. Mengel,* and the officer ordered the American crew to abandon the ship at once. The conversation between the German and Captain Hanson was related by the latter:

We asked him if his flag was flying, because we couldn't see any, and he said, " No." He asked me for the ship's papers, and when I gave them to him, he said, " We'll add you to the list. We sank three steamers and three schooners yesterday and we've accounted for twelve American vessels since we've been in these waters." He told us to take our things and everything we wanted, adding that he'd take what we left. He asked me where my stores were and also asked for a piece of soap. When I was down in the cabin getting my stuff, the German sailors were placing bombs on the vessel. When he ordered us into the boat, I remonstrated against being set adrift in an open boat 125 miles from the land. He answered, " That's all right, Captain. Have no fear. The water is warm, the weather fine, and there are plenty of ships passing to pick you up. Good luck." [1]

The crew of eleven rowed close to the U-boat in an effort to identify it by number, but were unsuccessful. Then they turned toward the shore and were two miles away before the bombs exploded. Continuing westward through the night, they encountered the Danish steamer *Paris* at seven o'clock the next morning (June 4) and were taken on board. The *Paris* brought them into New York on the afternoon of June 5.

[1] New York *Times,* June 6, 1918.

During the night of June 3, the U-151 continued on southward and shortly after daybreak on June 4, while in 37° 35′ N., 74° W., about one hundred miles off Hog Island, Virginia, sent a shot through the foresail of the small American coasting schooner *Edward R. Baird, Jr.*, of 279 tons. Two officers from the U-boat boarded the schooner, and the elder, a man of about forty-five, demanded the manifest and papers from Captain Couldman. The American skipper was given fifteen minutes to abandon his boat. The boarding party was not loquacious. In answer to questions, one of the officers said he did not know how long he had been in American waters, or how many submarines Germany had on this side. After the schooner's crew had left bombs were placed against the bulwarks and exploded, but the *Edward R. Baird, Jr.*, being laden with lumber, did not sink at once, although hopelessly shattered. The submarine had sighted a steamer about six miles away and wasted no further time with the schooner. It set off in pursuit of what turned out to be the French steamer *Radeoleine*, at that time in 37° 10′ N., 74° W. The French commander had spotted the U-151 at about the same time but at first mistook it for an American destroyer. He hoisted his own colors and changed his course from east to west. This move established the identity of the strange craft, which at once opened fire with a 6-inch gun. It was exactly seven-fifteen o'clock in the morning when the first discharge apprised the *Radeoleine* that it had to deal with a German submarine. A wireless S.O.S. was sent, giving the ship's position, and shortly afterwards came the reply from over the horizon, "O.K., S.O.S." Meanwhile, the U-151 had sent another shell after the fleeing steamer, and, with the range at twelve thousand meters, the *Radeoleine* began to return

the fire. The French vessel attempted no zigzagging, its commander being confident he could outrun his pursuer. After three shots, seeing that his shells were falling short, the Frenchman ceased firing. The U-151, although unable to get any closer than the original six miles separating it from the *Radeoleine*, fired fifteen or twenty times, every shell going overhead. In the meanwhile, the U.S. destroyer *Hull*, which had answered the French ship's wireless appeals,[2] came into view from the west at 7.55 P.M. The destroyer passed the *Radeoleine* at 8.10 P.M. and the U-boat immediately gave up the chase and submerged. The destroyer made no contact, but did pick up the crew of the *Edward R. Baird, Jr.* The *Radeoleine* continued toward Norfolk, passing an English smoke box adrift at 9.15 A.M., later sighting a quantity of wreckage and at 1.40 and 2.15 P.M. hearing shots to the northward. Hearing shots did not necessarily betoken the presence of the submarine. Naval craft and all armed merchantmen along the Atlantic coast from Boston to Florida were firing at anything suspicious by that time. Not a gun crew would take a chance. Frequently the gunfire was so close to land that people along the shore could both see and hear it, and numerous stories of U-boat attacks and repulses were the result.

Seven hours later, the U-151 reappeared some twenty-five miles further south and, with two warning shots, stopped the Norwegian steamer *Eidsvold* in 37° 12′ N., 73° 55′ W. The *Eidsvold*, of 1570 gross tons was northward bound with a cargo of sugar for New York. The attack occurred about four-fifteen o'clock in the afternoon of June 4. Describing it, Captain J. Johnson, of the *Eidsvold*, said:

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 42.

He signaled me to send a boat over to the submarine; one of the mates, three seamen and I took the ship's papers over to the submarine and boarded her. I told him we were bound for New York, from Guantanamo, Cuba, with a cargo of sugar. When he heard that it was sugar for New York he said that he was sorry that he had to sink the ship. I then asked for a reasonable length of time to get into the lifeboats, as I had my wife on board. He stated that he would give me as much time as it would take to get into the boats. I then returned to my ship and at 5 P.M. the boats got clear of the ship. They then fired three shots into the starboard side, then turned around and fired three shots into the port side, all shots taking effect at the water-line. My ship disappeared at 5.20 P.M. The submarine remained in view till dusk. She seemed to follow us slowly waiting for some vessel to come along and try to pick us up, when she would become easy prey for the submarine.[3]

The three boats from the *Eidsvold* were picked up twenty-two hours later by the Morgan Line steamer *Proteus* and carried into the Delaware, the Norwegian crew being landed at the naval base at Cape May.

Leaving the trail of the *Eidsvold's* boats, the U-151 continued southward through the night and the following morning, June 5, in 36° 30′ N., 75° W., encountered the British steamer *Harpathian*, of 4,588 tons, westward bound from Plymouth, England, to Newport News, in the overseas supply service. What happened was described in the official summary issued later by the Navy Department:

The Harpathian was torpedoed on June 5 at 9 A.M. The submarine did not appear until after the vessel sank. The U-boat gave no signals of warning, and the Captain,

[3] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 43.

who was on the lower bridge taking observations, did not see the torpedo until it struck. The crew immediately took to the boats. The vessel sank in seven minutes. Three minutes later the submarine came up a short distance away and an officer came out of the conning tower and asked if every one was saved. The Captain replied that all were safe except a fireman, who was hurt. The injured man was taken aboard the submarine for medical attention, which was given him, and he was returned to the lifeboat. The submarine commander put a bucket of fresh water on the lifeboat and gave the steamer captain a plug of American brand tobacco.[4]

Captain Owens and the thirty-nine seamen of the *Harpathian*, twenty-six of whom were Chinese, were picked up on June 6 at 11 A.M. by the British steamer *Potomac* and reached Norfolk that night. The injured fireman was one of the Chinamen.

On the afternoon of June 5, some five hours after the British vessel had been torpedoed, the U-151 was sighted by the American schooner *Ellen A. Swift* in 36° 30′ N., 73° 40′ W., but at too great a distance to inflict injury. Two New Bedford, Massachusetts, whalers, homeward bound, met the enemy about an hour later in the same location that it had been reported by the *Ellen A. Swift*. Captain J. T. Gonsalves, of one of these whalers, the *A. M. Nicholson*, implored the German commander not to destroy them as both were poor men and the loss of their ships would mean ruin. Strangely enough the plea won and the whalers were ordered to get out of the vicinity at once.[5] The whalers reached New Bedford on June 9 with their story.

[4] New York *Herald*, June 7, 1918.

[5] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 44.

The commander of the U-151 turned toward shore after letting the whalers escape and at 6 P.M. the same day stopped the Norwegian steamship *Vinland*, in 36° 32′ N., 73° 58′ W. The *Vinland*, of 1,143 tons, was bound from Cardenas, Cuba, to Philadelphia, with a cargo of sugar. It was an old story to the Germans, a new one to the nineteen men comprising the crew of the neutral vessel. They were given twenty minutes to leave their ship, during which time they managed to pack suitcases and gunny sacks, launch their two boats and get well clear. Before they left they saw the boarding party take two bags of sugar and then attach a cylindrical bomb on the outside of the hull about two feet above the water line.[6] After the steamer had been sunk, the two boats were ordered to the side of the submarine and Captain Bratland, master of the *Vinland*, was invited on board.

According to his version, given later, the U-boat was constructed with bulwarks three or four feet high around its decks and an elevated bow standing much higher, the whole giving the impression at a distance of a heavy-laden cargo carrier. He also said the German seamen told him they held a dance on deck every night to celebrate victories of the day. After two hours spent on the U-151, the Norwegian captain was released and returned to his waiting boats. The two small craft started a long row for the shore. They pulled all that night and the next day and night, and on Friday, June 7, were picked up in the morning by the U.S. destroyer *Rathbourne*, on its trial trip from the Delaware. The *Rathbourne* immediately turned back toward Cape May to land the survivors.

At ten-ten o'clock on the morning of June 6, and less than twelve hours after the sinking of the *Vinland*, the

[6] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 44.

British steamer *Mantilla* ran across the U-151 in 36° 02′ N., 73° 41′ W. The ship, however, sighted the enemy in time and managed to escape without trouble, an "allo"[7] from it being picked up by shore stations at the hour of the encounter. After the fruitless attack upon the *Mantilla*, the U-151 hovered back and forth some one hundred miles southeast of the mouth of the Chesapeake.

During June 7 it failed to intercept any prey, but on the morning of Saturday, June 8, in 36° 25′ N., 74° 20′ W., it overhauled the single-screw Norwegian steamship *Vindeggan*, of 3,179 gross tons, which was carrying a cargo of two thousand five hundred tons of copper from Valparaiso to New York. A single shot was enough to bring the steamer to and a small boat was launched to take the ship's papers over to the U-boat. A Chinese member of the crew was drowned when a number of Celestials jumped into the boat and capsized it.[8] Just then the U-151 spied another vessel some distance to the eastward. The submarine signaled to the *Vindeggan* to wait and set off in pursuit of the newcomer. The second ship was the *Pinar del Rio*, of the American and Cuban Steamship Line, which had sailed from Cuba on June 4, bound for Boston with twenty thousand bags of coffee. The *Pinar del Rio* had been warned to be on the lookout for enemy submarines, but despite the utmost precaution did not spy the U-boat until after a shot had been fired across the bow. This was at eight-thirty-five o'clock in the morning, in 36° 16′ N., 73° 50′ W. When seen, the U-151 had

[7] The code word, "allo", which is French for "hello", was adopted as a submarine warning by the French and, subsequently, by all their allies. An "allo" signal is not a distress signal, but indicates that a submarine has been sighted but has not attacked. An "allo" means, "I am going to signal the position of a submarine with the time and date of sighting."

[8] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 45.

approached too close for the American ship to attempt an escape. Captain John Mackenzie, of the *Pinar del Rio*, described the capture as follows:

The raider was displaying flag signals for us to abandon ship. The submarine came close up, several men appearing on her deck, and someone called out in English for us to hurry and save what we could. With the thirty-two others of the crew we got into two boats and cleared from the side of the steamship, seventeen of us in mine and sixteen in the first mate's. We rowed over to the U-boat and asked, " What will we do next? " The commander of the submarine asked us if we had all our papers and other property and I said " Yes," although I had left about $300 worth of clothes and personal effects on board. " All right, goodby," the commander said, and the U-boat got underway and sank the Rio with shell fire and then submerged.[9]

Before the *Pinar del Rio* was sunk, J. Arkes, chief mate; Walter C. B. Burrows, first assistant engineer, and William F. Clark, a cadet, all of whom were in one boat, distinctly saw a vessel, with a single funnel amidships and painted gray, standing about three miles off and saw, also, the submarine signal to the stranger in the international code, " Follow me." They were unable to investigate the mystery further, being more interested in getting clear of their ship, particularly as a choppy sea was running. A few hours later the boats drifted apart and toward dusk the captain's boat was picked up by a Norwegian fruit steamer and the eighteen men carried into New York, arriving on the afternoon of June 10. The mate's boat made the shore at Manteo, North Carolina, where an immediate account was given of the supposed submarine mother ship. The report caused a decided stir, but it was not until long

[9] New York *World*, June 11, 1918.

afterwards that an explanation came. It was from a German source — the report of the commander of the U-151, in the Cologne *Volks Zeitung* of July 31, 1918. The submarine mother ship was the *Vindeggan*, of which the German report states:

After the steamer [the Pinar del Rio] had been sunk, we went back to the Norwegian ship and asked why it had not escaped. The captain said he thought he would not have been able to go very far at any rate of speed and our guns would have reached him soon enough.[10]

The U-151 had learned of the valuable cargo of copper on the *Vindeggan* and made immediate plans to transfer some of it to the submarine before sinking the steamer. But inclement weather had set in and it was not until the next morning (June 9) that this work could be undertaken. Then the submarine ran up close under the lee of the Norwegian vessel and Captain Ballestad, of the *Vindeggan*, was informed that his crew would be expected to assist in the task. Two German seamen climbed into the masthead and maintained a lookout to watch for any patrol vessels which might try to interfere with the proceedings. Two of the steamer's lifeboats were lowered and manned by other German sailors. The Norwegian crew was sent to the mainhold to pass the ingots up on deck where more Germans shifted them over the side. As rapidly as a boat was filled it was rowed over to the U-151 and the ingots taken below. Describing the work, the commander of the submarine stated:

The over-hauling of the copper, about 70,000 kilograms were taken over, was quite a slow process. It was rendered more difficult by the mass of sharks which gath-

[10] New York *Times*, September 14, 1918.

ered about both sides of the vessel. The Norwegians began to shoot at the sharks with revolvers. But all this was useless. Finally three lines were let out and a large shark was caught. Great joy prevailed. The captain of the ship had taken another captain, who wished to travel to his homeland, together with his wife and a two year old child along with him. We took the woman on board. She was quite a genteel lady, only she used perfume somewhat too freely so that it was not long before the whole ship reeked with it. We wanted to take her below deck but owing to the rough weather this was not agreeable to her. So she stayed on the surface of the vessel, where her husband had some wicker furniture carried to her. The child was treated very considerately by the crew. Milk and chocolate were given to it.[11]

The transfer of the copper was not completed that day and the U-151 decided to stand by its victim until the morning of June 10 before sinking it. From 5 A.M. to 11 A.M. on June 10 the work of transhipment went on. Shortly afterwards bombs were placed on the *Vindeggan* and it sank in seven minutes. The lifeboats with the Norwegian crew were towed westward for some distance when, in 36° 30′ N., 71° 29′ W., another Norwegian steamer came into view. The U-151 cast off the *Vindeggan's* boats and started after the newcomer. It overtook it before dark and a single shot across the bow sent the crew to the boats. It was the *Henrik Lund*, of 4,322 tons, bound from Norfolk to New York in ballast. A prize crew was sent on board, bombs were attached and within an hour the Norwegian craft was at the bottom of the sea. The *Henrik Lund's* crew was taken in tow along with the *Vindeggan's*, the two Norwegian captains, according to the U-151's

[11] New York *Times*, September 14, 1918.

commander, having met before, "celebrated a reunion." Captain Axel Kaltenborn, of the last victim, was invited on the submarine and subsequently told his experiences:

> The German commander appeared to be very proud of his craft, and said she could dive in twenty-eight seconds. He also told me that he had been away from Germany for two months and could stay out for another six months. The cabin was comfortably fitted out and there was plenty of food and drinks of all kinds. Pointing to a registry of shipping on the table, the commander said with a smile, "That is my Bible," and showed where he had crossed off the names of the vessels that had been sunk by the U-boat on her cruise. He mentioned the two Norwegian steamships Vinland and Eidsvold and also admitted sinking American ships but did not give me the names. The commander was polite in his manner, all the time I was on board, two hours, and said he was sorry he had to sink my ship. "War is war, and I must carry out my duty," he said. The crew of the U-151 numbered about seventy-five and they appeared to be contented with their lot.[12]

The sixty-eight officers and men from the two Norwegian steamers were uncertain as to what their fate was to be when the U-151 continued to tow them along. When a small steamer was sighted some distance ahead after dark, they suspected they were to be used as a decoy. The U-151 suddenly cast off the towing hawsers and moved away. The distant steamer turned out to be the *Brosund*, from Oporto to New York. It stopped and took the sixty-eight men on board, dimming all the lights as it did so. The U-151 remained within sight and saw the transfer effected without attempting to attack the rescuing vessel. Wasting no further time than was necessary in that vicinity,

[12] New York *Times*, June 14, 1918.

the *Brosund* proceeded under full steam to the northward and, on June 12, reached New York in safety.

A number of vessels reported encounters with the submarine during June 9, although, from the statements of the commander of the U-151 and of the captain of the *Vindeggan*, the enemy craft was nowhere near the scenes of the supposed encounters. The first was the steamship *Luna*, which thought it spied the enemy at two o'clock in the morning about ten miles east-southeast of Winter Quarter Light. Whatever the *Luna* saw, the vessel lost no time in getting out of the vicinity and running into the Delaware. Three hours later, just as dawn was breaking, the U.S. battleship *South Carolina*, coming up the coast under convoy of several sub-chasers, made out what was thought to be a periscope sticking out of the water. The secondary armament of the battleship was turned loose on the suspicious object and S.C. 234 raced over the spot and dropped several depth bombs. Nothing happened.[13] The location of this supposed encounter was in 38° 26′ N., 74° 40′ W., or approximately five miles from Fenwick Light and more than one hundred miles from the actual location of the U-151 at that hour. Late the same afternoon, the steamer *Pajos* fired at a suspicious object several miles away and then raced into Norfolk with its story. Other presumed sightings on June 9 and June 10 were all too far north to have any bearing on the U-boat's activities.

[13] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 46.

## CHAPTER VII

# CONVOYS, EFFECTS AND THE PRESS

Although June 3 had been the date upon which the Navy Department inaugurated the coastal convoy, it was impossible for it to function immediately. It was one thing to announce that vessels hereafter would be protected on their journeys offshore; it was another to apply this principle to ships scattered from eighty to one hundred miles out along a distance of one thousand miles. As a result, it was several days after June 3 before the convoy system was working with anything approaching smoothness. It had been the practise prior to that date " to allow coastwise ships to sail direct, and as far as practicable lights were burned and the ordinary aids of navigation were kept going." Secretary Daniels' annual report, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, sets forth that as soon as the U-boats appeared, the convoying system began. With this statement there has been disagreement, the claim being made that the convoying started, not with the first appearance, which was May 19, when the *Nyanza* was chased, or, at the latest, May 25, when the three schooners were attacked, but on June 3, after six more ships had been destroyed. The Secretary's report states:

Immediately upon their [German submarines] arrival in American waters, without in the slightest degree allowing the enemy's efforts to diminish the rate of flow of troops and supplies abroad, all coastwise shipping was hauled in close under the protection of our district forces and a series of routings, escorts and air patrols were started which rendered reasonably secure the vessels that plied up and down our coast.[1]

The convoying routes, as set down on paper, were comparatively simple. The designated sub-chasers and submarine patrol boats from the Third District escorted all vessels from New York Harbor southward along the Jersey coast to Barnegat, where the vessels of the Fourth District picked up the ships and saw them in safety to abreast Winter Quarter Light, off Maryland. The Fifth District convoying fleet continued the duty southward from that point to Norfolk. Vessels to be convoyed were held in harbor until a sufficient number had been assembled to make the journey worth while. Similarly, the communication service enabled a timing of the despatch of all coastwise steamers so that no naval craft returned empty-handed. Third District patrols, having turned over the southward-bound fleet at Barnegat, invariably received a northward-bound assortment of vessels to take back to New York. The same rules held true regarding the Fourth and Fifth districts, although at times schedules slipped, as will be seen in the following interesting account of the dangers and fatigues of this duty as given in the report of the commander of one of the sub-chasers of the Fourth District:

Escort work was a most strenuous and dangerous business. Vessels were met at Winter Quarter Light Vessel

[1] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 16.

and escorted to Barnegat, the northern limit of the District, where the District chasers were relieved by other vessels from the Third District. If no relief vessels were on hand, the District chasers took the convoy through to the port of destination, New York at one end and Norfolk at the other. As the convoys often made ten and eleven and sometimes thirteen and fourteen knots, the chasers were put hard to it to keep up and invariably were forced to make the entire run at top speed. Escort duty at night in clear weather with no lights was dangerous, but on foggy or squally nights it was doubly so and that summer was an exceptionally foggy and squally one. The steamship lanes both day and night were crowded and the danger that any passing vessel might mistake a chaser for a submarine was omnipresent, as no lights were carried by either the chasers or the convoys. In most cases the convoy would steer a zig-zag course both by day and night, which increased the hazard of the escort being run down.[2]

An announcement made by Rear Admiral Nathaniel R. Usher, commandant of the Third District, showed the restrictions placed upon the ships to be convoyed. This announcement, made public on June 9, set forth:

The following steps have become necessary for the protection of shipping at sea and in order that shipping may be properly routed.

The control of all shipping, coastwise and overseas, for routing and within the defensive areas and outside of harbors, has been assumed by the Navy Department. This control will be exercised locally by the Commandant of the Third Naval District.

Ship owners, agents and masters of vessels in the Third Naval District, all ports from New London, Conn., to Barnegat, N. J., desiring information regarding the prob-

[2] Manuscript narrative, Ensign Karl F. Knipe, U.S.N.R.F.

able date of sailing of their vessels are advised to see the Navy route officer.

Before leaving port masters of vessels must, in all cases, apply to the Navy routing officer for order and routing instructions.

Vessels at sea should be prepared to receive at any time radio instructions to put into the nearest port, or some port other than destination, for orders.

Orders to make port should be promptly carried out and arrival reported at once, with request for further orders and route instructions.

These requirements are entirely outside of customs control and harbor regulations in force under order of the Secretary of the Treasury.[3]

The Treasury regulations, mentioned in the foregoing and adopted on June 11, were drastic. In addition to requiring the registration of every boat of more than twenty feet in length, except vessels registered in foreign or coastwise trade, they forbade all navigation within the harbors after dark, except for necessary traffic permitted by the port captain or collector. Licenses were not issued to boats doing junk business and the licensing of chandlers' vessels was limited to the few required for harbor needs. Those were permitted to transport articles to and from vessels in the harbor only by written permission of the customs authorities. Vessels in coastwise travel were required to report their leaving and arriving unless they had special permits from port officials. In addition, every officer and member of a crew of vessels in coastwise travel, including yachts and pleasure boats, had to obtain identification cards, and a harbor license was not issued to a vessel which carried a person not holding such a card. This, of course, did not

[3] New York *Herald*, June 10, 1918.

apply to travelers on ferry or other passenger boats. No person was permitted to carry a camera on any vessel in harbor except by permission of port authorities or unless the camera was deposited with the purser during the journey. Ferries were excepted from this regulation. Under any circumstance, however, the taking of pictures from a vessel in harbor, excepting by special permit, was forbidden under heavy penalty.

The first naval hunt squadron to get under way was a unit consisting of the U.S. destroyer *Jouett* and a half-dozen sub-chasers. It departed from Norfolk on June 6. Its territory extended northward and southward beyond the limits of the Fifth District. Patrol duty was handicapped during June by the lack of listening tubes, a device which was not placed on any of the coastal naval craft until near the end of the month. The absence of this means of submarine detection meant a blind search and the *Jouett* and its companion ships were unsuccessful in making a contact during the period of the first patrol. Nor was the aerial patrol any more successful, although it was improved daily by the addition of seaplanes and dirigibles. One of the former, Number 990, was forced to land on the sea off Barnegat when its engine went dead on June 10, but its occupants were picked up by the S.C. 209 a few hours later. The dirigible "Connecticut" disappeared at sea after leaving Cape May on June 15. Fears for its crew of two, Ensigns A. R. Houghton and Edward B. Packard, were expressed for several days, but, on June 17, the schooner *Luther Little* ran across them afloat on the sea forty-five miles south of Sandy Hook and succeeded in towing the dirigible into port as well as rescuing the crew.

The safety of the final trio of passenger ships known

to have been in the vicinity where the U-151 operated on June 2 and 3 was established in the two days following the rescue of the survivors of the *Carolina*. The *Sixaola*, of the United Fruit Company, after having tried in vain to make Philadelphia, put into the Virginia capes on June 5. The same day the *Brazos*, the companion ship to the *Carolina*, after a wild run under forced draught, reached San Juan, Porto Rico, at one o'clock in the afternoon. That night a violent anti-German demonstration broke out in Ponce. Aliens' houses were stoned and feeling ran high not only against Germans but against Spaniards of known German sympathies. United States Attorney Martin, of Ponce, quelled the disturbance by a well-worded statement in which he said: "The harming of Germans in Porto Rico will hurt us; killing them in Europe will hurt them. The most effective way to avenge the sinking of the *Carolina* is to subscribe liberally to the Red Cross which takes care of the families of our soldiers who put their lives in hazard." The *Cretan*, of the Merchants and Miners Line, arrived at Jacksonville several days overdue, owing to the precautions of its captain, who hugged the shore from Virginia to Florida. Word was also received that the Atlantic City fishing fleet was safe, the various craft having put into ports from Cape May south to Chincoteague, Virginia.

While the first news of the submarine raid had brought a sudden jump in war risk insurance for coastal bottoms, the Government had met the situation at once by a corresponding drop in marine insurance rates. Marine underwriters, on June 3, advanced insurance from one to two per cent. to all ports, coastwise as well as transatlantic, and predicted the rates would go higher if the U-boat menace was not eliminated. On the other hand, on June 5, the

Treasury Department announced that the submarine danger was not sufficient to justify advances in Government rates. Instead, the rate on life insurance for officers and crews of merchant vessels engaged in traffic through the war zone was reduced from twenty-five cents to fifteen cents per hundred dollars, as had been recommended before the appearance of the U-151 off the Atlantic Coast.

The submarine raid was taken calmly also in the New York and other stock markets. The first news of the sinking of American vessels caused some unsettlement but there was not the faintest sign of demoralization. To the contrary, the stock declines were orderly with a noticeable absence of urgent liquidation. The news, however, checked a progressive recovery movement which was developing with better news from the battle front than had been received for some time before. Trading was quiet in the recessions and held fairly steady during the first two days. Subsequently the market regained its former upward impetus and, after June 4, the submarine activities had no apparent effect upon it.

The news of the raid acted as an immediate spur upon all lines of recruiting. On June 4 more than two hundred twenty-five men enlisted in the naval reserve at New York, making it the record day for naval recruiting at that station since the beginning of the war. On the same day, two hundred men enrolled at the navy recruiting station in Philadelphia, while corresponding stimulation was reported from the army and merchant-marine recruiting stations all along the coast.

As a result of continuous rumors of U-boat bases in Mexican waters and mysterious communications between the shore and the enemy submarine, Secretary Daniels ordered a thorough combing of the coast and, on June 10,

the Navy Department stated it had no evidence that U-boats had made any use of the shores from Halifax to the Mexican border. Long after the war, Captain Bartenbach, who commanded the German submarine bases in Flanders, declared that "Germany never had a submarine base in America, nor did German submarines, operating off the American coast, have a mother ship or receive any aid or supplies from shore." However, there were many rumors throughout June regarding German agents on the American coast. The first one came with the temporary detention of one of the passengers from the *Carolina's* motor launch at Lewes, Delaware. He was released after an examination and a few days later a man was arrested in Cape May because of mysterious light flashes from his room. He also was released when a defective switch was found as the explanation. On June 6 naval guards chased and fired at three suspects in the swamps at Nassau, Delaware, and the next day a registered alien enemy was apprehended in Atlantic City with coast maps in his possession. A thrilling rumor of a woman "master spy" at Cape May, on June 7, was exploded when it was found that a fisherman's wife hanging up clothes had been the innocent cause of the suspicious signaling reported. Then the naval authorities were sent on a vain search for three supposed German sailors who had asked a woman for food in a town on the Virginia coast; another registered alien enemy was arrested in Atlantic City for light flashes from a pavilion at midnight, June 10, and, finally, on June 16, a naval guard raided a house in Palermo, New Jersey, and seized a small private wireless plant, which had been running despite orders closing all save government radio stations.

Stories of encounters with the U-boats were as plentiful

as the spy rumors. The steamer *Westerner* ran into Newport, Rhode Island, on June 7, with an account of sighting a submarine off Nantucket, but Rear Admiral Spencer S. Wood, commanding the First Naval District, after an investigation, announced, on June 8, and again, on June 13, that "not one single report of the presence of any enemy submarine in these waters has been confirmed." Other shore points were constantly hearing gunfire at sea and reporting, "without verification," the loss of another ship. For three days the nation gave up the schooner "Desauss", the tug *Waltham* and two coal barges, only to discover that "Desauss" was a garbled version of the schooner *Horatio G. Foss*, the same derelict mentioned in an early Navy Department despatch as having been damaged in a collision in late May off Winter Quarter Light, and the *Waltham* and its barges were not even in the vicinity. A "steel" tanker, "floating bottom up", after investigation, turned out to be the schooner *Hauppauge*, which, like the *Edna*, another victim of May 25, was ultimately salvaged.[4] Seabright, New Jersey, fishermen reported a two-masted schooner carrying supplies to a U-boat, while Ocean City, Maryland, had "a thrilling encounter" just off shore to talk about.

While the Atlantic seaboard was extremely agitated over rumors and speculations, official efforts in Washington were centered upon reëstablishing assurance. On June 5, Secretary Daniels pointed out that "the great duty of our Navy is to keep open the door to France; to carry our men and munitions to the great battle front, and to guard food supplies for our belligerents. That has been accomplished so far and we shall continue to keep the road open." The same day he informed the House Naval Committee

[4] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 27.

that, during the week preceding June 2, nearly a score of transports, carrying approximately one hundred thousand American troops, left the ports of the United States for Europe.

An acrimonious discussion upon the raid developed, on June 6, in the United States Senate, when Senator Frank B. Brandegee, of Connecticut, read an editorial attacking the Navy Department for not issuing a warning prior to June 3. This editorial, from the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* of June 5, pointed out the warnings regarding U-boat activities as found in the reports of steamers encountering submarines prior to June 2 and the three damaged schooners of May 25. It cited the statement of the captain of the *Bristol* to show that the Navy Department had issued no warning to shipping at sea and concluded:

> The failure to take quick and sharp naval measures is mysterious, puzzling to the lay mind. Is there a proper explanation? Or is this one more case added to the piled-up enormities of bureaucratic stupidity during this war? The disappearance of the Cyclops should have sufficed to get our coast patrol in action.

Senator Brandegee made no comment upon the editorial but Senator J. Hamilton Lewis, of Illinois, administration spokesman in the upper house, came to the defense of the navy. He replied, he said, not to the editorial, but to keep the public mind from being misguided or forming false impressions which might " pervade the public confidence." Pointing out that the bulk of the naval forces were necessary for convoying transports, he explained that there were limitations to the number of places the balance of the forces could be at one time. He then launched into an attack upon " certain members of the United States Sen-

ate" whom he charged with having made inaccurate accusations on the floor of the house against administration war activities. It was these accusations, he concluded, which made Germany believe the country was not prepared to defend itself. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, also spoke in defense of naval activities, stating that every precaution "that human foresight could suggest" had been taken. "I have no doubt that in the newspaper offices there are men who might do better," he remarked, "but, unfortunately, they are not charged with the duty." Senator Lodge discoursed at length upon the naval preparations and also upon the possibility of an enemy submarine base in the western Atlantic.[5]

The debate in Congress brought from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a positive statement during the same afternoon that an official warning had been issued by the department "prior to Saturday" [June 1]. He would not state how much "prior to Saturday" it had been sent out. This notice, he said, gave very definite information of the prospect of a U-boat attack, and was sent to all Atlantic ports and flashed to vessels at sea. The first warning of the actual presence of submarines, he added, was received from the Fourth Naval District. Secretary Daniels, in the *Public Ledger*, on June 8, answered that paper's editorial as follows:

> The Department could not take it upon itself to warn all ships against sailing or direct ships at sea to return to port upon such information as we had prior to Sunday [June 2]. If we had followed such a course in the case of every rumor of submarines off the coast during the last six months shipping in this country would have been abso-

[5] Congressional Record, Vol. 56, Part 8, 65th Congress, 2d Session, June 6, 1918, pp. 7411–7412.

lutely demoralized. There scarcely has been a fortnight that we have not had some sort of report of some one sighting something that looked like the periscope of a submarine and consequently if all ships had been directed to remain in port our vessels would have been tied up fast to their piers practically all of the time.

On June 7, Senator Benjamin R. Tilghman, of South Carolina, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, who had been absent during the debate of the previous day, had read into the Congressional Record a brief letter from Secretary Daniels, stating that all possible steps were being taken to hunt down the enemy. Senator Tilghman said he wanted to assure the panic-stricken that there was no need for panic and that the navy would "hunt down these damned devils and wipe them off the face of the earth." [6] The same day Senator Swanson, of Virginia, stated that "the indications of the last few days are that the German submarines that came over here have been driven at present from the coast and from the main lines of travel of American vessels." [7] It happened that Senator Swanson's statement and the first news of the sinking of the Norwegian steamer *Vinland* occupied parallel columns in almost all newspapers of that day. To offset the varied U-boat rumors which were reaching Europe, Secretary Daniels cabled a clear statement of conditions, which was published in London on June 9. It stated:

The activities of German submarines off the American coast have not in any way changed the policy of this Government. The road to France will be kept open for transportation of our troops and delivery of munitions and food

[6] Congressional Record, Vol. 56, Part 8, 65th Congress, 2d Session, June 7, 1918, p. 7476.

[7] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, June 7, 1918.

supplies for our forces and those of our allies. There is being no weakening of our naval forces in European waters as a result of the new activity necessitated on our own coast. The country has remained calm in the face of Germany's attempt to bring frightfulness to our doors. In fact, this enemy effort has stimulated recruiting and strengthened the determination of our people to use every resource to defeat the enemy.[8]

During this period the State Department was being supplied with extracts of all editorials from German newspapers anent the U-boat raids, the texts being cabled from Amsterdam, Holland, and Zürich, Switzerland. A great many of these articles were made public in this country, together with quotations from the neutral press and comments by Allied experts. One of the earliest received was the statement which appeared in the *Occidental*, a Guadalajara, Mexico, daily, which, on June 4, announced that the German submarines had destroyed fifteen American warships and that the United States Government was trying to keep it secret.

Arthur Pollen, a British naval expert, in an article copyrighted by the New York *Times*, declared that the possibility of an extensive raid upon the American seacoast had been expected by him for some time. He said he believed the long deferment of such an attack was due to a feeling that any frightfulness visited upon American women and children might result in reprisals upon Germans in America, and also because of a German belief that America was not whole-heartedly in the war and it would be best not to arouse her. He concluded by saying that, while bigger submarines with larger range guns might bring more serious results on the Atlantic coast than the

[8] New York *Herald*, June 10, 1918.

one then operating, he questioned whether such attacks could be important enough to affect the main point of the war.

Despatches from Paris indicated that the French did not consider the raid on the American coast as anything more than a feint aimed at keeping as many American warships busy in home waters as possible. The belief was expressed that submarines along the Atlantic seaboard could accomplish nothing of much importance compared to what they could do around the British Isles. Other Parisian authorities regarded the raid as having a dual purpose: first, to attempt to break up the convoy system and prevent the transportation of troops to France, and, second, to affect the morale in America. Predictions were made freely that the U-boat in the western Atlantic would be entirely unsuccessful.

From Italy came a suggestion by Isaac Marconi, the inventor, that the American navy would do well to so patrol the coast of Mexico and Central America as to prevent the establishment of U-boat bases there. If such were found to be already in existence, his advice was to destroy them at once. He likewise predicted that the purposes of the raids would be frustrated and that the entire plan would fail. It was a mere bluff, he said, which could have no military value and was probably intended as a German idea of how to frighten America.

The first of the German editorials reached this country on June 8. They were from two Cologne newspapers, the *Gazette* and the *Volks Zeitung*. The former's naval expert, Captain von Kuellwetter, wrote:

One can picture the great success as a result of an offensive on a large scale in North American waters. In the barred regions of England the defense undoubtedly has

developed into a well-considered system, which is not the master of our U-boats, but which, nevertheless, so far as lies within the enemy's power, renders their task difficult. There can, of course, be no question of such a system in American waters. Over there they have no experience. Moreover, America apparently has sent to Europe most of her few utilizable torpedo boat destroyers.[9]

On the editorial page of the *Zeitung* appeared a violent tirade against America which concluded:

It is therefore only right and fair that we, too, make use of our means and show the friends of humanity in their homeland what war looks like and what it means. Our U-boats first visited the American coast for legitimate peaceful commerce. The North Americans may now feel the fist of the war lord. They need not be surprised. He who sows the wind reaps the whirlwind, even when he sits on the other side of the great herring pond, where he is under the delusion that he is safe from the storm.[10]

On June 9 there was published in the United States an editorial from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which stated:

It is the first big and carefully planned action of our undersea warfare undertaken against the war prolonger in the Far West. It is linked up with our offensives on the European battlefields. The U-boats have brought the war to the American shores to catch American transports near the point of departure because it is not always easy to deal with them in the open sea or in European waters. The German people wish their brave sailors good luck and complete success in their task.[11]

[9] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, June 8, 1918.
[10] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 9, 1918.
[11] New York *Herald*, June 10, 1918.

Via Zürich, the State Department received, on June 10, quotations from the *Stuttgarter Neue Tageblatt* and the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*. In the latter, Count Reventlow, an ardent anti-American, declared that "the German submarines have no special aim either in Europe or in America. For them it is simply a question of destroying Allied tonnage or tonnage placed at the Allies' disposal." The Berlin correspondent of the *Neue Tageblatt* was quoted as saying that "the situation is becoming serious for America. She sees our submarines drawing around her coasts and ready to cut off all communication between the mother country and the army."

A despatch from the American Expeditionary Force, on June 13, gave an illuminating indication of the German idea of effective propaganda against American soldiers. A German toy balloon, carrying sheets of this propaganda, drifted over the lines and was seized upon. The message from the enemy read:

> Thousands of Brooklynites are sleeping in cellars fearing a night bombardment. Some of the wealthiest are moving toward Chicago. The few Wall street brokers who must remain downtown in Manhattan are engaging cots in Turkish baths in the Woolworth building and other skyscrapers. Atlantic City and other seaside resorts are noticeably shy of bathing nymphs on account of fear of submarine shells.[12]

Later in the month came numerous anonymous contributions from German papers, forwarded by brief despatches through Switzerland. One German newspaper was quoted as saying that only the censorship of the American Navy Department, concealing the great losses to shipping,

[12] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 13, 1918.

prevented greater alarm in the United States. Another enemy paper asserted that the hour was perhaps not far distant when American ports would be bombarded by German cannon, while a third stated that "this is only the beginning. The real work of the submarines begins when the Atlantic is filled with ships assembled by America. Germany possesses submarine cruisers which can cross the ocean, and then will occur scenes which will make the marrow of Wilson's bones turn cold." [13]

In contrast to all these boastful utterances, the Swiss press, while maintaining its neutral tones, seemed to have little faith in the newest German undertaking, the *National Zeitung*, of Basle, predicting that the U-boat campaign on the American coast probably would end "like all other similar undertakings, with disappointment on the part of the originators." It expressed the belief that the submarine raids would merely arouse American hatred and make the war a matter of personal importance to every American, and that the attacks would only serve to a momentary advantage for which a high price would have to be paid later. It concluded:

> This is naturally beyond the comprehension of Germany's military leaders and people. Immediate results will be innumerable American volunteers. A wave of hysteria, fanaticism, increased thirst for revenge will sweep America and easily counterbalance the advantages of the attack for Germany.[14]

[13] *Ibid.*, June 18, 1918.
[14] *Ibid.*, June 18, 1918.

## CHAPTER VIII

# THE END OF THE FIRST RAID

From eight-thirty o'clock on the evening of June 10, when the Danish steamer *Brosund* rescued the crews of the *Vindeggan* and *Henrik Lund*,[1] until 7.45 P.M. on June 13, the Navy Department heard nothing authentic regarding the U-151. The silence was broken at the latter hour when an "allo" came from the British steamer *Lhan Stephen Castle* in 38° 02′ N., 72° 47′ W., followed in fifteen minutes by an "S.O.S." from the British steamer *Keemun* in almost the same position. From 8 until 9.43 P.M. naval operations, via shore radio stations, was supplied with as thrilling account of a running fight with the enemy as any on record in the war. Cape May caught the first appeal from the *Keemun* and relayed it as received, "S.O.S.SSSS 37–58; 72–47. Gunned."

At 8.18 P.M. the Philadelphia Navy Yard aerials recorded a fragmentary call, "S.O.SSSS. 37–57" (no longitude given). At 8.24 P.M. the same station reported, "S.O.SSSS 37–56; 72–47. Gunned." Likewise, at 8.43

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 45.

P.M., came "S.O.SSSS 37–48; 72–47. Gunned and chased." A longer message at 8.50 P.M. was intercepted by Cape May, "S.O.SSSS 37–48; 72–47. Gunned and chased. Steering due south. Speed, 12 knots."

The Philadelphia Navy Yard at 9 P.M. heard, "S.O.SSSS 37–48; 72–53. Steering due south." At 9.13 P.M. the Navy Yard received, "S.O.SSSS 37–45; 72–53. Steering due south. 12 knots." There followed a half hour of silence and finally, at 9.43 P.M., indicating the fight was still on, came, "S.O.SSSS 37–38; 72–53. Steering due south. 13 knots. Chased."

The alarm had been broadcasted in the very beginning, and destroyers and sub-chasers were speeding toward the scene, but when they arrived the battle was over and the *Keemun* had escaped. How it happened was described by both Captain Chope, of the *Lhan Stephen Castle*, and Captain Collister, of the *Keemun*. The former vessel had sighted a strange craft about ten miles off the starboard beam and the Britisher became suspicious when he noticed the stranger was closing in on him. He turned away and, after some maneuvering, realized that he was still being followed. Said Captain Chope:

I noted two big guns on the submarine, one forward and one aft. My gunner reported to me, after looking at her through his sight, that she had removed two clews from her fore deck since we had first sighted her. When we had the submarine astern of us, the S.S. Keemun appeared on our port bow. I hoisted the "B" flag, with a ball underneath and the proper signal "North." The Keemun apparently did not see our signal as she did not answer it. Therefore, I sent out an "allo" message, giving the ship's position. The Keemun at that time was astern of us, about five miles distant. The Marconi officer on the ship reported

that he had picked up a message that the Keemun was being shelled. I noted three shots fall near the Keemun. The Keemun returned the submarine's fire.

The first Captain Collister, of the *Keemun,* knew of the presence of the U-151 was when he caught the *Lhan Stephen Castle's* "allo." The enemy was then sighted about seven miles away and began firing almost immediately. Both craft were making about twelve knots an hour. Before a full head of steam could be crowded on the Britisher, the range was down to seven thousand yards and the British gun crew opened return fire. As shown in the wireless calls, which were sent out at fifteen-minute intervals, the *Keemun* headed due south, increasing its speed from twelve to thirteen knots and gradually drawing away from the pursuer. The U-151 sent a total of ten shells after the fleeing freighter, but none took effect. The vessel replied with more than that number, the last shot being fired when the range had increased to eleven thousand yards. At that time, a few minutes before 10 P.M., the submarine abandoned the chase.

During the night, the U-boat ran in a southeasterly direction and, at five o'clock in the morning of June 14, in 37° 30′ N., 72° 10′ W., about two hundred miles off Virginia, sighted the Norwegian bark *Samoa,* of 1,138 gross tons, bound for Perth Amboy, New Jersey, from Africa, with a cargo of wool and copper ore. The U-151 did not approach the *Samoa* for an hour, finally running up to within one hundred yards and throwing a shell across the bow. The Norwegian crew was given fifteen minutes to launch the boats and, when they were clear, the submarine ran around to the west side and fired three shells into the vessel. The *Samoa* sank after the third shot. Then

the U-151 obligingly sent a wireless message asking for assistance for the men in the boats and turned away to the northwest. The forty men from the bark had taken only a meager supply of food and water. From about seven o'clock, on the morning of June 14, until four o'clock in the afternoon of the next day they rowed toward the west, being picked up at the latter hour by the schooner *George W. Truitt, Jr.*, which transferred them the next day to the U.S. destroyer *Paul Jones*.[2] The latter vessel carried them into Norfolk on June 16.

Nine hours after despatching the *Samoa*, the U-151 overhauled the Norwegian bark *Kringsjaa*, of 1,750 gross tons, Buenos Aires to New York, with a cargo of flaxseed. The bark was overtaken in 38° 02′ N., 71° 40′ W., about thirty-five miles from the spot where the *Samoa* had been sent down. It was stopped by a warning shot and the crew ordered to abandon ship within fifteen minutes. Captain Gunwald Magnusdel and nineteen seamen got away with two boats, one containing nine men and the other eleven. The U-boat sent over several shells and the *Kringsjaa* sank shortly afterwards. Captain Magnusdel asked the submarine officer to give the boats a tow toward land but was told that the U-boat was headed north. The German officer, after instructing the Norwegians to steer northwestward, remarked, "I will report that you have been sunk, by wireless, in order that you may be rescued."[3] Boasting afterwards of the calls sent out in the case of both the *Samoa* and the *Kringsjaa*, the commander of the U-151 said:

On the return voyage, two sailing vessels with copper ore were sunk. After the sinking of these ships I sent wire-

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 45.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

less messages to all that at such and such a point U-boats were active. To prove that the message was understood, I received a reply asking if the positions given were correct. An American warship passed at this point without noticing the incident. One just has to learn how to wage war.[4]

The Norwegian seamen had a rough experience. During June 15 they made some progress toward shore, but were finally separated by a storm and blown far to sea. On the following day they were found by the U.S destroyer *Patterson*, which came across the boat with eleven men in 35° 58′ N., 68° 17′ W., and the other boat a few hours later. The destroyer took them to Lewes, Delaware, arriving on the morning of June 17.

Continuing northeastward, the raider, homeward bound, was sighted on June 15 at 7.30 P.M. by the British steamship *City of Calcutta* in 39° 08′ N., 66° 18′ W., but no attack was attempted. Not until June 18 was the enemy heard from again, but on that day it secured the biggest single haul of the entire raid. The victim was the British transport *Dwinsk*, a vessel of 8,173 gross tons with a length overall of 467 feet, 5 inches, and a 53-foot beam. The *Dwinsk* was westward bound, having landed American troops in Liverpool the previous week. With two deck guns and a British gun crew considered as ample defense in the mid-ocean lanes, the transport was ploughing through a gentle summer sea alone. Spotting the oncoming transport, the U-151 submerged and waited. At exactly nine-seventeen o'clock in the morning, in 38° 30′ N., 61° 15′ W., a single torpedo bored its way into the hull of the *Dwinsk* near Number 4 hatch on the port side aft and exploded. The seamen, rushing up from below, felt the

[4] New York *Times*, September 14, 1918.

decks tilting to port. The British gunners found their weapons useless because of the sharp angle. Captain Nelson gave immediate orders to launch the boats. It was a difficult task on the slanting decks, but seven boats were lowered and one hundred forty-seven officers and men, the full complement of the ship, were crowded into them. Not until the boats had cleared the side by a goodly distance did the submarine appear. It emerged about three miles off and approached the sinking transport. As it neared, an officer on the deck called to the men in the boats, "Hold your oars. We've come to shell the ship. Keep clear." Nineteen shots were discharged at the transport and six were seen to take effect. The U-151 swerved and ran up to the seven boats. It stopped near the one containing the captain. He, however, was disguised in a steward's coat and wore no hat. An officer on the submarine picked out the first mate and ordered him on board. The version as given by the commander of the U-151 follows:

> Upon sinking a transport that was put out of commission by one torpedo, we had an opportunity of studying the new American swimming vest. A most charming fellow in a lifeboat, who took up a huge amount of space, attracted our attention. He was stout by nature and by reason of his giant swimming vest required even more room. Therein we found a whisky flask, a box of provisions, and on the left side a container with compressed air, so that the wearer of this wonder-robe was not even obliged to inflate the swimming vest.[5]

After the mate had answered all the questions the submarine commander had to propound, he was permitted to

[5] New York *Times*, September 14, 1918.

return to the lifeboat and the U-151 dropped somewhat astern. The seven boats held close together and Captain Nelson decided to start northwesterly, believing they stood better chances of being picked up in that direction. In each boat a small mast was rigged up and, with a little spread of canvas, the most was made of a light breeze. The U-boat, instead of leaving them at once to their fate, continued to follow astern and somewhat to the port side, apparently using the sails as a means of effacing itself from observation while running on the surface. It was about three hours after the torpedo had struck that the *Dwinsk* finally went down. By this time the boats were a number of miles away, but the occupants obtained a clear view of the final plunge of the transport. A short while later the American transport *Von Steuben* sighted the array, in 38° 42′ N., 61° 19′ W., but, rightly suspecting a decoy, fired eight shots, none of which were close. The U-151, according to the subsequent report made by the *Von Steuben*, tried a torpedo which passed fifty yards ahead of the transport. Prompt maneuvering undoubtedly saved the big vessel, which dropped depth bombs on the estimated position of the submarine as it passed.[6]

After this encounter, the submarine continued to trail the boats, finally leaving them about dark. The night of June 18 was dark, with not a star in the sky to serve as a guide, and a stiff wind, freshening to gale toward midnight. Each small craft had its own battle to fight. None could look after the others and when day dawned, Captain Nelson found his own boat and one other the sole occupants of that stretch of ocean. Daybreak marked the end of the storm, and, in direct contrast, the sun came out and

[6] Report of Captain Yates Sterling, Jr., U.S.N., Navy Department files.

shone with intense heat throughout both morning and afternoon. All through the day the men at the oars toiled away, rowing steadily westward but knowing that, unless they were picked up by a passing vessel, the chances of gaining the shore through their own unaided efforts were remote. Meanwhile conditions on board were terrible. Both boats leaked badly, necessitating constant bailing and at times, particularly when a heavy rain fell during the night of June 19, they were almost swamped. The rations were limited to one biscuit and a cup of water a day. In forty-eight hours they had rowed and sailed close to two hundred miles and once in the course of that time, on June 20, they spied a transport halfway up the horizon but were afraid to signal it, remembering the reception at the hands of the *Von Steuben* two days before. Then, on Friday, June 21, a third transport appeared and Captain Nelson decided to risk being fired upon. American flares were used and the vessel, instead of sheering away and peppering at them with shells, steamed near, observed they were really in distress and not decoys, and took them on board. The captain and his men, forty-seven in all, arrived in New York on the night of June 23, and within the next twelve hours two other boats were accounted for. One of them, containing seventeen men, had been picked up in 39° 10′ N., 63° W., on June 19, by a schooner from Halifax to Bermuda and had been landed safely at the latter port on June 23. The other, also with seventeen men, had been rescued by an inbound steamer, on June 19, and arrived at Hampton Roads on June 24. Four days later, twenty-four more men arrived at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, on a fishing schooner.

The sixth boat, holding twenty men, was picked up by a freighter on June 28, ten days after the sinking of the

*Dwinsk* and the crew was later transferred to a naval vessel which ran into Norfolk. The original complement of the boat had been twenty-one, but one man, E. Corrie, a naval cadet, had been washed overboard during one of two hurricanes that had struck the small craft. Numbered among the twenty was Lieutenant Ross P. Whitemarsh, U.S.N., whose conduct was subsequently rewarded by the presentation of the Navy Cross, the citation stating:

For distinguished service in the line of his profession as the officer in charge of an open boat which put off from the steamship Dwinsk after the torpedoing of that vessel and remained afloat for ten days, much of the time in a raging storm, before being rescued. His courage and hopefulness under these trying and perilous conditions set an example to others in the boat, maintaining a spirit of cheerfulness when the chances of rescue seemed almost negligible.[7]

What happened to the seventh boat, commanded by the second officer, is unknown. It contained twenty-three men,[8] one of whom was Edward Goldwaithe, U.S.N., a seaman signaller. Perhaps the explanation lies in part in the following news item of June 28, 1918:

Word of another sea tragedy was brought into port [Philadelphia] by a steamship which came in from Europe. About a thousand miles from the Delaware Capes this vessel sighted an overturned lifeboat. Her course was changed to take her nearer the object and when she was a couple of ship lengths away her crew discovered two liferafts, a number of lifebelts and a quantity of wreckage floating close to the upturned boat. Nothing could be learned about the identity of the vessel from which the

[7] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, p. 54.

[8] Letter from Cunard S.S. Company, Philadelphia, to author, March 18, 1920.

wreckage came, but the absence of sea growth and the condition of the paint on the boat and the rafts indicated the disaster which overtook the vessel had been a recent one. The wreckage was sighted on June 21 in 38° 48′ N., 60° 15′ W.[9]

To return to the U-151. After leaving the boats from the *Dwinsk* on the night of June 18, it resumed its homeward journey and at noon on June 22, in 39° 30′ N., 53° 40′ W., approximately fourteen hundred miles off New York, came upon the Belgian freight steamship *Chilier*, a vessel of 2,966 gross tons. The submarine opened fire and the plucky Belgian crew whose sole armament consisting of "an old French 90-mm. gun, which could be loaded with powder and cartridges", attempted resistance. Several ineffective shots were fired in answer to the modern 6-inch projectiles from the U-boat before the crew finally abandoned the ship.[10] Thirty-one members of the crew got away in two boats. They saw the Germans board the *Chilier* and place bombs in the hold. The enemy took a little food and a pair of marine glasses from the steamer and within an hour the ship disappeared under the sea. Then the U-151 left the scene. Late the same afternoon a summer storm capsized one of the boats and six men were drowned. The others were dragged into the remaining craft, making a total of twenty-five men on board. For five days these twenty-five fought for their lives through summer heat and storm. The captain took charge of the meager rations and doled them out, a sip of water and a nibble of biscuit apiece each day. At the end of the fifth day the half-famished men had consumed a biscuit apiece and a single glass of water. On June 27, about one thou-

[9] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 28, 1918.

[10] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 49.

sand miles from land, a sailing vessel came along, the first craft they had seen, and took them on board. They reached New York on July 1 to add their story to the swelling total of U-boat destruction.[11]

On June 23, the day after the *Chilier* was sunk, the U-151 secured its final victim. It was the Norwegian steamer *Augwald,* bound from France to Baltimore. It was shelled without warning at nine o'clock in the morning in 38° 30′ N., 53° 42′ W. Captain Hans Hoye immediately ordered the crew to abandon ship and two boats were lowered, the captain and twelve men going in one and the chief officer and thirteen men in the other. Not until they had pulled away did the submarine approach the steamer. It then ran up close to the *Augwald* and fired a number of shots. One of these lodged in the after bunker compartment and exploded. Within a half hour the ship sank. The U-151 paid no attention to the lifeboats and submerged. On the second day the weather grew very stormy and the boats became separated. The one containing the captain was picked up several days later by an eastbound vessel and the thirteen men were landed at Gibraltar.[12] The chief officer's boat fared far worse. For three days the sea ran heavy and a stiff gale blew. Four times the boat overturned and was righted after desperate struggles. In these disasters three of the crew were drowned, the chief officer, third engineer and boatswain. The chief engineer, Alfred Pederson, who had succeeded to the command, was almost lost. Upon one occasion he was pinned under a gunwale. He had an overcoat and it was some time before he managed to shake off the encumbrance. Finally his companions dragged him back on top

[11] New York *Times,* July 2, 1918.

[12] Statement to author by Norwegian consul, Philadelphia.

the overturned craft. With the first capsizing, oars, provisions and other valuable articles floated away or sank. Only by careful balancing was the boat kept upright. In bailing, caps and sou'westers were used, two men holding a coat so as to form a huge cup. After the rain stopped, the sun came out and dried the salt on the men's clothes and blistered the skin from their bodies. With the loss of the food, they ate what they could catch out of the sea and small marine animals on pieces of seaweed drifting by. For eleven days the torment continued until July 4, when the British steamer *Haverford* picked them up and four days later landed them in Philadelphia. A graphic story of the rescue was given by Captain Jones, of the *Haverford:*

We sighted the boat which held these men on the morning of July 4 about 8 o'clock. The chief engineer was on watch at the time and sighted a black object floating on the sea. He reported to me and we made an investigation. The first thought which crossed our minds was that it was a German decoy. I kept a strong telescope trained on the object as we approached it and could at last make out the forms of men huddled in the bottom of the boat. Even then I was very cautious of approach and kept a sharp lookout all around the ship. The minute the poor devils in the boat saw I could recognize them, they collapsed in a heap at the bottom. Then I decided that no trickery was intended and lowered a boat. Finally we had them all safe on board our ship. I wish I could describe the condition of the men. They were mere skeletons and almost unconscious from hunger, thirst and exposure. I put them under the care of the ship's doctor and chief steward. Though they were put to bed at once, none of them could sleep but kept begging piteously for something to eat. At first they were fed nothing but bread soaked in beef broth.

We dared not give them all they asked for or they would have died, so starved were they. They begged for more and it was mighty hard to refuse them. When they were asked to go to sleep they said they had had plenty of sleep and that now they wanted to eat, not sleep. In a day or two they began to improve and were finally put on the full ship's rations.[13]

After the sinking of the *Augwald*, the U-151 nosed northeasterly in the first stage of the course around the north of the British Isles and, in so doing, encountered several armed ships from a convoy that had been scattered by storm. The first of these was the British steamship *Glenlee*, which, with a dozen other vessels, had started from New York, on June 15, under convoy of the U.S. cruiser *Columbia*. The *Glenlee* had fallen far behind the rest and, at 7 A.M. on June 25, was intercepted by the U-151 in 40° N., 49° W. The British gunners offered so effective a resistance that the enemy finally gave up the attack, but not before the ship's wireless calls had been caught by the rest of the convoy. One of these, the United States Navy cargo-carrier *Dochra*, had also become separated from the convoying cruiser, and the U-151 located it, at 7 P.M. the same day, in 40° 25′ N., 47° 29′ W. The *Dochra* was carrying a cargo of hydroplanes to France, and would have been a valuable addition to the enemy's toll. The submarine opened fire at a distance of a mile and a half, firing three shots, all of which fell astern. The *Dochra* replied with ten shells from its 4-inch guns and the aim of the navy gunners was too close to the U-151 for comfort. The U-boat submerged and it was feared it would try and run up close undetected

[13] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, July 15, 1918.

and torpedo the steamer. The convoying cruiser, far ahead with the main part of the fleet, solved this danger by ordering the *Dochra* to return to Halifax.[14]

Two days later, on June 27, the *Lake Forest*, another navy cargo-carrier, met the U-151. This encounter was in 41° 12′ N., 44° 03′ W., some distance east and north of the spot where the *Dochra* was attacked. The *Lake Forest* was westward bound from Clyde, Scotland, and engaged in a running fight from 6 A.M. until 7.25 A.M., the U-boat firing sixty shots and the steamer twenty-four rounds. The navy vessel, skilfully handled by its commander, Lieutenant H. R. O. Johnson, kept the enemy at a distance, while the gun crews, under Lieutenant H. F. Berg, U.S.N.R.F., made the return fire so effective that the U-151 finally gave up the fight.

The course of the submarine on its homeward journey was traced almost daily by encounters with steamers. On June 28 the U.S. army transport *McClellan* sighted it in 42° 15′ N., 41° 19′ W., and the U.S. cruiser *Minneapolis* reported it in 42° 17′ N., 41° 22′ W. The U.S.S. *Lake Erie* sent an "allo" regarding it, on July 2, from 40° 12′ N., 33° 55′ W., and an unidentified steamer radioed, on July 5, that it was being chased in 45° 40′ N., 25° 30′ W. The last encounter was with the British steamship *Nevassa* which was chased, on July 6, in 49° 06′ N., 26° 51′ W. From that date on, the U-151 attempted no more forays. It passed successfully through the mine fields and finally returned to Kiel before July 31, 1918.

In the period that it conducted the raid, from May 25, when the *Hattie Dunn*, *Hauppauge* and *Edna* were attacked, until June 23, when the *Augwald* was sent down, a total of twenty-three victims was secured. This figure

[14] Manuscript narrative, Robert W. Martz, U.S.N.

includes the tanker *Herbert L. Pratt*, sunk by a mine at the mouth of the Delaware. Not all of the vessels were total losses, the *Herbert L. Pratt* and the schooners *Edna* and *Hauppauge* being salvaged. The gross tonnage of the twenty-three victims was 58,028 (See Table I), which, less the amount salvaged, left a loss of 50,885 tons. Thirteen of the ships attacked successfully were American, seven were Norwegian, two were British and one was Belgian. The Norwegian losses totaled 16,508 gross tons; the British, 12,761; the Belgian, 2,966, and the American, excluding that salvaged, 18,650. The largest victim was the *Dwinsk*, of 8,173 tons; the next largest, the *Carolina*, of 5,093 tons, and the smallest, the schooner *Edward R. Baird, Jr.*, of 279 tons. Divided by class, twenty steamers, totaling 42,023 tons, and eight sailing vessels, totaling 8,862 tons, were destroyed.

In the period of the raid, the U-151 extracted a toll of forty-seven lives, two of whom were women. The greatest loss occurred when the *Dwinsk* was torpedoed, one boat with twenty-three occupants disappearing at sea and a man in another boat being drowned. The second highest toll was the capsizing of the *Carolina's* motor launch, which cost thirteen lives. Six men were lost on the *Chilier;* three when a boat from the *Augwald* overturned, and one on the *Vindeggan.* Approximately seven hundred men and women were forced to seek safety in ships' boats when their vessels were captured, which, with forty-seven lives lost, establishes a proportion of one death to every fifteen rescues.

The monetary loss exceeded twenty-five million dollars, this figure including the value of ships and cargoes. The United States Shipping Board announced the value of the *Carolina*, *Pinar del Rio* and *Winneconne*, but not

of the respective cargoes. The Shipping Board estimate placed the *Carolina* at "probably exceeding $500,000"; the *Pinar del Rio*, "probably exceeding $450,000"; and the *Winneconne*, $400,000. The total loss in the case of the *Texel*, with its cargo of sugar, was $2,000,000. The *Vindeggan*, with a cargo of copper ore, was probably higher, and a similar cargo on the *Samoa* was also of value. Nor were the *Pinar del Rio's* twenty-five thousand bags of coffee and the *Vinland's* and *Eidsvold's* cargoes of sugar small spoils.

The raid, while productive of large tonnage losses, failed in its efforts either to terrorize the American shores, to paralyze coastal shipping, or to intercept and interrupt the transportation of troops overseas. For the first few days of June the appearance of the U-151 caused some trepidation. The American public, in securing its first taste of submarine activity, could not surmise how far the storied ruthlessness as practised in Europe would be invoked in home waters. Later the general mind became calmer and, in the latter days of the raid, the news of additional victims only aroused a grimmer spirit to win the war. In fact, it is a question whether the U-151's activities in fomenting increased hostilitity against the common enemy did not enlist the nation more heartily in the cause of the Allies. The element of surprise, on June 2, enabled the raider to send down six ships, but subsequently, with the convoy system operating, the toll for a single day never exceeded two vessels and many days elapsed during which none was destroyed. During the entire period coastal shipping, routed by the navy and well guarded, carried on the nation's commerce, the only interruption being the few days elapsing before convoying on a large scale could be carried out. Not once, in the thirty days that the U-boat

was off the coast, did it molest an outward-bound transport. Yet, during the month of June, a total of 280, 434 American troops sailed from Atlantic ports in 128 vessels. This figure was the highest attained up to that time and was exceeded only by the figures for the two months which followed.[15]

[15] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1919, p. 206.

# CHAPTER IX

## BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND RAIDS

THE departure of the U-151 from the vicinity of the coast was not apparent for several days after the sinking of the two Norwegian sailing vessels, *Samoa* and *Kringsjaa* on June 14. Distress calls from a number of ships implied that the submarine was nearer shore than actual results showed. Even with the knowledge that one submarine was headed home, the Navy Department was not certain that a second U-boat might not have eluded the British information service and be lurking in western Atlantic waters. In particular, an "allo" at 7.10 P.M., June 13, from the steamship *Cornelia*, giving its position as eighteen miles southeast of Horseshoe Light Vessel, almost at the mouth of the Virginia capes, and apparently substantiated the next day by the story of the schooner *Massasoit*, gave grounds for this uncertainty. The latter craft reported, on June 14, to the steamship *William P. Palmer* that, on the preceding night, while ten miles off Winter Quarter Lightship, a submarine came to the surface and stood near by for two hours. No attempt to molest the *Massasoit* was made. The schooner and the *Cornelia* probably encountered an Ameri-

can submarine. When a few days later, on June 16, the U.S. armored cruiser *Frederick* reported by wireless that its convoy had been attacked by a U-boat, the position given, 37° 23′ N., 71° 37′ W., was further eastward than any encounters so far made known. This might have relieved naval minds had not the steamship *Australcrage*, on the same day, sent an "allo" from 38° 05′ N., 74° 46′ W., a location again presaging activities nearer the Virginia capes. Even as late as June 20, the navy was still looking for the enemy in neighboring waters and the commandant of the Third District offered a reward of one thousand dollars "to any person who furnishes authentic information of any actual submarine base, reserving the right to decide who is entitled to such reward and to apportion the reward if two or more persons find such information."[1] The arrival of survivors of the *Samoa* and *Kringsjaa* and the report from the transport *Von Steuben* that it had encountered a submarine far at sea, on June 18, finally brought the certainty that the marauder or marauders were headed home. On this premise, and from various S.O.S. calls received, the Navy Department sent a warning on June 25, "to shipping operating in the area east of longitude forty, between the latitude of Cape Race and Bermuda."

The precautionary measures taken with coastal shipping had resulted, by this time, in a long series of accidents, inevitable under the circumstances. To bring ships close to shore meant the increased hazard of grounding, and to run without lights made collision a very present risk. Vessels lost through either of these causes were indirect results of the submarine raids and should be so classed. The first accident reported was on June 16, when the Cuban

[1] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, June 21, 1918.

passenger and freight steamship *Bavaria* " hugged itself " into the treacherous shoal water off Absecon Light, Atlantic City, and grounded. After eighteen hours of work, during which a quantity of the general cargo was shifted, the vessel was floated at high tide, on June 17, and resumed its voyage.

More serious was the second accident, the loss of the U.S. gunboat *Schurz*, formerly the German warship *Geier*, which was sunk near dawn, of June 21, off the coast of North Carolina in collision with the tanker *Florida*. The *Schurz*, manned chiefly by a crew of naval reservists, was stealing up the coast without lights when the huge steel hulk of the tanker emerged from the darkness and gouged a great hole in the gunboat's side. There were 217 officers and men on the *Schurz*. One seaman, Manuel Gouveia, Jr., was killed in the stokehold when an iron bolt crashed against his head at the moment of impact. Ten others were injured but the remainder escaped unscathed. The order to abandon ship was carried out with splendid discipline. Captain W. D. Wells, who had sustained a broken rib, remained at his post directing the launching of the boats. John M. Kiser, machinist's mate, and two water tenders, James A. Donnellan and Fay R. Rabon, in the engine and fire rooms respectively, got their men on deck and remained on duty until ordered out by the engineering officer, Lieutenant Olva Johnson. When Donnellan left his post, the water was up to his waist. Lieutenant A. W. Schwerin made a minute inspection of the damaged part of the ship, giving accurate reports and striving to find some way to keep the vessel afloat. Lieutenant E. B. Rogers, who had aided Lieutenant Schwerin in the inspection of the damaged compartments, afterwards saved all the confidential papers he could carry and destroyed the rest. Un-

der the direction of the captain and the executive officer, Lieutenant G. F. Howell, all of the lifeboats were lowered, Quartermaster Virgil W. Dinell handling those on one side and Boatswain's Mate Claude H. Judson, those on the other. Dinell refused to descend to his craft until he had assisted Captain Wells to safety. A number of the men were forced to leap into the water and the rescue of these was directed by Lieutenant J. E. Shaw, who was painfully injured. A motor sailing launch and a motor dory, commanded respectively by Seaman David Sarran and Coxswain Edward C. Bryant, performed efficient work in picking up those in the water. The collision had occurred at 4 A.M. and wireless calls from both the *Schurz* and the tanker brought immediate assistance from a steamer inbound from the West Indies. This vessel arrived before the *Schurz* sank and stood by, receiving the men from the small boats and also those who had been picked up by the *Florida*. A number of the seamen had to be lifted from the boats by means of a hoisting chair because of their injuries. Despite his broken rib, Captain Wells personally called a muster of his crew on the deck of the rescue vessel. The following day the survivors were landed in Norfolk, and, about a month later, many of the officers and men mentioned above received commendatory letters from Secretary Daniels.

The third accident came on June 29 when the American steamship *Hattie Gage*, keeping close in, under orders, ran aground four hundred yards from the shore line off the Virginia coast. A heavy sea was running at the time. In an effort to launch one of the boats, Alvin Dowling, the first mate, was drowned. A little later, the coast guard shot a line across the ship and Captain H. Heinke and the crew were hauled to safety in a breeches buoy.

The Navy Department was still hearing of ships destroyed by the U-151 on its homeward journey when Admiral Sims notified it that the British information service had located another raider headed toward the American coast. He cabled on June 29, 1918, stating:

Second cruiser submarine at sea. At present off west coast of Ireland. Her field of operations not yet known. Cannot reach longitude of Nantucket before July fifteenth. Shall keep department informed.

Six days later, on July 5, he cabled that the U-boat had been reported, on July 4, about 45° N., 35° W., proceeding southwesterly. Immediately after receipt of the first warning, an important change was made in the method of convoying overseas vessels from American ports. Up until that time Squadron Number 1, cruiser force, had been engaged in escorting troop transports and the fast merchant convoys from New York, and Squadron Number 2 in escorting medium-speed merchant convoys out of New York and Newport News at regular eight-day intervals. The previous exacting duties of the cruisers now were increased by the necessity of escorting transports from Newport News until they joined up at the rendezvous with the New York section of the group. This required cruisers to be held at Hampton Roads for the escort of the fast transports from Newport News as well as for the slower merchantmen.[2] So that all vessels at sea might be prepared, the Navy Department issued a warning, on July 2, stating that a lone submarine had been sighted on that afternoon in mid-Atlantic, headed due west. The next day the British Admiralty, from its Canadian stations, and the Navy Department, from Arlington, broadcasted a warning to

[2] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1919, p. 25.

watch out for U-boats in the areas between 45° N., and 35° N. On July 5, as a further safeguard, Secretary Daniels issued the following appeal to "The Press of America":

The appearance of submarines on the Atlantic coast makes it imperative that no mention should be made in any newspapers, either in the advertising or news columns, of the sailing or departure or location or supposed location of any ship in American waters. This information conveyed by advertising is as dangerous as in the news columns, and I am making this request to all newspapers in the country in the assurance that they will co-operate with the Government to prevent any information about ships reaching submarines which may be off the American coast.

Three specific disasters occurred in the first week of July, none of which shook the morale or efficiency of the navy, although two of them were of a nature which might have affected the efforts to combat the submarine had it appeared off the coast at that particular time.

The first occurred on July 2 when the Canadian troopship *City of Vienna*, a vessel of 6,111 gross tons, laden with seven hundred soldiers, went ashore on Black Rock, near Sambro Island Lighthouse, while proceeding out of Halifax, Nova Scotia. The grounding of the transport resulted in a brave deed by American seamen. Two American converted yachts, the U.S.S. *Aztec* and U.S.S. *Niagara*, were in the convoy, when the *City of Vienna* jammed itself against Black Rock, a jutting promontory which has often proved fatal to shipping in that region. British vessels had succeeded in transshipping the troops on board when the *Aztec* and *Niagara* reached the spot, but there remained behind twenty-six officers and men of the crew, who had

been marooned when a dense fog descended over the area. The *Niagara* ran in as near the vicinity of the transport as it dared and then called for volunteers to man a boat and go aboard. Four times as many volunteered as were needed. Lieutenant R. H. O'Brien, U.S.N.R.F., who secured the coveted right to command the boat, selected nine men at random, to which was added a tenth, Assistant Surgeon Louis Iverson, U.S.N., who insisted that he be taken along to render medical aid to any who might be injured. The longboat put off in the fog with a heavy sea rolling, and, after a tedious and dangerous pull, finally came upon the stranded steamer. The twenty-six Britishers were removed in safety and the boat started a return trip which was just as perilous. Aided by foghorns, Lieutenant O'Brien set a course toward what he thought was the *Niagara*, and brought up, in the course of an hour, alongside the *Aztec*, which was also contemplating a relief boat. The men from the *City of Vienna* were taken on board the American yacht and the following day transferred to a British ship.[3] The *City of Vienna* was a complete loss.

The second disaster occurred the same day when fire was discovered in the hold of the U.S. navy transport *Henderson*, two days out of New York with a full passenger list of soldiers and marines. The sole information regarding this fire made public during the war period consisted of the following brief paragraph:

[3] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, pp. 271, 278, 296, 298–300, 302, 304. The nine enlisted men from the *Niagara* were Gunner's Mate Robert E. Hill, Quartermaster Floyd B. Landis, Boatswain's Mate Frank L. Pease, Pharmacist's Mate Raymound E. Shoup, Coxswain Benedict L. Knitter and Seamen Walter E. Fox, Lincoln C. Freels, James C. Ogilvie and Edward J. Teevan.

Washington, July 5; The United States Army Transport Henderson has been afire at sea, but has made an Atlantic port in safety. Few details could be had at the Navy Department tonight, but it was said that the vessel was not badly damaged. It was not made known whether the Henderson was outbound or homebound, nor was there any information as to how the fire occurred.[4]

This despatch is a remarkable illustration of the tightness of the naval censorship. The burning of the *Henderson* occurred scarcely more than one hundred miles off the Atlantic coast; the damaged vessel made its way westward to the Delaware capes with the fire still smoldering in the hold and ascended the Delaware to the Philadelphia Navy Yard between banks, which, day and night, were beehives of activity, yet the story never leaked out. The account of the fire on the transport, like the rescue of the twenty-six men from the *City of Vienna*, shows how the best traditions of the American Navy were upheld. The *Henderson* carried twenty-two hundred troops, the majority of whom were marines. The transport, a vessel of ten thousand tons, four hundred ninety feet long and ninety feet beam, was one of a large convoy.

At five-thirty o'clock in the afternoon of July 2 a member of the crew detected smoke coming from the third hold, next to the forward magazine, and, upon advice from a petty officer, immediately went to the bridge with his information. An investigation showed the thermostat fire-alarms under deck beginning to drop, and the stores in the third hold blazing furiously. Without a trace of panic, officers and men went to work with fire hose, striving to extinguish the blaze before it spread any farther. While the troops on board observed the calm air of veterans, the

[4] New York *Times*, July 6, 1918.

seamen battled for three hours, when it was seen that the fire was getting beyond control. At nine o'clock, after darkness had descended, it was decided to transship the soldiers and marines to another vessel in the convoy. The transfer took three hours, during which destroyers hovered around the two ships, the *Henderson* glowing red between its plates, the *Von Steuben* standing by and receiving boatload after boatload of men. Several of the destroyers nosed up against the *Henderson* and the marines and soldiers swung down ladder and rope to their decks. It was smooth weather, otherwise the transfer could never have been effected. With the ship clear of all but the crew, the *Henderson* turned back toward the nearest port — Philadelphia — two destroyers bearing it company. Hour after hour the fight with the flames was conducted, but it seemed to be a losing one. During every minute there was danger that the fire would communicate to the magazines. Seamen, bare to the waist and with cloths tied around their mouths and noses, kept streams of water on both magazines, fore and aft. Toward morning Commander George W. Steele decided to make half the crew leave the stricken ship. The men demurred. In fact, they had to be forced over the side into the destroyers. The hand pumps were manned, in addition to the steam pumps, but a decided list toward the bows kept increasing. The ports on the starboard side were cracked and buckled with the heat and were also under water, letting the sea in faster than it could be pumped out. It looked black for the *Henderson*, so black that the commander of one of the destroyers sent an urgent wireless message to Captain Steele to abandon the ship. The latter disdained even to answer the suggestion. In the emergency a carpenter's mate named Rathside volunteered to go below and put leak stoppers on the sub-

merged ports. He stripped and dove into the scummy water, avoiding some spots where oil was blazing upon the surface. The man reached the third platform and succeeded in his task, coming to the surface exhausted by the ordeal. The leak stoppers served their purpose. With an abatement of the water being shipped, the pumps began to make sufficient headway so that, by shifting an overhead crane, the crew was able to bring the submerged ports above the surface and render them water-tight.

By this time, after dawn on July 3, the fire was pretty well under control, although it had gutted everything over the third hold and warped the decks. The steel plating above the magazines was steaming and the concrete floor on the main deck, which was three platforms and the lower deck's distance from the hold, was swelled out of shape. All during that day the fire smoldered and occasionally leaped forth, when fanned by a vagrant breeze. Flames would come shooting up the trunk shaft and out over the decks. Added to this, the abundance of water in the upper holds was overbalancing the transport, threatening to turn it over. Once, at 2 A.M. on the morning of July 4, the *Henderson* swung way over until almost flat on the water with its scuppers under. The crew was too exhausted even to become excited at the imminent peril. Somehow the transport righted itself, but it was realized that unless the water in the upper holds was removed, the vessel was not going to stay on an even keel. Captain Steele decided to try the experiment of releasing the water in the upper holds into the magazines, and also getting into the peak and turning the dogs on the cargo hatches. The manifold valves were badly warped but responded at last to hammering. The question of getting into the peak was more of a problem. It meant descending through the trunk hole,

which was partially filled with water, to a depth of forty feet. Chief Gunner's Mate John W. Duffy volunteered for the deed. He was equipped with a diver's helmet, the rest of the suit being missing, and down he went. He came up with the job done and the effect upon the buoyancy of the transport was immediate. The troubles were not yet at an end, as a little later in the night the transport dipped its bow so deep that the propellers raced in the air astern and it was necessary to stop the engines for fear of a head-on dive. Once more the *Henderson* righted itself. Then, at a pace which resembled a crawl and with the fire still smoldering in the third hold, it reached the Delaware capes and passed up the river to gain the Philadelphia Navy Yard on the third night. Just before reaching a dock, the transport shoved its nose into the mud in the back channel, but managed to extricate itself without assistance.[5] A Board of Inquiry sat immediately after the *Henderson* arrived, and, having determined the cause of the fire as spontaneous combustion, absolved any one from blame for the disaster. The following minute, used later by Secretary Daniels to commend thirty-three officers and men, was adopted:

> Good discipline prevailed on board throughout, and that all possible efforts were made to preserve the ship and personnel — all in a thoroughly seamanlike and officerlike manner. That the officers and men concerned are worthy of commendation for the service rendered in saving the ship and in the safe and successful transfer at sea of a large number of men from the Henderson to other ships, such transfer taking place at night.[6]

[5] Personal narrative of Chief Gunner's Mate John W. Duffy, U.S.N., Philadelphia.

[6] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, pp. 257, 259–269, 272, 274, 278–280, 282–285. The following officers and men were commended:

Some hours before the *Henderson* reached the Delaware Breakwater, the third disaster took place. It was the destruction by flames of the Sewell's Point, New Jersey, section base, the headquarters of the Fourth Naval District's submarine patrol fleet. The origin of the fire, which broke out at 10.30 A.M., July 4, when the base was practically deserted, most of the force being participants in an Independence Day pageant at Cape May, is undetermined. The loss, three hundred twenty-seven thousand dollars, included the most complete equipment of naval stores on the New Jersey coast. Within a few minutes after the discovery of the flames most of the station was ablaze. Calls were sent to the fire departments at Cape May Wildwood, Anglesea and the Wissahickon barracks of the naval reserve. The efforts of all fire fighters proved futile in a stiff northwest wind.

From subsequent investigation it was found that the flames started beneath a one-story frame structure which housed the post-office and numerous small offices. This building was in a nest of other structures, all frame, and all connected by covered passageways with the barracks. The barracks had once been an amusement resort and its

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Lieutenant J. L. Barnswell, Lieutenant G. Bannerman, Lieutenant Commander W. C. Barker, Lieutenant E. T. Brown, Ensign H. L. Carlson, Acting Pay Clerk W. Davis, Lieutenant H. D. Dougherty, Gunner W. S. Durkee, Ensign B. J. Eastman, Ensign C. E. Eaton, Ensign B. Allison, Ensign A. Elzey, Ensign N. W. Emery, Ensign J. H. Enwright, Lieutenant S. A. Folsom, Medical Corps; Ensign F. H. Flagg, Gunner W. F. Frizzle, Ensign E. A. Green, Machinist H. S. Goucher, Lieutenant Commander S. Hempstone, Lieutenant Henry F. Horan, Lieutenant J. C. Hamre, Boatswain F. Jeffrey, Ensign Charles J. Lamb, Ensign I. R. McKean, Ensign George F. Pushaw, Ensign R. M. Rush, Ensign C. J. Shull, Lieutenant F. Schultz, Commander George W. Steele, Carpenter A. Stiner, Lieutenant Frederick A. Stevenson, Ensign N. D. Sample, Lieutenant Alf Swendsen and Lieutenant Q. R. Thomson.

main room was a tower which was raised to a height of about eighty-five feet. The tower stood at the northeastern end of the cluster, a covered passageway connecting it with the two-storied administration building. The tower, passageway and administration offices fronted directly on the dock facing the bay. Behind the tower, the remainder of the barracks building ran due west. Behind the administration offices was the mess hall and in between was the post-office building and the source of the fire. Across a street (Beach Avenue) from the rear of the barracks and mess hall stood the frame pay office and beyond that the hospital. To the right of the administration offices, but separated by a considerable open space, was the powder magazine and behind the powder magazine was the garage, built of corrugated iron.

All of the frame buildings were of dry pine and they blazed furiously from the start. It was apparent that nothing could save the cluster and every effort was concentrated upon preventing the destruction of the powder and the gasoline, the latter being stored directly to the right of the garage. Enlisted men were detailed to get as much of the supplies out of the burning buildings as possible and a call was issued for volunteers to save the powder. A battleship submarine net, which had been sent to the base for drill purposes, was resurrected, weighted with shot and dropped into the bay just beyond the dock and to the right of the main wharf. A dozen men carried shells and powder bags from the magazine and dropped them over into the submerged net. Everything was salvaged except the powder for the 6-inch gun mounted at the end of the wharf. The water soaked through the silk bags and so damaged it that it had to be sent back to the manufacturer to be dried out. The wind velocity, fortunately, was seaward,

which saved both the garage and hospital, as well as the aviation base, which was some distance to the rear of the latter. The pay office burned and the barracks and adjoining structures were totally destroyed. Two enlisted men were overcome by smoke and many acts of bravery recorded. Aside from the monetary loss to the Government, the fire wiped out every vestige of clothing and equipment owned by the two hundred fifty men who comprised the section base personnel. They saved only the uniforms they had worn for the Cape May parade. Sixty tents, sheltering three men each, were pitched near the spot that afternoon, and the remainder of the force was quartered in a near-by hotel until adequate arrangements could be made to take care of all.[7]

The problem confronting the navy with another submarine headed westward was difficult of solution. The U-boat menace had to be met but not a single warship could be called home from abroad. An offensive against the undersea boats had to be undertaken, although the paramount duty was to safeguard the transports and cargo boats destined for France. Everything else was secondary, yet the Navy Department dared neglect nothing. The loss of a ship in the war zone was to be expected; the loss of a vessel along the Atlantic coast, as evidenced in the first raid, meant recrimination, editorial attack and, perhaps, congressional denunciation.

Naval craft available for effective work against the submarine were scarcely more numerous in early July than they had been during the raid of the U-151. Some additional sub-chasers had been commissioned and, by transfer from less exposed districts, the fleets of small vessels based around Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia and

[7] Personal narrative, Ensign Paul Hartranft, U.S.N.R.F.

Norfolk, had been augmented slightly. Also some few American coast-defense submarines had reached each of the five districts. To offset this, another contingent of sub-chasers had sailed from Newport for Europe, via Bermuda, taking from all of the districts crews experienced in hunting during the June raid.

It had been established by Admiral Sims that another submarine was headed westward. There yet remained the most vital problem — the point where it would begin operations. Until some definite idea could be gleaned there could be no concentration of hunt squadrons in given areas, no specific step to safeguard any particularly exposed shipping or coastal point. Awaiting something authentic, naval operations learned that the oncoming U-boat had been sighted, on July 8, in 40° N., 50° W., and so notified all districts. Following this, the hunt squadron headed by the U.S. destroyer *Jouett,* and which had been provisioning at Cape May, put to sea, on July 10, to patrol the area south of Long Island.

There was renewed activity also in the aerial patrols. Twelve naval aviation patrol units had been created and trained, this including one in the Panama Canal zone and two in Nova Scotia. From these constant flights were carried on over shore waters.[8] Three accidents, two of them fatal, occurred in this period. On July 11, seaplane 1860, containing two aviators, was forced to descend on the sea off the New Jersey coast and was picked up the same day by the steamship *Carago.* Two days later, Ensign Junius F. Andrews was killed near Chatham, Massachusetts, and Ensign Parks seriously injured, when their seaplane crashed on the beach. On July 19, Lieutenant Arthur F. Souther met death in an accident near Providence, Rhode

[8] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1919, p. 43.

Island, his machine falling one hundred feet into the water.

While the navy awaited the opening of the second raid, the Treasury Department, on July 11, issued an order making "it obligatory for the owners of all American merchant vessels leaving Atlantic and Gulf ports in the United States for any ports whatsoever, and vice versa, including vessels engaged in coastwise traffic, to insure the masters, officers and crews against the loss of life or personal injury, or capture, caused by the risks of war." The new order went into effect on July 13 for vessels sailing from the United States and on July 28 for vessels sailing from foreign ports. It also provided for the reduction of the monthly insurance rate on fishing vessels and their cargoes from three fourths of one cent per one hundred dollars to one half of one cent.[9]

Accidents continued to pile up as the suspense regarding the whereabouts of the U-boat continued. On July 10 the American steamer *Oostereijk* was in collision eight hundred miles off the coast with the steamship *San Jacinto*, the crash occurring at night. The former ship sank soon afterwards and the crew was transferred to the *San Jacinto*. On July 16, the French steamship *Jean Laurent*, bound for Philadelphia with mineral oil, ran aground on Fenwick Island Shoal, and was floated two days afterwards, and, on July 18, the United States Shipping Board steamer *Gorredijk* ran aground on McCries Shoal, off the Delaware, but was floated without damage.

The first authentic word regarding the raider was received by the Navy Department on July 12, when the crew of a Norwegian bark, the *Manx King*, was brought into port by a British steamer and reported that their ship

[9] Official U.S. Bulletin, July 11, 1918.

had been captured by a U-boat. Two days later the steamer which had reported sighting a submarine on July 8, in 40° N., 50° W., arrived in New York with a story of a running fight with the enemy. A second victim was reported on July 17, when the crew of the Norwegian bark *Marosa* rowed ashore at Cranberry Island, Nova Scotia, and stated that their craft had been destroyed on July 7. Each of these three encounters were south of Capt Race and too far out to give any definite idea of the enemy's destination. The suspense was broken, on the morning of July 19, by what Admiral Sims later called "the only real victory" of the submarine raids in American waters.[10]

[10] Sims' "The Victory at Sea", p. 319.

## CHAPTER X

# THE U.S. ARMORED CRUISER

## *SAN DIEGO*

THE Navy Department's uncertainty regarding the whereabouts of Germany's latest submarine raider was solved, on July 19, by the loss of the U.S. armored cruiser *San Diego,* which struck a mine ten miles southeast of Fire Island, a tiny atoll off the Long Island shore, and went down in twenty minutes. The cruiser sank, its 6-inch guns firing until the water rushed into the gun ports, without once sighting a U-boat, but its destruction proved that the enemy, last heard of in the vicinity of Cape Race, had made its way almost to the mouth of New York Harbor and had deposited mines in the converging channels leading to the chief port in the United States. The suspense had ended but at a high cost. The enemy had "gotten" his first American capital ship almost in the shadow of Manhattan.

A naval aviator brought the first news of the disaster. Summer residents on Fire Island and in Babylon, a resort on Long Island, had heard the distant mutter of guns at sea a few minutes before the seaplane came to the surface and taxied shoreward. The pilot disengaged himself from

*Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.*

*The U. S. Armored Cruiser* San Diego, *sunk by a mine off Fire Island*

a host of questioners and sped to an observation post where a telegraph wire communicated directly with the Fire Island wireless station. Not until he had sent his message would he consent to an interruption. Then he answered the persistent queries with the statement that an American cruiser was sinking ten miles at sea and that he had seen at least one thousand men struggling in the water. It was shortly before noon that the first alarm, the message from the aviator, went broadcast. The Fire Island wireless station had a powerful equipment. Its appeal was caught by every ship within the radius of several hundred miles and by every naval shore station from Boston to Norfolk. Telephone wires in the Third Naval District burned with instructions for the next few minutes. The coast guards at Fire Island and Oak Island were ordered out; seven or eight patrol boats were sent from the naval training station at Sayville and larger naval craft despatched down Lower New York Bay and eastward past Ambrose Channel Lightship. By noon, every available craft was on the way to the scene. The aviator had given the exact location — 40° 30′ N., 73° W.

Just over the horizon, ten miles southeast of Fire Island, the sinking of the *San Diego* had called forth from officers and men a demonstration of American heroism which takes rank with the same indomitable navy spirit displayed in every vicissitude of the World War and all the other wars that have gone before. The *San Diego* was one of ten ships of the armored cruiser class, a type which was called upon for the bulk of mid-sea convoying. It had rounded Cape Cod the preceding night, en route from the Portsmouth Navy Yard to New York, and, as it steamed westward, paralleling the coast of Long Island, at a speed of fifteen knots, it was "zigzagging by an approved plan",

to quote from the report of the subsequent board of investigation. The cruiser was a powerful fighting ship as armored cruisers go. Behind the 6-inch armor belt were four 8-inch, fourteen 6-inch and eighteen 3-inch guns, four 3-pounders and three 18-inch torpedo tubes. Surmounting the superstructure were four funnels, one military mast and one basket mast. With a displacement of 13,680 tons, twin-screw engines gave a maximum speed of twenty-two knots, and the 502 feet of length and proportionate breadth housed a crew of 1,189 officers and men. The *San Diego* had coaled at Portsmouth and the commander, Captain H. H. Christy, had maintained a careful inspection watch during this process " to prevent the introduction of any foreign matter in the coal bunkers." As the cruiser zigzagged westward through the coastal waters " all lookouts, gun watches, fire control parties, etc., as prescribed by the ' orders for ships in convoy ' of the cruiser and transport force, were at their stations and on the alert. All reasonable and necessary orders to safeguard the water-tight integrity of the ship in dangerous waters had been given and were being carried out."[1] Below decks, the atmosphere was entirely different. The vessel was due in New York within a few hours and liberty parties had been formed. The men who had secured the right to go ashore as soon as the ship docked were busily engaged on personal adornment and repair of their wardrobes. Some were shaving, others were sewing on buttons and many were mending rents or scrubbing stains and spots on trousers and jackets.

At five minutes after eleven o'clock that morning, the *San Diego* was jarred to the keel by a violent explosion on the port side just aft of the forward port engine room.

[1] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, pp. 206–207.

The impact of this external blow (afterwards established as contact with a floating mine) ruptured the steel hull of the big cruiser below the water line and at the same time twisted the bulkhead dividing the port engine room from Number 8 fire room, the next compartment aft. The twisting of the bulkhead bulged the casing in which the water-tight door between the engine and fire rooms swung. The steel barrier, designed to seal either compartment in the event the other should be flooded, failed in the emergency, and the sea, pouring through the gap in the outer hull, swirled from the fire room to the engine room. Three men died at the instant of the explosion, either killed by the concussion or drowned like rats in a trap as the water engulfed them.[2] One man only came out of the inferno. Machinist's Mate Hawthorne was at the throttle of the engine. He was blown four feet under the engine-room deck, arose, closed the throttle on the engine which had already stopped and then escaped up the engine-room ladder. Within two minutes the feed tank, circulating pump and port engines were wrecked. The prompt action of Lieutenant J. P. Milton, on watch in the starboard engine room, alone kept the ship afloat for a length of time sufficient to allow the crew to get away in comparative safety. The lieutenant, in a splendid effort to localize the effect of the explosion, unhooked and closed the water-tight door into the starboard engine room, giving a temporary respite during which the engine was kept running until stopped by rising water.[3]

The crew of the cruiser met the emergency without

[2] The three men killed in the explosion were Fireman, 1st cl., Thomas Everett Davis; Engineer, 2d cl., Francis James Rochet, and Machinist's Mate, 2d cl., Frazier O. Thomas.

[3] Official Report of Rear Admiral Palmer, Acting Secretary of the Navy, July 20, 1918.

the shadow of a panic. The wall of water which had been flung up on the port side had scarcely subsided when the notes of "General Quarters" were ringing from ship's bugles. An instant later Lieutenant Commander Gerard Bradford, the executive officer, and Lieutenant C. J. Collins, senior engineering officer, had sped below to ascertain the extent of the damage and the measures to be taken to remedy it. Men, partially dressed, some with lather drying on their faces and beards half-shaved, came running to their battle stations. The whole movement was executed with the precision of a practise drill, yet even by then the *San Diego* was listing eight degrees to port. From the bridge, Captain Christy gave rapid orders to the division officers in charge of the port and starboard 6-inch batteries. "Fire at anything that looks like a submarine," he commanded. Scarcely had he concluded when a forward gun in the port battery picked out a suspicious swirl in the water and sent a shell directly into the center of it. A starboard weapon banged next and soon both batteries were firing deliberately and with careful aim. The executive officer came back to the bridge and reported that Frame Number 78 had been blown in below the water line; the port engine room and Number 8 fire room had been flooded and the bulkheads in the vicinity were all badly strained and leaking. Seven minutes had ticked away since the explosion. During that time the *San Diego* had hung at the eight degree list. Now it began to settle more rapidly to port with a corresponding upward tilt on the starboard side. Captain Christy saw that the ship was doomed. It was now time to save the crew. "Abandon ship," he commanded and a nod from the executive officer to the buglers was followed by the call which pierced the roar of the 6-inch pieces. Lieutenant Clarkson J. Bright, gunnery

officer, faced the captain with an interrogation. "Keep firing," Captain Christy said. "Keep firing as long as you can serve the guns."

The crew abandoned ship with the same exemplary discipline shown in going to battle stations. No war vessel, when stripped for action, carries enough boats for the entire personnel. Those who had no assigned lifeboat knew their duty — overboard with a life preserver and watch out subsequently for a raft. Fortunately it was a calm day, with the sea almost as smooth as a table top; fortunate in more ways than one, for the explosion had put the wireless apparatus out of commission and a blustery day would have kept the naval aviator ashore and thus prevented all news of the disaster reaching the relief ships. In those few minutes between the time that the order came to launch the boats and the *San Diego* took its final plunge, the conduct of officers and men was more than heroic. There were a dozen specific instances of calm cool-headedness. There was Lieutenant Collins, the chief engineering officer, who herded his men up from the stokeholds and engine rooms without the loss of one of them; there was David Easdale, a ship's carpenter, who was found by the executive officer calmly tightening the dogs on a water-tight door which led to a flooded compartment on the berth deck; there was Ensign J. P. Hildman, who, with the quarter deck partly submerged, doubly secured the forks in the depth charges as a guarantee against explosion when the ship sank; there was Pay Clerk J. D. Gagan, in charge also of the supply department, who gathered from the safe all papers and money in his custody and leaped overboard, the money bags in one hand, a life preserver in the other; there was Lieutenant Paul T. Shortridge, who displayed "exceptional coolness and presence of mind" in his leadership

in launching the boats, and there was Boatswain Alva Henderson, who, with an eye to the future, cut adrift a pile of lumber stowed on the boat deck.[4] Nor was the throwing overboard of the lumber the sole effort made to preserve the men struggling in the water. Two sailboats and two punts had been rigged at the first alarm and these four boats were the only ones for which there was launching time. Every life raft on the upper decks, however, had been cast adrift at the direction of the officers, together with fifty mess tables and about one hundred kapok mattresses, which were buoyant. One of the life rafts slipped from the hands of the men on deck and plunged into the sea in the center of a cluster of men floating with life preservers. It is possible that one or two were struck, stunned and drowned as a result of the accident. The total loss of life in the sinking was six, which, including the three known to have met death at the time of the explosion, left three other deaths to be traced. Either the falling life raft or the heavy smokestacks of the cruiser, as they toppled over a few minutes later, accounted for the other trio of fatalities.[5]

During the early stages of the "abandon ship" order, the list to port had been growing more and more alarming. It reached seventeen and one-half degrees and water began to pour through Number 10 gun port. Gun after gun was silenced in the same manner. The flooding of the gun deck accelerated the heeling of the cruiser. It also

[4] All of the officers and men mentioned in the text were commended by Secretary Daniels (Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, pp. 259–260, 262–263, 267, 269, 273, 278, 284).

[5] The three men who lost their lives either from blows from a life raft or the falling funnels were Engineer, 2d cl., Clyde Chester Blaine, Machinist's Mate, 2d cl., Andrew Munson, and Seaman, 2d cl., John Paul Harris.

drove the men from the starboard batteries, but not until their gun muzzles were literally pointing skyward. All told, fifteen shells had been fired at suspicious objects on the surface, the majority of the shots coming from the starboard weapons. By that time the *San Diego* was over at an angle of thirty-five degrees. The end of the lower bridge took the water and Lieutenant Commander Bradford dove far out to port, daring the dangerous plunge without a life preserver. A minute or two later Captain Christy, the last to leave the doomed cruiser, walked across the rungs of two ladders, which, had the *San Diego* been in an upright position, would have led straight downward to the boat deck, but which were almost parallel at that time with the surface of the ocean. From the boat deck he crawled to the outside of the armored belt, crossed it and dropped four feet to the bilge keel, made his way to the dock keel, which at that time was eight feet above water, and jumped far out to starboard. Scarcely was he clear when the cruiser, with a final sweeping roll, went over on its port side, the stacks smacking the surface like rifle shots. Then, with a sullen muttered roar, as the water ran into the starboard boiler room, it took the final plunge. It was not yet eleven-thirty o'clock. Within twenty-five minutes after the mine had exploded, the armored cruiser had gone down and more than a thousand men were struggling for their lives in the water. Perhaps a hundred or more, floating in the immediate vicinity, were carried down into the vortex by the suction from the sinking ship, but all of them managed to struggle back to the surface, where, under the direction of Lieutenant Shortridge and Lieutenant F. G. Kutz, the first division officer, efforts were already on foot to save those who had neither life raft, table top nor mattress upon which to cling. A dozen

or more of the ship's boats, some capsized, others half-filled with water, had floated clear and were salvaged, righted or bailed out and filled with survivors. Some distance away, Boatswain Henderson, who had followed the logs he had cut loose, constructed a raft. Other men swam to the life rafts and climbed upon them, among them being the pay clerk, who, before pulling himself upon the float, placed his money bags upon it with the remark, "There's $20,000 saved."

Though in imminent peril of death, the men remained hopeful, even good-natured, and exchanged badinage as they dragged others to safety. An inquiry regarding the whereabouts of Captain Christy was answered by a dozen voices with "There he is", "See his old bald head", "Three cheers for the skipper." Captain Christy was shoving about on a barrel amid the wreckage, shouting orders so as to preserve the accustomed "aboard ship" discipline. He was hauled upon a life raft and cheered to the echo. Some distance away, the executive officer had been given a similar ovation. Not satisfied with cheering, the men decided to sing. They started off with "The Star Spangled Banner" and followed it up with "My Country 'Tis of Thee."

Captain Christy, realizing that steps would have to be taken to secure assistance, ordered the two sailboats under Lieutenant Bright, with five other officers and twenty-one men, to proceed to shore. There was little breeze stirring and the men rowed the whole distance. At 3.15 P.M. the leading boat pulled through the surf at Point o' Woods, on Long Island, and beached in front of the big summer hotel with the crew of Life Saving Station Number 82 and summer guests lending a willing hand. Fifteen minutes later the second boat came in. The first had been marked

"S.D. 1", which led to a rumor that the battleship *South Dakota* had been the victim. The men from the *San Diego* brought the first concrete news of the disaster and their reports were none too sanguine. They were certain that not more than eight hundred of the crew of more than eleven hundred had been saved. Several of them were also certain they had seen a submarine, but Lieutenant Bright doubted this story. He explained that the high explosive shells used left a thick brown smoke on the surface of the water and that this probably deceived the men. While the officers communicated by telephone with the Third District headquarters at New York, the seamen crowded into a telegraph office and began to send reassuring messages to parents. The summer guests made arrangements to clothe them. Most of the men were only partially clad. One young seaman had stepped ashore attired in a bit of sacking. While being clothed, a steaming dinner was prepared and served in the hotel dining room at five o'clock. Two hours later a naval patrol boat arrived and took them aboard.

While the two boatloads were being made much of at Point o' Woods, the rescue of the balance of the crew was being carried on. The steamship *Malden,* Captain Brown, had caught one of the wireless calls from a shore station, and, being in the immediate vicinity, proceeded to the spot. The courage of the skippers of the *Malden* and other vessels which came up subsequently was more than commendable. No one knew then whether the *San Diego* had been the victim of a mine or a torpedo, and, if it should have been the latter, the rescue vessels would have steamed into a trap. The *Malden* came along and began the rescue work. Twenty minutes later, the steamship *Bussan,* Captain James F. Brewer, arrived. The *Bussan*

had no wireless. The first it knew of the sinking was when the watch officer saw what appeared to be a chain of floating buoys spread out like supports to a monster fishing net. He reported his discovery to Captain Brewer who, after an investigation, steamed for the spot, arriving amid cheers from the men in the water. "They looked like a big crowd of swimmers at Coney Island on a summer afternoon," was Captain Brewer's subsequent description of the scene.

The *Bussan* joined with the *Malden* in taking the *San Diego's* crew aboard and were aided by the steamship *E. P. Jones*, Captain Dodge, which arrived a little later. Several boats from the nearest life-saving stations had also reached the spot and aided greatly in transshipping the men. There were 370 officers and men placed on the *Malden;* 708 on the *Bussan* and 78 on the *E. P. Jones*, making a total of 1,156, which, with the 27 who had reached shore at Point o' Woods, accounted for 1,183 of the crew. The three steamers searched the vicinity for more survivors, remaining in the dangerous water until 3 P.M., when they turned toward New York. It was not until late at night that the ships reached the army docks at Hoboken. The men were met at the piers by Red Cross agents with food and clothing and were given sleeping quarters for the night on an idle transport.

The nation had been in suspense as to the fate of the *San Diego's* crew. The story of the men in the sailboats that at least three hundred had perished had prepared the way for an account of a dread calamity. The sole message from the Navy Department sent out during July 19 was more reassuring, but was not published until the following morning. It stated:

The Navy Department has received reports from the Third Naval District stating that the U.S.S. San Diego was sunk ten miles southeast of Fire Island Light at 11.30 o'clock this morning. One officer and two boats' crews were landed at Life Saving Station 82 on Long Island. Other survivors are in boats and four steamers are standing by. So far as can be ascertained there appears to have been no loss of life. The cause of the sinking has not yet been determined.[6]

It was not for several days afterwards that the loss of life was finally established at six, with six men slightly injured. In fact, on July 21, two days after the sinking, the Navy Department made public a list of sixty-two names which were classified; three known to be dead; missing, forty-seven; and, unaccounted for, supposed to be on leave, twelve. Subsequent developments showed that all but three of the sixty-two had either been rescued or else were, as the list surmised, on leave at the time.

Within less than twenty-four hours after the *San Diego* had gone down, the Third District mine-sweeping force located and destroyed three contact mines in the same vicinity.[7] This discovery was communicated to the naval court of inquiry which had convened in New York. Aided by the report on the mines and the testimony of officers and men who had examined the damaged portions of the cruiser before it sank, the court arrived at a speedy decision which not only exonerated any of the ship's personnel from blame, but commended them highly. The report established positively that a mine had been the cause.

[6] Philadelphia *Press*, July 20, 1918.

[7] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 137.

## CHAPTER XI

# THE U-156

# BEGINS OPERATIONS

THE U-156 had sown the mine which destroyed the *San Diego*. This, the second raider sent from Germany and of which Admiral Sims had warned in cables of June 29 and July 5, had left Kiel on June 15, about the time the U-151 headed homeward from American waters. Like the U-151, the U-156 was of the converted merchant submarine type. It was about two hundred feet long, and about twenty-five or thirty feet in breadth. It carried two 5.9-inch guns, one twenty feet forward of the conning tower and the other a little greater distance aft the conning tower, and also torpedo tubes, one on the port side aft and one on the starboard side. The U-boat carried a limited number of mines, just how many will never be known. The crew numbered seventy-seven, including the officers. The commander was Kapitanleutnant von Oldenburg and the oberleutnant, J. Knoeckel. Passing safely through the North Sea and around the north of the British Isles, the U-156 attempted no attacks until it was well on its way into the Atlantic, when, on June 26, in 55° 50′ N., 15° 30′ W., or several hundred miles west of the Irish

coast, it torpedoed without warning the British steamer *Tortuguero,* of 4,175 gross tons. Twelve seamen lost their lives when the vessel sank.[1]

After the sinking, the U-boat continued southwesterly, traveling undetected until July 5. On that day it attacked the navy cargo boat *Lake Bridge* in 43° 35′ N., 43° 50′ W., first attempting to steal close to the American vessel by disguising itself as a steamer. A false funnel aided in the deception and the U-156 was able to get within ten thousand yards unsuspected. Undue haste on the part of the enemy saved the cargo boat. When the false funnel dropped, the *Lake Bridge,* which was westward bound from Lamlash, Scotland, to Hampton Roads, still had time to crowd on steam. The submarine opened fire with its deck guns, one of the shells exploding so close as to throw fragments on the deck of the pursued. The *Lake Bridge* was armed and returned the fire, at the same time covering itself with a smoke screen. Finally, by superior speed, the cargo boat outdistanced the enemy and escaped.

The Norwegian bark *Marosa,* of 1,987 gross tons, was the next victim. It was stopped, at 4.30 P.M. July 7, in 40° N., 50° 35′ W., by two shots, one of which struck the water close by and the other passed over the vessel and exploded on the water beyond, throwing fragments of shrapnel back on the deck. Captain Andreas A. Nyhus ordered two lifeboats lowered and the crew rowed toward the submarine. The boat of S. E. Holte, the chief officer, was the first to reach the submarine. When the captain's boat arrived, he was ordered on board and the ship's papers and log book taken from him. The chief officer told the story of what happened subsequently:

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 50.

Five German sailors armed with revolvers came on board by boat. On going alongside, they told us they would give us twenty minutes to get out oilskins. We put more provisions into our boat and our oilskins. Then they asked me if the gig up forward was any good and I told them yes. They then ordered me to put her into the water, which I did. As we had all we could get, we pulled away, laying off half a mile from our vessel in our boats until darkness set in. All we could see of what the submarine's crew was doing was hoisting articles in the gig by the starboard davit. The last we saw of them was when they pulled from our ship to the submarine and they were still using the gig. The kind of stores they took I do not know, but they were carrying bombs with them or some apparatus with long white lanyards on them. The German sailors who boarded the ship went through the cabin and the rest of the ship. They stationed a man on the mizzen royal yard as a lookout with large powerful binoculars, and they also tore all the hatches off.[2]

The crew of the *Marosa* did not see the ship sink. They pulled northwestward during the night and the next afternoon sighted a bark toward which they started, only to discover it also was in the hands of the enemy and was in a sinking condition. For the next two days they rowed steadily northwesterly without sighting anything, but, on July 11, the Norwegian bark *Sorkness* picked them up. The captain of the *Sorkness*, although bound eastward, ran in toward the Nova Scotian coast and the men from the *Marosa*, when two hundred miles offshore, again launched their boats and rowed the balance of the distance, arriving, on the night of July 16, on Cranberry Island.[3]

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 52.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

The vessel they had seen, on July 8, in the hands of the enemy was another Norwegian, the bark *Manx King,* of 1,729 gross tons. It was stopped by the U-156 in 40° N., 52° W., and the crew ordered to abandon the ship within fifteen minutes. They pulled away and night came before they could learn the fate of the bark. Captain Helgesen believed his vessel had been bombed and sunk. The nineteen men rowed for a day and were then picked up by a British steamer, arriving in this country, on July 12, with the account of their experience.

The next ship to sight the submarine was the U.S.S. *Harrisburg,* which reported, on July 17, that it had seen a U-boat lying on the surface ten thousand yards distant in 40° 10′ N., 68° 55′ W., but that there had been no attack. Whether the U-156 was then bound for the vicinity of Long Island to lay its mines, or whether, with the mines deposited, it was circling toward the New England coast is a question. There had been time, between July 8 and July 17, to gain the vicinity of Fire Island and return to the position described by the *Harrisburg,* or there was time, between that date and its next appearance, for it to have made the journey to within sight of New York and then rounded Nantucket and started north. The floating missiles might have been deposited four days before the *San Diego* struck one, or they might have been laid that very morning, July 19. The exact date is not important. The results were the same in either case. However, on July 21, two days after the cruiser had been sunk, the U-156 ran in close to the Cape Cod coast of Massachusetts and made its presence known by a vicious attack upon a tug and four barges.

The high toll charges to negotiate the Cape Cod Canal, a privately owned waterway, which, running for seven

miles from Cape Cod to Buzzard's Bay, appreciably shorten the distance between Boston and southern Atlantic ports, had long caused the towing of coal barges by the longer route which led outside the fishhook projection in the southern Massachusetts coast. On Sunday morning, July 21, at ten-thirty o'clock, the sea-going tug *Perth Amboy,* owned by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, was steaming southward about three miles offshore with four barges in tow — the *Lansford,* of 830 tons; Number 403, of 422 tons; Number 740, of 680 tons, and Number 766, of 527 tons — only one of which was loaded and that with a cargo of stone. The tug was at a point off Coast Guard Station Number 40, at Orleans, when a deckhand sighted a streak of water shooting by the stern. He recognized it as the wake of a torpedo and, before he could recover from his surprise, two more streaks were visible, one some distance beyond the bow and the other about twenty yards astern. He shouted a warning and at the same time there came a flash out of the fog which surrounded them and a shell crashed through the wheelhouse. A fragment of flying steel took off the hand of John Vitz, an Austrian seaman, who was grasping the spokes of the steering wheel. In quick succession came other shots, several of which sent splinters showering from the wooden cabin of the tug, slightly injuring a number of the crew.[4] Captain J. H. Tapley, who was in the cabin, ran on deck as the submarine loomed out of the fog bank. Flames shot from the engine room of the tug, in-

[4] Schedule A, Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance. The men wounded, in addition to John Vitz, were Frank Beckworth, chief engineer; Wilfred Dickson, oiler; William Duley, oiler; Manuel Gomey, cook; Mike Sgaliardich, oiler; John Bogovich, sailor; Hollis Pettingill, assistant engineer; Andre Serre, sailor; Pascal Soils, messboy, and Toni Yedreschich, George Yurman and Joseph Yurman, firemen.

dicating that one shot at least had gone home, and the U-156, satisfied that the *Perth Amboy* was accounted for, turned its weapons on the barges.

The *Lansford* was second in the tow. It received a concentration of shrapnel, most of which burst overhead, fragments strewing the deck. On board was Jack Ainslie, eleven-year-old son of Captain Charles Ainslie, the skipper. The boy had sighted the U-boat and ran at once to the cabin to return with a small American flag, which he waved defiantly over the rail. Not satisfied with this display of patriotism, he started for a twenty-two caliber rifle, but was stopped by his father. The *Lansford* had one boat supposed to hold five men. It was launched, Captain Ainslie being wounded in both arms by fragments of shrapnel. Two boats from the other barges also put off but the men on the *Perth Amboy* seemed determined to stick to their blazing vessel. There were about thirty persons on the four barges, including three women, wives of the officers, and five children. None of these latter were injured, although their escape, as well as the escape of the men, was due to the poor aim on the part of the enemy during the first few minutes of the bombardment. The boats from the barges rowed hard for the shore, while the life-saving crew at Orleans put out deliberately for the burning tug, despite the hail of shot bursting around them.

Two miles farther offshore, the Boston fishing boat *Rose*, on a seining trip, had observed the beginning of the submarine's attack and was in turn brought under fire but escaped. Captain Marsi Schuill said later that "the Germans must have fired as many as five shots at us, the nearest coming within ten feet of our stern, but we were traveling pretty fast and when the submarine crew saw their shots were falling short they gave up."

The U-156's challenge had not gone unanswered by the navy. Four fast seaplanes, despatched immediately upon news of the attack, left the Chatham training station, a few miles farther down the coast, and headed for the spot. One seaplane circled above the U-boat; swooped down, dropping a bomb from but a short distance overhead, and then rose high in the air. The bomb did not explode. Each of the other three planes also dropped a bomb and none of them exploded. The U-boat thereupon turned a gun skyward and opened fire, keeping the planes at a high altitude. Shortly afterwards the enemy submerged.

Before the strange engagement came to an end, the thousands of spectators who had witnessed it were treated to an actual, though harmless, bombardment of the American coast. The eye-witnesses consisted of bathers, cottagers, who watched from piazza chairs, and automobilists who stopped their machines along the way. With little thought of danger they were gazing at the shells bursting about the boats in which were the barge crews, when the screech of a shell was heard overhead. It flew inland and exploded in a pond about a mile from the ocean's edge. The German gunners secured a more accurate range on the next shot, which buried itself in the sand of the beach. Four shells were fired at the shore in all, but no one was injured. Very few even took the trouble to seek a safe spot, preferring to remain where they could watch the destruction of the barges and the heroism of the life guards going to the rescue of the tugboat crew. The lifeboat took eleven men off the *Perth Amboy*, saving them at a time when there was scarcely a spot on the little vessel which was not burning. Included in the number were Vitz, the helmsman, and John Bolovich, another Austrian seaman,

who had a badly shattered arm. The lifeboat put back for the shore at about the time the boats from the barges pulled safely into Nauset Harbor, a tiny cove a short distance from Orleans. Young Jack Ainslie was sitting in the bow of the *Lansford's* skiff as it came through the breakers and was given a rousing cheer. Captain Ainslie's injuries were dressed at the summer home of Doctor J. Danforth Taylor, of Boston, but, when the life guards came ashore, it was found necessary to rush Vitz and Bolovich to the Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston.

All four of the barges had been sunk, while, but a short distance offshore, the hulk of the *Perth Amboy* was still blazing furiously. The very daring of the raid astounded the villagers on Cape Cod, who, at the same time could not help but marvel at the prodigious waste of ammunition on a fleet of barges returning to a coal port. It was estimated that the attack had cost the Germans in the neighborhood of fifty thousand dollars in expended ammunition, forty-five thousand dollars of this being placed as the cost of the three torpedoes fired in vain at the *Perth Amboy*. As against the ammunition cost, the net result had been the destruction of the four barges valued at ninety thousand dollars, and serious damage to the tug. The *Perth Amboy* was salvaged the next day and repaired at a cost of less than twenty-five thousand dollars.

Naval authorities were inclined to look upon the attack as a feint engineered to distract attention from the real purpose of the raider, which, it was supposed, was the sinking of transports. The conclusion was reached in shipping circles, however, that the tug and its tows had not been the real aim of the U-boat. Two valuable vessels, the colliers *Arlington* and *J. B. King*, had passed Orleans

shortly before the *Perth Amboy* was fired upon, and it was believed that the enemy had been laboring under a case of mistaken identity. The foray was perhaps one of the most spectacular, if the most useless, staged along the Atlantic coast during the entire period of submarine activity.

The raid had, however, accomplished something which was of extreme value to the Navy Department. The failure of the aerial bombs dropped by the attacking seaplanes opened the eyes of officials to the fact that something must be wrong with the mechanism of these delicate engines of destruction. Immediate steps were taken to inspect the entire stock of projectiles in the Navy Ordnance Bureau. Secretary Daniels announced that tests had shown a low percentage of bombs failing to explode but that the Ordnance Bureau had taken under consideration the alteration of the bombs so as to increase the certainty of exploding. Subsequently the Navy Department developed a heavy aeroplane bomb for submarine warfare which overcame all the defects.

The day following the attack on the tug, Rear Admiral Wood, commanding the First Naval District, issued the following statement:

I want to correct the impression given currency by certain published stories that the Chatham aircraft were late in getting to the scene of the attack or were not otherwise "promptly on the job." They were there and dropped two bombs, the explosion of either one of which might have been effective in destroying the hostile craft.

The whole occurrence from a strategic point of view impresses me as little short of ridiculous. I gave the German Government credit for having more sense than to waste good ammunition on a couple of scows worth hardly

more than the ammunition that sank them, and believe the whole performance due to a desire to impress the American public with the nearness of the German operations and to excite pacifists, whom they think so numerous in this country, to renew activities to end the war. It is more or less in the nature of a " circus stunt " done also to impress the German people with the idea that the submarine warfare is being carried to the very shores of America, and that the campaign of frightfulness is being waged relentlessly.

Incidentally, if the German sea-fighters are of the impression that this kind of four-flushing tactics will terrify the American people they have still a lot to learn of the sentiment of this country. Such foolishness and futile demonstrations have quite the opposite effect.[5]

Announcement was made from Washington, on July 22, that the Cape Cod Canal would be taken over by the Government to safeguard the coal supply of New England, and the following day President Wilson issued an executive order placing the control of the canal in the hands of the United States Railroad Administration. Rules were formulated for coastwise shipping and the coal-carrying barges which resulted in the coal trade plying its business unmolested through the canal from July 23 to the end of the war. The attack off Orleans had served the purpose of driving the Government to a measure which was bound to expedite shipments and at the same time prevent excessive tolls.

The temerity of the German raider in creeping so close to the Cape Cod coast resulted in the First District hunt squadron maintaining a close offshore watch. It was pointed out that in the case of the foray at

[5] New York *Herald*, July 23, 1918.

Orleans the German commander either took a long chance or had an exact chart of the dangerous shoals and shifting sandbars off the Cape, and, were he provided with such charts, there might be other points at which he would aim.

On the evening of July 22, a seaplane came to the surface near the village of Wauwinet, on the Nantucket coast, and reported a steamer in distress some half-dozen miles offshore. The village of Wauwinet, lies at the extreme eastern end of Nantucket Island and the position of the vessel was given by the aviator as near Great Round Shoal, lying but a little over five miles away. The crew of the Coskata Coast Guard Station went off in its lifeboat and the navy bombers from Chatham also sped for the scene. The alarm was premature, as the ship proved to be a Belgian relief vessel, which had been damaged in an explosion in the port of Boston several months previous and was bound southward to New York in tow of the tug *Resolute.*

To strengthen the coastal patrols in late July, the Navy Department had increased the number of submarines based at the various naval districts, the submersibles including several of the newer N type as well as some of the more obsolete M and O types. As early as May 15, 1918, Admiral Sims had urged the use of the American submarine in counter-offensive against the enemy U-boats. His cable which described the U-151, in fact, said in part:

> I venture to remind the department . . . that the employment of surface vessels to patrol against this submarine would probably result at best in merely driving her from one area to another, whereas the employment of submarines against her might lead to her destruction.[6]

[6] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 10.

One of the submarines attached to the First District, the N-3, had a narrow escape the day following the false alarm off Nantucket, its avoidance of destruction at the hands of a watchful armed transport being so close as to demonstrate the grave danger incurred in waters where, to the naval gunner, all periscopes were hostile ones. The N-3, engaged in the hunt for the enemy U-boat, was running submerged some distance off the port of Boston, and came to the surface within sight of the transport, which immediately opened fire. The gunners on the transport had scored one hit before the American vessel could establish its identity. Fortunately for the N-3, the shell which struck it smashed through the outer hull but failed to explode. At that, the damage might have been fatal but for the presence of mind of Chief Gunners' Mate R. D. May. The shell had opened up the outer hull into the torpedo department which was flooded. May leaped to the emergency levers and in a trice had closed the water-tight doors, preventing the water from getting farther into the submarine.[7] Before the transport fired again, an ensign was hoisted from the staff on the conning tower. A hasty inspection showed that the damage was not serious and the submersible was able to return to its base under its own engines.

On the same day the N-3 was fired upon in mistake, a despatch from Halifax, Nova Scotia, gave the first inkling of another naval mishap, this time in the shape of the loss of a dirigible from the Chatham air station. The dirigible had sailed from its base on July 19 and disappeared. The crew, three in number — W. C. Briscoe, W. B. Griffin and C. A. Upton — were found floating on the empty bag, on July 22, about ten miles off Halifax, and were picked

[7] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, p. 144.

up by a coastal steamship which landed them at Summerside, Nova Scotia, that night.

While the navy was having its troubles over and under the sea, the U-156 had not been idle. On July 22, twenty-four hours almost to the minute after the attack on the *Perth Amboy* and its barges off Cape Cod, the U-boat added to its toll the crack, knockabout Gloucester fishing schooner *Robert and Richard*, which was bombed and sunk in 42° 42′ N., 68° 23′ W., or about sixty miles southeast of Cape Porpoise near Cashe Fishing Bank. The spot was one hundred miles north of Orleans, on the Cape Cod coast. The *Robert and Richard*, known as the " highliner " of the Gloucester fishing fleet, had been two weeks on the Banks and had just completed a catch which stocked its hold with thirty thousand pounds of halibut and seven thousand pounds of mixed fish. All of the dories had been recalled and the little vessel, of one hundred forty gross tons, had turned its nose toward home. So far that year it had earned between sixty and seventy thousand dollars. Captain Robert A. Wharton saw a low-lying black craft approaching but thought it was an American patrol craft. He had no knowledge of recent events along the coast, having been at sea since before the *San Diego* sank. When the supposedly friendly craft had zigzagged to within a mile and fired a shot across his bow, he was satisfied immediately that it was a German submarine. Captain Wharton's story of the sinking of the *Robert and Richard* is interesting throughout:

As soon as the German came within hailing distance, three men — the commander, first officer and a seaman — came on deck. The first officer ordered us to send a boat alongside. I went over in my boat, rowed the Germans to the schooner and boarded her with them. Both

officers spoke good English. The first officer loosened up a bit. He went down into the cabin to get the ship's papers and the American flag I kept there. When he came on deck he said, "This is the second American flag I have now. I have one in my summer home in Maine and I'll keep this to go with it some day." I opened my eyes at this and asked him if he lived in Maine. He had lived in America a long time, he told me, and had had a summer home in Maine since 1896. He was a big chap. He and the sailor wore working clothes. They were a rather rough looking lot. The captain was the only one in uniform. I did not see any others of the crew. The first officer superintended placing the bomb. They sank it over the side with a lead and swung it under the keel after setting a time fuse. We were told to go into our boats. The Germans were the last to leave the ship, taking a spare dory. We had pulled a mile away and the submarine was a safe distance off when the bomb exploded. That was the last I saw of my ship.[8]

The crew of the *Robert and Richard*, numbering twenty-three, had gotten away in five dories, pulling clear of the schooner at ten-thirty o'clock in the morning. The sea was calm, but the air was hot and the scarcity of drinking water was felt almost immediately. Number 1 dory had a gallon and a half of water and a fair supply of biscuits; none of the other boats had anything to eat or drink on board. The submarine had last been seen heading southward and, observing nothing in the vicinity which promised a rescue, the five dories rigged up small sails and proceeded to take advantage of the light puffs of southerly winds, heading due west toward the Maine shore. The little flotilla remained together until about nine o'clock, becoming separated in the darkness. Each of the dories

[8] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, July 24, 1918.

maintained a course estimated as westward and daybreak found the captain's boat and one other, with a total of eleven men, still in company. The other three dories had disappeared. One of these latter, containing three men, after rowing and sailing through the entire day of July 23, arrived on the beach at Kennebunkport, Maine, at 7 P.M. and brought the first tidings of the loss of the schooner. Shortly afterwards, the two dories under command of Captain Wharton were picked up a short distance off Portland, Maine, by the coal steamer *Snug Harbor* and carried into that port. Nothing was heard of the other two dories until the following day, July 24, when a naval patrol boat picked up four more of the crew and landed them at Portland, where the captain's party had arrived previously. A few hours later the balance of the crew, four men and a boy, were taken into Boston on a naval vessel to which they had been transferred by a sea-going tug. The tug had come across them some distance offshore during the preceding night. The fishermen brought with them to shore some additions to the story as related by Captain Wharton, but whether the facts as they narrated them were true or outgrowths of the captain's yarn is hard to say. One account declared that the U-boat commander had been recognized as a former master of a towboat. Before the war, this towboat and its master had sailed back and forth along the coast for many years.

It was not important from a naval standpoint whether the U-boat commander had once been master of a coastwise towboat or whether the chief officer owned a summer home in Maine. What the First Naval District was interested in chiefly was to safeguard the overseas transportation out of the port of Boston, and, at the same time, hunt down the marauder and destroy or drive him from the waters

along the shore. The protection to transports sailing from Boston was effected satisfactorily, the convoying forces being increased. Naval authorities realized that a submarine which appeared off the Cape Cod coast one day and the Maine coast twenty-four hours later might very readily bob up off Boston at any time. Maintenance of the utmost vigilance, however, was not rewarded by a sight of the enemy. The hostile U-boat kept at a discreet distance from the troop convoys. Rear Admiral Wood of the First District, on July 24 issued a statement to all shipmasters and factory managers in the port of Boston, instructing them not to permit a demonstration at sight of an outward-bound transport loaded with troops. In part this statement read:

> It is well known by all that an enemy submarine is lurking in the waters adjacent to this coast, and that the sinking of coal barges and fishing vessels is merely incidental to the real mission. To sink our transports, to train machine gun fire mercilessly on our men who may be struggling to save themselves from drowning, is the real purpose for which this submarine was sent 3,000 miles from her base. It is therefore the plain duty of every American not only to refrain from any demonstration whatsoever in connection with ship sailings, but to refrain even from the discussion of sailings or preparations for sailings which may come to his attention. It must be remembered there are persons in our midst who would, if opportunity offered, make traitorous use of any information of a naval or military character.[9]

The operations of the U-boat off the New England coast had focused attention in northern waters. Even the rumored sinking of a submarine near Fire Island, as reported in the daily papers of July 24, could not sway in-

[9] New York *Times*, July 25, 1918.

terest elsewhere. This rumor, which came from Babylon, Long Island, on that date, was discounted from the fact that in the same column it was announced from Washington that the Navy Department had no knowledge of it. The public harkened back to mid-June when the newspapers sank U-boats daily and rightly regarded the story for what it actually was, a rumor drawn from gunfire heard at sea. The navy, on July 24, had obtained something definite from London regarding the raider, which indicated it would remain in northern waters. This was a cable from Admiral Sims which stated:

Admiralty has received reliable information indicating that U-156 is intended to operate in Gulf of Maine but if foggy there to shift operations off Delaware.[10]

[10] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 11.

## CHAPTER XII

# THE U-140 APPEARS

On the same day that the *San Diego* was mined, naval operations informed all districts that a German cruiser submarine was headed for the American coast. It was the U-140, which had left Kiel on June 22, one week after the departure of the U-156.[1] Its probable destination was suggested by Admiral Sims, in a cable of July 26, 1918, and in which he called attention to the harbor works, cranes and naval stores at Wilmington, North Carolina, as being considered by the enemy "as favorable objects for bombardment." The U-140 had reached mid-ocean by July 15, an "allo" from the U.S.S. *Harrisburg* on that date locating the enemy in 45° 33′ N., 41° W. Three days later the American tanker *Joseph Cudahy* encountered the U-boat in 41° 15′ N., 52° 18′ W., considerably southwest of the spot indicated by the *Harrisburg's* wireless call. The tanker had fallen behind the rest of its convoy because of slow speed. Despite this handicap and the fact that its armament consisted of only a pair of 3-inch guns, the *Joseph Cudahy* made its escape.

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 70.

After July 18 came a period of silence followed by a wireless call, on July 26, from the British steamer *Melitia*, which met the enemy and was gunned in 38° 42′ N., 60° 58′ W. The U-boat was too far away to chase the speedy Britisher and the two vessels merely exchanged a few futile shells. That afternoon, however, the U-140 came into sight of the steamer *British Major*, a tanker flying the English flag, and a long chase resulted. The fight, which lasted for five hours, was reported four days later when the *British Major* reached New York. The first warning regarding the presence of a submarine had come from the chief officer on the bridge who saw the U-boat emerge about eight miles to the northwest. The tanker had been doing ten knots an hour. Under forced draught, the speed was increased to fifteen knots with the direction due west. The U-140, maintaining a speed of from sixteen to seventeen knots, opened fire with three guns. After fifteen minutes, during which shells were breaking close, the tanker turned southward, this move enabling the after 4-inch gun to be brought to bear upon the pursuer. The range was too much for the single 4-inch piece, and the *British Major* contented itself by firing only at long intervals. Within an hour, the U-boat had fired fifty-two times and was within four miles of the quarry. The tanker's captain saw that the enemy was aiming to cut him off from the shore and also work into position for a broadside. To avoid this he veered sharply to the east and followed that course until darkness. The U-140 followed him, firing until 7 P.M., when the pursuit was abandoned. The tanker's officers tallied two hundred three shots fired by the enemy, all after the first hundred being shrapnel. Fragments of the latter, bursting near the stern, ripped open the leg of a cook. No one else was injured.

Before the reports of these engagements had reached the Navy Department, the industrious German news bureaus had circulated an alarming rumor, which came to this country by way of the neutral press at Basle, Switzerland, and which announced:

A despatch received at Basle, Switzerland, today (July 27) from Hamburg, says: " More than twenty large submarines are now operating off the American coast. The number of submarines in the Atlantic has been increased by thirty percent in the last seven months.[2]

Based upon Admiral Sims' accurate reports of enemy submersibles departing for this shore, the Navy Department knew the figure to be a gross exaggeration. The public had no such means of determining the truth or falsity of the statement. In fact, the gullibility of the public in swallowing such rumors was later remarked upon by Admiral Sims in the course of his testimony before a subcommittee of the United States Senate investigating naval awards. At the same time he took occasion to reprove the censorship by remarking:

The more accurate information people can have, the more active is the support they give their Congressmen and their Armies, and it is important that you should have all the accurate information we could give you. Unfortunately, on the subject of submarines, we could not give you very much.[3]

The U-140 made its first kill the day after the unsuccessful pursuit of the *British Major*, when, in 38° 42′ N., 60° 58′ W., it fired three shots over the Portuguese bark

[2] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, July 28, 1918.

[3] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, p. 661.

*Porto*, of 1,079 gross tons, bound from Savannah, Georgia, to Oporto, Portugal, with a cargo of six hundred bales of cotton and barrel staves. The bark was boarded by the commander of the submarine and one officer and a seaman, and what followed was retold by Captain da Velha after he reached shore:

One of the first things they inquired about was whether or not we had on board any pork or chickens. When I replied, yes, they proceeded to move all the pork and chickens we had on board. While we were tied alongside, the Germans for five hours took the supplies from our ship and put them on the submarine by use of planks. In addition to the pork and chickens they took practically all of the ship's stores. . . . The crew of the Porto did not wait until all the supplies were removed to the submarine, but shoved off in the two large lifeboats after about half an hour. After shoving off we remained in sight of the bark and the submarine until the bark was sunk. The Porto was sunk at about 5.30 P.M. with bombs and shell fire.[4]

The eighteen men from the Portuguese bark were taken up by a passing steamship the following day and arrived on shore on August 1.

The U-140 continued westward and, on July 30, in 38° 24′ N., 68° 41′ W., laid in wait for the American steamer *Kermanshah* and discharged a torpedo which missed the stern of the vessel by not more than fifteen feet. Another torpedo missed the bow by five feet when the ship was maneuvered rapidly to a position paralleling the on-coming missile. The *Kermanshah* had a navy gun crew and a single 4-inch shell was sent into the wake of the second torpedo, the explosion sounding "like the bursting of the shell against a hard object." The first

[4] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 71.

torpedo had been fired at about 11.45 A.M., and twenty minutes later the U-140 appeared on the surface about four miles distant. The *Kermanshah* opened fire but discovered that the U-boat was out of range and was attempting no pursuit.

Radio calls from the *Kermanshah* and several other vessels, on July 30 and 31, indicated that the enemy was prowling several hundred miles off the coast in the main ship channel leading to New England. In addition to the *Kermanshah's* encounter, the American steamer *El Capitan* sent an "allo" from 40° N., 70° 57′ W., on July 30, and the *Vitrubia* from 38° 55′ N., 65° W. Neither of these vessels, however, could have sighted the U-140 in the positions reported.

A hunt squadron, consisting of fifteen sub-chasers and the U.S. destroyer *Jouett*, which had sailed from Cape May on July 25, with instructions to base in the future at the Third Naval District, was combing the area west of the seventy-third parallel of longitude, but the enemy seemed to be keeping clear of coastal waters. Meanwhile shipping hugged the shore and convoys maintained unusual vigilance.

On July 28, the steamship *Achilles* ran aground on McCries Shoal off the Delaware Breakwater, but was floated without difficulty and on July 31, at 11.30 P.M., the steamship *Poseidon*, of 1,909 tons, collided with the U.S.S.B. *Somerset* when five miles N.N.E. of Five Fathom Bank Lightship and sank within thirty-five minutes. Each vessel was running without lights and the night was misty, with a consequent low visibility. The *Somerset* backed away after the crash and both ships were in radio communication during the thirty-five minutes that the *Poseidon* floated, but could not locate each other. The

radio calls were picked up at Cape May and the Coast Guard cutter *Morrill* rescued one survivor and recovered three bodies. Five miles away, the tanker *James McGee*, bound from New York to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, came across thirty-two men clinging to rafts and overturned boats at seven o'clock in the morning of August 1. At 9.30 A.M., the tanker spoke the *Morrill* and a naval surgeon was placed on board. The master of the *Poseidon*, J. Dorie, died from shock and injuries after being landed at Lewes, Delaware, and five of the crew were drowned. As a result of the threefold danger — groundings, collisions and submarines — the Allegheny Region of the United States Railroad Administration, on August 1, diverted the entire Philadelphia and Reading coal fleet from Port Richmond, Philadelphia, to Port Reading, New Jersey. This step insured an inland water route by way of the East River, Long Island Sound and the Cape Cod Canal to the New England market. The coal fleets continued to ply from Port Reading until May 1, 1919.[5]

On August 1, the U-140, having abandoned the outer channels, started shoreward and at eight o'clock in the evening, while two hundred miles southeast of New York in 39° 12′ N., 70° 23′ W., torpedoed the Japanese freight steamer *Tokuyama Maru*, of 7,029 gross tons. The big Japanese vessel, laden with a partial cargo of chalk, was bound from England to New York, where it was to take on a cargo of steel plate. The torpedo struck " on the starboard side under the bridge." The crew had just about time to launch the boats. Eighty-five, the entire personnel, got away in safety. The submarine did not put in an appearance until several hours later when it emerged near

[5] Report of the Allegheny Region, U.S. Railroad Administration, 1919.

one of the small boats. An officer questioned the men in the boat as to the identity of the victim. This learned, the U-boat turned away and abandoned them to their fate. They were picked up by a northbound American schooner and carried clear to Nova Scotia before being landed, reaching shore August 7.

Turning southwest during the night of August 1, the U-140 reached 36° 40′ N., 73° 58′ W. by the morning of August 4 and intercepted the American tank steamer *O. B. Jennings*, of 10,289 gross tons, a little more than one hundred miles off the Virginia Capes. The *O. B. Jennings* had sailed from Plymouth, England, on July 20, for Newport News, Virginia. It had separated from its convoy after a few days at sea and was headed homeward without escort. At 9.15 A.M. the captain of the tanker, George W. Nordstrom, saw the wake of a torpedo coming toward the port beam. The vessel's helm was put over and it swung to port, the torpedo narrowly missing. The tanker had been making full speed, but the captain ordered even more steam and proceeded to zigzag at frequent intervals. Fifteen minutes later, the U-140 opened fire at a distance of eight miles, being just visible in the blinding light of the rising sun. In reply, the tanker broke out the American ensign and opened fire with the only gun on board, a 4-inch piece manned by a British gun crew. At the same time fifty-five smoke boxes were broken astern in the effort to form a screen. The enemy shelling grew more and more accurate, its guns completely outranging the tanker's lone weapon. At 11.40 A.M. a direct shot hit the engine room through the counter, smashing the port engine and wrecking the main steam pipe. Previous to this James H. Scott, the second steward, had been killed by shrapnel, and a number of men wounded, one of them, Thomas McCar-

thy, second engineer, seriously.[6] With the engines out of commission, the tanker gradually stopped, turning around to port. At the same time another shell hit the magazine and exploded, destroying the little ammunition that remained. Captain Nordstrom hauled down the colors, ordered all hands in the boats and abandoned the ship. Before the captain's boat left, his clothing was placed on the body of the dead second steward, a wise precaution as events showed. The U-140 ran up close and ordered the three boats alongside, the officer on the submarine saying, "We got you at last; I knew we would." The men did not reply and the officer asked, "What damage did the shell in the engine room do?" He was told it had put the engine out of commission. Second Officer Rene Henry Bastin, who was taken prisoner, described the subsequent conversation and events:

"Where is the captain?" I think it was the sub's captain who asked, but I could not tell at the time. He spoke broken English. No one answered, and with his guns pointed at our boat, he asked again where the captain was. I answered in English, "The captain is dead," which he did not understand. He repeated his question and I spoke in Flemish, or low German, saying the captain was on the deck of the Jennings under the flag. He asked for the next in charge; we shrugged our shoulders and said we did not know who was in charge. Then he came closer to my boat and said to me, "If you do not know where the captain is you come here." I saw the submarine dropping alongside the boat with machine guns and pistols aimed at us. As I knew there was nothing else to do, I jumped on the submarine, making the jump so as to not fall in between the boat and the submarine. I was dressed

[6] Schedule A, Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

in white trousers, white boots and uniform. As I landed on the submarine, the captain said, "You are an officer of the ship, so I must keep you on board as a prisoner of war." I was ordered below and the boats were sent off. When I got below one of the officers locked me up in one of the rooms and told me to wait. While I was in that room I heard heavy gun fire, which I suppose was the submarine shelling our ship. At 2 o'clock I was ordered on deck by two men armed with pistols. The way I was wounded it was all I could do to get up. When I reached the deck I fell down. The captain said; "Just have a look at your ship; I am going to show you how she sinks; where are all your destroyers and your navy?" To this I made no answer. "Excuse me," I said, "but where are our boats?" He showed me in the distance two black spots which might have been boats. At the same time orders were given to the artillery officer for a continuous bombardment of the ship by the guns — two 6-inch and two 4-inch. At 4 P.M., the Jennings went down by the stern. At 4.30 she took a heavy list to port. At 4.45 she capsized, bottom up and then would not sink. The submarine steamed at high speed around the Jennings at a distance of 100 yards. At 5.15 she fired a stern torpedo amidships. At 5.30 she fired her bow torpedo which struck No. 2 tank. The Jennings disappeared. At 5.45 nothing was to be seen but a few planks and the wreckage of two lifeboats.[7]

The wireless calls from the *O. B. Jennings* had been caught by the Fifth Naval District and the U.S. destroyer *Hull* was sent posthaste for the scene. At 2.20 P.M., August 5, it picked up two boats in charge of the first officer and chief engineer and cruised around for some time searching for the captain's boat. The latter had become

[7] Narrative of Rene Henry Bastin, 2d Officer, tanker *O. B. Jennings*, in *The Lamp*, a Standard Oil publication, April, 1919.

separated from the others during the preceding night and was found at eight-thirty on the morning of August 5 by the Italian steamer *Umbria*, which ran inshore toward Currituck beach. The boat was again launched and the men rowed ashore, reaching land at 3.30 P.M.

On the night of August 4, during patrol duty off Hog Island, Virginia, in connection with the search for the enemy, sub-chaser Number 187 was sunk in collision with a steamer. There were no casualties.

The further movements of the U-140 are traced extensively through the narrative of Second Officer Bastin. After the sinking of the tanker, the submarine headed southward at a speed of about five knots. Bastin had remained on deck despite orders to go below. He said he was too depressed and semi-conscious from his wounds, which were from shrapnel, to care what happened to him. During the entire time, in fact, that he was a captive on the submarine, the naval doctor on board gave him no attention and "spent most of the time, when the submarine was not submerged, pacing the deck and smoking cigarettes." What care the American's injuries received was at the hands of a sailor who helped him bandage them. Bastin was permitted to remain unmolested on deck all the first night (August 4–5) while the U-boat proceeded at a rate not exceeding three miles an hour. At 7 A.M. on August 5, however, he was forced below by the artillery officer and confined in a torpedo room in the bow.

During the period on deck and while within the vessel, the prisoner made good use of his eyes. As a result, he obtained an excellent description of the enemy craft, which differs from those given by other vessels in the number of guns, but which is so complete as to appear accurate. The U-140 was armed with two 6-inch and two 4-inch guns

and twelve machine guns, and carried four thousand rounds of ammunition, according to Bastin. In addition it had eight torpedo tubes, four on the bow and four on the stern, and thirty-five torpedoes, each twenty-four feet long. The commander, who was a captain in the German Navy, and whose name was Kopenhamel,[8] boasted that his ship was the latest type of submarine and the largest afloat; that it had been built at Kiel by Krupp and Company in 1918, and had been commissioned in June. It was more than three hundred eighty feet long, with a twenty-four foot beam and a depth of twenty-five feet. For propulsion, it was equipped with twin screws and five sets of engines, two of the Diesel type of fourteen cylinders each, two oil engines used to run at low speed and two load accumulators. Besides that, it carried four motors, used when submerged, an auxiliary motor for pumps and enough oil to cover thirty-two thousand miles at a speed of three knots, using one oil engine. The maximum surface speed was twenty-six knots, the maximum submerged, twelve knots. Belted with two and one-quarter inch plate, additional protection was afforded by the interior being divided into seven water-tight compartments, and the tested diving depth was four hundred ninety-five feet. The complement was six officers and one hundred two men, the second in command being named Blottner, an ex-officer of the *Princess Alice*, a former German passenger ship. The artillery officer came from the battle cruiser *Seydlitz* and held the rank of lieutenant. He was rated as the best artillery officer in the German Navy.

It was this formidable craft which at noon on Monday,

[8] Bastin gives the name as "Kliphamel", but Captain Bartenbach, commanding the German submarine bases in Flanders, after the war gave the name as "Kopenhamel" (New York *Times*, April 12, 1919).

August 5, in 34° 59′ N., 73° 18′ W., about one hundred ten miles off Cape Hatteras, came upon the becalmed American schooner *Stanley L. Seaman*, of 1,060 tons, and fired a shot across the deck. Captain William McAloney and the crew of eight men took to their boat before the submarine drew near. They rowed close to the U-140 whose officers, learning the men were without water and provisions, took them in tow and pulled them back to the schooner.[9] They were allowed to gather what they needed and then put off in a gasoline launch instead of the original longboat. While they were getting away they could see the Germans looting their supplies. Stores, provisions and clothing were carried over to the submarine. Finally, the *Stanley L. Seaman* was sunk with a bomb. The crew spent three days in the launch before being picked up by a British vessel and taken into Newport News.

The U-140, after the sinking, started westward at a speed of eight knots and at various times, from 3 P.M. until after dark, according to Bastin, attempted futile pursuits of distant vessels. During the night and through the morning of August 6, it approached to within a short distance of the shore and, submerging about noon, crept unseen to the tip of Cape Hatteras, coming to the surface at 1.40 P.M. about midway between the United States Shipping Board steamer *Merak*, and the Diamond Shoal Lightship. The *Merak*, a former Dutch cargo vessel of 3,023 gross tons, was on its way to Chile with a cargo of coal, and was about three miles northeast of the lightship. The latter, a helpless hulk of 590 gross tons, was moored on its station over Diamond Shoal, the most dangerous point on the Atlantic coast. The U-140 opened fire first on the *Merak*, and that vessel, taking up a zigzag course toward the coast,

[9] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 77.

ran on the shoals. Shells were falling all around and several had struck the bridge. The crew lost no time in taking to the boats, and the enemy, seeing the ship could not get away, turned its attention to Lightship Number 71, as the beacon vessel was officially known. Second Officer Bastin, called on deck by the submarine commander at that time, found the U-boat shelling the lightship at 150 yards with both 6-inch guns and told later of its destruction:

I noticed the smoke of these shells was yellow and I think the shells fired at the O. B. Jennings were smokeless. I concluded therefore, that the submarine was firing gas shells at the Diamond Shoal. I think she did that in order that none of the Light Vessel crew might escape. The Light Vessel blew up in a few minutes and I saw her lee boat pulling away at a few hundred yards distance. The submarine was shelling the boat with a 4-inch gun but missed it and the submarine could not go any further in as it was shallow water. That is how the shoal light boat escaped.

The *Merak's* crew also witnessed the scene, and said that the first two shots from the submarine put the wireless on the light vessel out of commission, and that the crew of twelve men all escaped and rowed ten miles to shore. With the lightship disposed of, the U-140 turned its attention to the stranded steamer. An officer of the latter described what happened:

A boat with several men was sent from the submarine to the Merak and in a few minutes she blew up. As we were rowing away the U-boat started after us and hailed us to stop. The submarine came to within a boat's length and an officer, speaking perfect English, asked our name, nationality, cargo and where we came from. He did not seem to place us and he told one of his men to go below

and get him Lloyd's Register. Examining the book, he said, "Oh, your ship was a Hollander, was it?" He then asked if we had a sail and on being told we did, he advised us to hoist it, with the remark that the coast was only ten miles distant to the westward. Another officer said, "You are going to let them go, aren't you?" He replied, "Yes, I don't want them, they can go." He waved us goodbye and started after two ships that were visible about four or five miles away. He was seen shooting at both vessels.[10]

Of the *Merak's* crew of forty-three, twenty-three were subsequently landed at Norfolk and the others at Elizabeth City, North Carolina. In the meanwhile, the U-140 was unable to overtake either of the ships mentioned by the *Merak's* officer. One was the *Mariners Harbor*, a steamer bound from Porto Rico to New York with a cargo of sugar, and the other, the British steamer *Bencleuch*. The *Bencleuch*, which was farther out to sea, was chased and gunned for some time but managed to escape. The *Mariners Harbor* put in close to shore, hugging the coast and receiving frequent messages from the Britisher, the last of which came at 6.25 P.M., and announced, "Ceased firing after thirty-seven shots, 23.25, steering toward Lookout."[11]

Nothing more was heard of the U-140 until eight o'clock in the morning of August 10, when, in 36° N., 73° W., it appeared three miles off the port side of the Brazilian passenger steamer *Uberaba* and dropped a shell in the sea within twenty feet of the ship's side amidships. The *Uberaba* mistook the summons as coming from an American patrol craft, particularly as, when sighted through a glass, a funnel and a small superstructure were

[10] New York *Tribune*, August 10, 1918.

[11] Publications No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 78.

visible. The Brazilian steamer stopped and the stranger approached. As it drew near the funnel and bridge dropped away and a burst of shrapnel was fired from the bow gun, scattering fragments over the bridge of the *Uberaba*. From the wireless of the steamer, as the ship got under way as rapidly as possible, crackled an appeal " S.O.S. Help. We are running extreme danger. We are being attacked. Lat. 36° N. Long. 73° W.S.D.Z." Shrapnel began to fall all around the wireless house, but the operator stuck to his post, sending out frequent calls. The captain of the *Uberaba* had in his custody not only his ship, but the lives of three hundred fifty passengers, including one hundred officers and men of the United States Navy on their way to the South Atlantic fleet. Twenty-five of these latter joined the black gang of the steamer in the stokehold and gradually the speed crept up to fifteen knots. An American engineer, one of the cabin passengers on the *Uberaba*, told the story afterwards:

As we were beginning to despair of getting any assistance in time, an answer came which read, " This is a land station. Four destroyers are rushing toward you." The good news was circulated among the passengers on deck and one American woman went into the drawing-room and rattled off a number of patriotic airs on the piano, which had a cheering effect on everybody. Our chief anxiety was whether we could stay afloat until help arrived. One shell exploded right over the deck, throwing five of the passengers flat on their faces. The passengers were ordered to stand by the lifeboats with their lifebelts on and not to take any baggage. The women were calm and the children gazed in wonder at the exploding shells. The shrapnel shelling became so heavy that we were ordered off the deck to take shelter in the salons below. The gunners aimed at us frequently with solid shot, but could not

hit the ship apparently because of the zig-zagging. Two hours had passed and all hope of being saved had nearly gone by when the lookout on the crow's nest yelled, "Smoke on the horizon on the starboard quarter." The captain looked through his glasses and said he thought it must be the American destroyers coming to our rescue. A few minutes more and there was no doubt of it. A big destroyer was coming at a speed of forty knots and was within five miles of us.[12]

The destroyer was the U.S.S. *Stringham*. Its commander kept under the lee of the *Uberaba* until he was almost on top of it in an effort to reach the U-boat before it could take alarm. But the U-140 saw the approaching warship and submerged quickly. The *Stringham* went by the Brazilian steamer, whose passengers cheered from the deck, and raced over the spot where the submarine had last been seen. Fifteen depth charges were dropped.[13] The effect of these on the U-140 was described by the prisoner, Bastin:

The submarine went down by the head and in a few seconds, we saw a big depth of water in the gauge glasses. I noticed after a minute she was 100 feet deep; at the same time we heard concussions of depth charges — which were repeated at very short intervals. A few minutes later everybody at his station looked to me as very excited and pale, wondering what was going to happen. The submarine was standing at a 300 foot depth. Suddenly a depth charge burst. It seemed to be right on her stern because she got a lift and went down head first, and in a few seconds I saw the depth was 415 feet. On an order from the officer in charge to straighten her up everybody

[12] New York *Times*, August 31, 1918.

[13] Letter, Historical Section, U.S.N., to author, January 5, 1921.

rushed toward the stern. I can tell you, during those few minutes we all thought our last moment had come. When the submarine got straight she was steaming at a very slow speed — about two knots — so the destroyers with their submarine telephones could not hear the motion of the propeller. Another depth charge burst right on top of us, blowing up the middle hatch, putting the lights out and giving the submarine a list of forty degrees. I felt water dripping on me while I was sitting in the bow torpedo room. Two more depth charges dropped on top of us and then the submarine felt as though she were straightening up. I heard water rushing everywhere and this kept up for it seemed about three hours. Temporary lights were used and the submarine kept on steaming slowly at 415 feet depth in all kinds of angles, now down by the stern, now down by the head, or with a list of forty degrees to port, etc. At 12 P.M., the lights came on again. I learned that the dynamo room had received fifty-five tons of water through leaks, the pipes bursting, but the submarine, with her powerful pumps, which were worked by compressed air, could blow out 500 tons a minute.

While the U-140 was having a narrow escape at the hands of the *Stringham*, an American submarine, mistaken for an enemy U-boat, had even a more dangerous experience. On August 7, a short distance off the New Jersey coast, the U.S.S. O-6, Lieutenant Commander C. Q. Wright, U.S.N., was on patrol when a British merchant ship mistook it for a hostile craft and opened fire. Before the submarine could submerge, two shells took effect, one smashing into the conning tower and the other into the 3-inch gun pit. The O-6 made a crash dive and as a result both conning tower and gun pit were flooded. Lying below the surface until the merchantman had passed, Commander Wright finally brought his vessel up just in time

to be mistaken again for an enemy, this time by the U.S. destroyer *Paul Jones*. The destroyer hulled the O-6 six times before Lieutenant A. S. Glann, U.S.N., made his way to the deck and signalled the identity. At the same time he opened the flooded conning tower which was inaccessible from below. The *Paul Jones*, realizing the mistake, ran over to offer assistance, but the O-6 was able to proceed unaided into Cape May. The destroyer acted as a convoy for the trip. For the "exceptional meritorious and gallant service," Lieutenant Commander Wright was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal [14] and Lieutenant Glann received the Navy Cross for "extraordinary heroism." [15]

The destruction of the Diamond Shoal Lightship had been received by the public with astonishment, because of the temerity of the enemy in approaching so near the shore and the singling out of prey so useless from the standpoint of tonnage. Naval authorities, however, realized the purpose, which was an effort to handicap commerce by any method possible. The Diamond Shoal Lightship was one of the most important along the coast. Great volumes of both coastwise and overseas commerce pass Cape Hatteras, and the storms off that point are notorious. With the warning light gone, the chances of vessels being wrecked on the treacherous shoals was omnipresent. The Lighthouse Bureau took steps at once to replace Lightship Number 71 by another one which was always held in reserve. While these preparations were on foot another submarine scare came from North Carolina in the shape of a report that a U-boat had made an attack with gas on Smith Island, on August 10, and temporarily put the coast

[14] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, p. 68.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

guard and lighthouse personnel out of commission. The reported gassing came from the commandant of the Sixth Naval District at Charleston, South Carolina, and was circumstantial in character. The Navy Department, in making it public, stated that a further investigation would be made. It was felt that a submarine had nothing to do with it as the only enemy U-boat anywhere near the North Carolina coast on that day was the U-140, which was busy dodging depth charges from the *Stringham.*

# CHAPTER XIII

## NORTHERN DEPREDATIONS OF THE U-156

New England waters had not escaped the further activities of the U-156 while its companion submarine, the U-140, was raiding off Virginia and North Carolina. For a week after the destruction of the *Robert and Richard*, on July 23, the northern raider found nothing in the shape of prey. During this period it loitered, probably in the Gulf of Maine, although several steamers reported sightings as far south as the area one hundred fifty miles east of Barnegat. Members of the crew of the U-boat told survivors of subsequent victims that it had waited three miles off Portland, Maine, for shipping that did not appear.[1] While the actual distance from shore may have been a misstatement of fact, it is entirely possible that the enemy, in conformity to Admiral Sims' cable of July 24 regarding its base of operations, did not depart from the neighborhood of the New England shore. Finally, on August 2, twenty-five miles due west of Briar Island, in 44° 17′ N., 67° W., it rose before the Canadian motor schooner *Dornfontein* and sent two shots across the bow. The *Dornfon-*

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 57.

*tein*, of 771 gross tons, was just getting into the open sea, having sailed from St. John, New Brunswick, with a cargo of nine hundred thousand feet of large lumber destined for Africa. The schooner was brand new and, with the cargo, was valued at two hundred thousand dollars. It was a handsomely modeled four-masted auxiliary schooner equipped with two 100-horse-power triple-expansion engines and thoroughly appointed throughout with electric lights, bath and other comforts. The U-156 ran in to within several hundred yards of the *Dornfontein* and an officer and three men went aboard. Captain Charles E. Dagwell and his crew of nine men were ordered to row over to the submarine and while they were launching a boat they saw the Germans loot the schooner of a six months' stock of provisions and all the clothing on board. According to the story told subsequently by the crew, all but the captain were taken into the interior of the submarine, passing through the engine room to what they described as "a sort of hold." The captain was kept on deck. While held prisoners, the sailors were offered a meal of bully beef and rice and were assured by their captors that they could eat the food without fear of poison as the U-boat was not "after them." The Germans told them that the submarine had laid the mine which sank the *San Diego*, and several of the crew made a partial identification of the enemy which they reported to be the U-56. As the Navy Department had learned that the U-56 had recently sought internment at Santander, Spain, it was not difficult to identify the U-boat as the U-156 named by Admiral Sims on July 24. The description of the raider, as secured by the men from the *Dornfontein*, was given as more than two hundred feet in length, mounting two guns of 5.9 caliber and manned by a crew of seventy.

After five hours spent on the submarine, the schooner's crew was again ordered into the boat and told to row for the shore. In the meanwhile, the German boarding party, disdaining to use bombs or torpedo, kindled two fires in the *Dornfontein's* hold and, by the time the crew had started away, the vessel was blazing from stem to stern. Captain Dagwell and the nine men reached Grand Manan Island, well inside the mouth of the Bay of Fundy, after a three-hour row and were taken in for the night by the Two Island Life Saving Station. The next day a patrol boat from Machias, Maine, ran over for them and their story was related to the naval officer of the First District at the section base at Machias. The alarm had been sounded in the Bay of Fundy and, on the night of August 4, the civil authorities at St. John forbade the use of any lights in the city. The *Dornfontein* drifted in the mouth of the bay until the fire, which was visible from Grand Manan Island, burned to the water's edge. Two days later the schooner was towed into Rumery's Bay, two miles south of Eastport, Maine, where it was found that about four hundred thousand feet of deal lumber in the hold had escaped the blaze. This was salvaged and the hulk sold for five thousand five hundred dollars.

Moving out of the mouth of the Bay of Fundy after the attack on the *Dornfontein*, the U-156 hovered off the Nova Scotian coast during the night. Next day (August 3) at 11 A.M., while "steaming on the surface at about ten miles an hour headed northeast", the submarine ran across the American fishing schooner *Muriel*, of one hundred twenty gross tons, forty-five miles W. by N. of Seal Island, N. S. The *Muriel* attempted to escape and received two shots, "one across said schooner's bow and one across said stern." Captain E. N. Nickerson hove to after that and

waited for the enemy to come up. The commander of the U-156 ordered the Americans to take to their boats and they got away in four dories, making shore the following day. They saw the Germans loot the schooner and then attach a bomb to the sounding lead and place it under the stern. The *Muriel* sank in two minutes after the bomb exploded.

The U-156 remained on the surface, steering southeast, and about one o'clock, when thirty-five miles off Seal Island, disposed of the schooner *Sydney B. Atwood*, another fisherman, of one hundred gross tons, in the same manner. At two-thirty o'clock, but a few miles from the scene of the previous sinking, the fishing schooner *Annie Perry* was intercepted by the raider, which approached it from the north, and, when three miles away, fired a shot across the bow. Captain James Goodman and his eighteen men put off in dories and were summoned to the side of the U-boat, where the Germans, after telling them not to be afraid as the ship and not the men was what was wanted, boasted of sinking the *San Diego* and "one ship four hundred miles from land." [2]

About three hours after despatching the *Annie Perry*, and ten miles nearer Seal Island, the U-156 overhauled a fourth American fishing schooner, the *Rob Roy*, of one hundred twelve gross tons. Captain Freeman Crowell, of the latter, was told by a German officer that he had sunk schooners hailing from Gloucester and Boston the same day. The destruction of the *Rob Roy* was witnessed by its crew and also by the men of the *Annie Perry* rowing to shore some miles from the spot. With calm weather, the men from the schooners made good progress and, like the crew of the *Muriel*, landed on the morning of August 4 at

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 58.

Woods Harbor, Shelburne, Lockport and other points along the Nova Scotian coast.

During the night of August 3, the U-156 crept up to within fifteen miles of the Nova Scotian coast southeast of Shelburne, and on August 4 added another fishing schooner, the *Nelson A.*, of Yarmouth, to its list. The *Nelson A.*, of seventy-two gross tons, after a week spent on the Lahave Banks, had set sail the preceding day for home with a catch of seven thousand pounds of halibut and ten thousand pounds of mixed fresh fish. At eleven-twenty o'clock in the morning, it sighted the enemy about seven miles away. The U-boat ran up, stopped a short distance astern, and ordered Captain John Simms and his crew to take to the boats. They made off in four dories while the *Nelson A.* was destroyed by bombing.

When the *Nelson A.'s* crew pulled toward the Nova Scotian coast, the U-156 started in pursuit of a distant steamer but turned for a few minutes in a futile effort to head off the auxiliary fishing schooner *McLaughlin.* The time lost in this latter chase enabled the larger prey to escape. Whereupon, the U-boat loitered over night in that locality and, on the morning of August 5, while fifteen miles southeast of the Lahave Fishing Bank, attacked and sank two more Canadian fishing schooners. The first was the *Agnes G. Holland*, of one hundred gross tons. It was disposed of by means of bombs. An hour later, at 10 A.M., the second victim, the *Gladys M. Hollett*, was despatched. The latter was a three-master of two hundred three tons, bound for New York from Twillingdale, Newfoundland, with a cargo of herring. The German boarding party stripped the schooner of everything movable, even the clothing, watch and nautical instruments of Captain Cluett,

and refused to allow the crew to save any personal belongings. The schooner's boat rowed away before the time bombs exploded and did not see their vessel destroyed. They reported it as lost when they reached the Nova Scotian coast the next day. On August 9, however, the *Gladys M. Hollett,* on its beam ends, was towed into a Canadian port and salvaged.

A few hours later on August 5, the Canadian tanker *Luz Blanca*, of 4,868 gross tons, blundered into the path of the enemy. The U-156 picked up the tanker about forty miles off the Nova Scotian coast and, concealed beneath the water, discharged a torpedo which badly damaged the hull of the vessel. Captain J. Thomas, commanding the *Luz Blanca*, seeing the blow was not fatal, at once turned the ship back toward Halifax. It had left that port five hours before, bound for New York. Five minutes later, the enemy emerged five miles distant. The tanker had a single gun, a 12-pounder, mounted aft. It was manned and fired, but all of its shells fell short. The U-156 did not answer the fire. Instead, it seemed to give up the chase and submerged. But the wily German maintained the pursuit under water and at two o'clock caught up with the crippled tanker. The U-156 came to the surface at that hour immediately astern of the *Luz Blanca* and began to rake it fore and aft with 6-inch shells. Again the tanker's lone gun replied and for half an hour a lively duel was fought, neither side being able to do serious damage. Finally a shell from the U-boat destroyed the tanker's propeller and another shot landed directly in front of the bridge, killing the chief cook and chief steward. The fire became so hot that Captain Thomas ordered the *Luz Blanca* abandoned. Three boats were launched amid a hail of shrapnel but with no further injury to the personnel. The *Luz*

*Blanca* sank in 43° 48′ N., 63° 40′ W.[3] Meanwhile the three boats had rowed some distance to the northward, where they were separated in a storm. Two of them were picked up by a sub-chaser and the third reached a lighthouse along the coast.

Turning southward after the destruction of the tanker, the U-156, on August 7, in 42° 15′ N., 64° 17′ W., stopped the Belgian relief ship *Elizabeth Van Belgie.* A boarding officer examined the ship's papers and finally, having established its humane mission to the satisfaction of the enemy, the relief ship was allowed to depart unmolested. The U-156 then continued to about one hundred fifty miles due east of Nantucket, where, on August 8, in 41° 30′ N., 65° 22′ W., it intercepted the Swedish freight steamer *Sydland,* of 3,031 gross tons. A shell which struck twenty fathoms in front of the vessel brought it to, although a second shell was fired after it had stopped, and landed less than ten fathoms away. The U-boat appeared six or seven miles astern and, when it ran closer, signalled in the international code to the captain to take his papers to it. Captain Alexandre N. Larson and three men put off in a small boat and placed his papers in the hands of a German seaman, who, in turn, passed them to a prize officer. In doing so, Captain Larson protested that the *Sydland* was a Belgian relief ship and should not be sunk. His plea impressed the German, who took six men and rowed back with the Swedish captain. Here a demand was made for the German permit which would indicate that the *Sydland* was in the Belgian relief service. Captain Larson had no such paper. The German returned to the submarine and evidently placed the matter in the hands of his superior. At 4.10 P.M., he came back again with

[3] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 59.

REDER
AXEL BROSTRÖM & SON
GÖTEBORG

S. S. "SYDLAND"

den 19

Ich bestätige daß der Dampfer „Sydland" von einem deutschen Unterseeboot am 8. August 1918 angehalten worden ist. Auf Grund der Charterpartie und des englischen Schiffs gegen deutschen Bestätigung, daß das Schiff für den Dienst der belgischen Commission of Belgium Relief bestimmt, ist das Schiff unversehrt da der Verdacht der feindlichen Bestimmung als beseitigt gilt.

Knoeckel
Oblt. z. S.

Courtesy Hist. Sec., U. S. N.

*Receipt from J. Knoeckel, of the U–156, to the master of the Swedish steamer* Sydland

word that the *Sydland* must be sunk. As Captain Larson still protested he was given a signed receipt for his vessel. Translated, this receipt read:

Ship owners: S.S. " Sydland "
Axel Brostrom & CO. . . the . .19 .
Goteborg.

I certify that the steamer Sydland was stopped by a German submarine on August 8, 1918. The ship is captured as the suspicion of hostile intentions is considered proved by reason of the charter party and the complete lack of any German certificate that the ship is intended for the service of the Commission of Belgian Relief.

J. Knoeckel, Lieutenant.[4]

The *Sydland's* crew of thirty men put off in two boats, one of them going close to the submarine and securing the proper course to steer. They did not see the sinking of their ship but heard the bombs exploding about eight o'clock in the evening when they were some distance away. The boats became separated later in the night, although both made good progress toward the shore. Two days later an inbound steamer picked up fifteen of the crew and took them into Boston, arriving August 12. The same day another vessel reported by wireless that it had rescued the men in the other boat.

From the scene of the sinking of the *Sydland*, the U-156 moved southwestward and, on the morning of August 11, came upon a convoy of eighteen vessels bound for Europe. The last of these, the British freight steamer *Penistone*, of 4,139 gross tons, was lagging three miles behind the rest, due to its inability to do better than eight knots while the rest of the ships were making eight and

[4] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 60.

one-half or nine knots. The encounter was in 39° 50′ N., 67° 25′ W. The U-boat remained concealed until the *Penistone* presented a fair target and then discharged a single torpedo. It exploded amidships, killing Cavivor Howells, the fourth engineer, and scalding four firemen. Under orders from Captain David Evans, of the Britisher, four boats were launched and thirty-nine survivors put off from the ship. W. H. C. Holloway, the wireless operator, who had sent out a call for help before abandoning the vessel, described what happened subsequently as follows:

Eleven of us with Captain Evans put off in one of the lifeboats. As we did not see the submarine, we started for the ship to get the papers. The submarine then appeared and an officer and three of the crew ordered me to go aboard the Penistone with them to blow her up. I placed two bombs in the hatches. These bombs were long and narrow and had fuses three or four yards long. The bomb I placed in Hatch No. 1 was filled with liquid fire. The other bomb I placed in Hatch No. 2. Before we lighted the bombs, the officer made me get the captain's bedding. They took him off with them in the "sub." The officer took pictures of us and the sinking of the Penistone.[5]

Immediately after the *Penistone* sank, the U-156 turned westward. The boats, four in number, kept together for a time and then the one containing Benjamin Davies, executive officer, and eight seamen, became separated from the others. The executive officer's boat was picked up by a tug on the morning of August 15. The men had rowed through all sorts of weather since Sunday, sustained only by the limited supply of provisions kept aboard a lifeboat for such an emergency. All the time they had been afloat Davies sat at the tiller and when he stepped

[5] New York *Times*, August 18, 1918.

on the deck of the tug he collapsed. The rescuing vessel took them into Nantucket the same day, and a few hours later the other three boats, containing twenty-nine men, reached Provincetown, Massachusetts. Numbered among the latter were the wireless operator and the seamen who had left the *Penistone* with Captain Evans and who reported him a prisoner on the submarine. The four badly scalded men were also in the wireless operator's boat.

Naturally, the attack on the *Penistone* keyed up the vigilance of the coastal patrols. The U.S. destroyer *Walke* had been despatched to the scene of the sinking but found no trace of ship or crew.

Farther down the coast on the same day occurred an unusual feat in aerial activity. The seaplane A-1737, one of the HS type of flying boats, was compelled to make a forced landing on the ship channel some distance off the southern New Jersey coast. The blow on the water damaged the frail craft so that it was in a sinking condition. Another seaplane, A-1734, witnessed the accident and the pilot landed close by the sinking plane. He brought his machine near enough to permit the three men on the A-1737 to crawl from the wing tips of their craft to the wing tips of the rescuer. Then he "taxied" the entire distance to shore, the A-1734 being loaded down with six men. The damaged plane was abandoned.

A few hours after the torpedoing of the *Penistone*, the U-156 appeared in 40° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W., some distance north by east, and attacked the American steamer *Herman Winter* by gunfire. The steamer made good its escape and for five days nothing more was heard of the enemy. When it next put itself in the way of a vessel it picked out the British tanker *Lackawanna*, which was met in 40° 40′ N.,

64° 40′ W. John Crosby, chief officer of the tanker, told the story afterwards:

It was about 3 o'clock in the afternoon when the second mate saw the wake of a torpedo. The ship was thrown out of its course and the torpedo missed by a few feet. A second torpedo launched from the submarine was dodged by the clever handling of the Lackawanna. All this time the U-boat had kept under water. Now she came to the surface, evidently determined to put the Lackawanna out of business by shelling rather than by the use of more of the costly torpedoes. She opened up with her guns at a distance of two miles. She was a speedier boat than the tanker, and was steadily lessening the gap between the two vessels. All this time our gun crew was busy, and I was acting as "spotter" for the gunner, calling the shells as they kicked up the water near the submarine. Our twenty-sixth shot took the submarine right. No, she didn't blow up with a bang, like they have in the books. What she did was to swing slowly broadside on. She was going fast at the time, and we knew she was through, but the gunner let her have his twenty-seventh shot. But it was the twenty-sixth did the trick. Up to that time she had been tossing shells three to our one. We didn't wait to make sure that the submarine was gone.[6]

The official report of the commander of the *Lackawanna* differed from Crosby's story in only a few details. According to it, the second torpedo was diverted by gunfire; it was the twentieth shot, not the twenty-sixth, which made the "hit", and the submarine submerged after trying ineffective fire from an after gun. Captain Evans, of the *Penistone*, a prisoner on the U-156 at the time, told a different story. He said, after being released, that the

[6] Philadelphia *Press*, August 31, 1918.

U-boat fired about forty shots from the forward gun after the tanker, but that it escaped by copious use of smoke and superior speed. He made no mention of the U-156 being hit.[7]

Running due north during the balance of August 16, the enemy reached 42° 10′ N., 64° 42′ W., on the morning of the next day, and stopped the small Norwegian steamship *San Jose*, of 1,586 tons. The *San Jose* was brought to by a shot across the bow and a boarding officer and a number of men arrived from the submarine. Captain Hans Thorbyonson protested against the destruction of his vessel on the ground that it was under charter to the Norwegian Government. One of the officers demanded that he produce a copy of the charter. Unfortunately there was no copy on board, although Captain Thorbyonson did have a letter showing that his ship was engaged in carrying foodstuffs from the United States to the Norwegian Food Commission. The German officers conferred, the discussion, according to the Norwegians, being animated. Finally the captain was informed he had failed to establish proper proof and that the *San Jose* would be sunk. The members of the crew were given half an hour to gather their belongings and launch lifeboats. After they had put off, one of the boats was ordered to the side of the submarine. Here Captain Thorbyonson was given a receipt signed by the same man who had signed the one given the captain of the *Sydland* on August 8, Lieutenant Knoeckel.[8] At the same time Captain Evans was brought on deck and placed in the boat. The captain said he had been told by the U-boat commander that he could stay with the submarine or board one of the *San Jose's* boats

[7] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 64.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

and he chose the latter. Within a very short time after the *San Jose* had been sunk by bombs, the crew was picked up by the British steamer *Derbyshire*. The latter was so close to the scene that the explosion of the bombs was heard on board. The Norwegians and Captain Evans were landed in Boston, on August 19, where the latter placed in the hands of the naval authorities a detailed account of the U-156 which had been his prison for seven days.

The First Naval District was glad to have all information possible regarding the very active raider. The U-156 was proving very much of a will-o'-the-wisp. A hunt squadron, which traversed the area from the Canadian line south to Nantucket, had been unsuccessful in locating it, although practically every sub-chaser in the district was at sea during the whole time. The navy's efforts had also been called into question by Congressman Daniel R. Anthony, of Kansas, who, on August 12, had presented a resolution (House Resolution 422) requesting the Secretary of the Navy "to furnish the House with facts concerning recent attacks of German submarines on American shipping off the Cape Cod coast of Massachusetts." The resolution went to the Naval Affairs Committee and was never heard of again.[9]

Canada also was interested in the pursuit, two Halifax newspapers offering a reward of five thousand dollars for information leading to the location of U-boat bases. In addition a five hundred dollar reward was offered to any one giving information that would lead to the first arrest of "any of the enemy agents."

[9] Congressional Record, 56, Vol. 56, Part 9, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, Aug. 12, 1919, p. 9229.

# CHAPTER XIV

## FIRST EXPLOITS OF THE U-117

While the U-140 and U-156 were active along widely removed sections of the coast, the Navy Department knew that a third raider was westbound from Germany. A wireless message, received on July 26, stated that the British steamer *Baron Napier* was being gunned by a submarine in 45° 26′ N., 32° 56′ W. On the same day, but more than two hundred miles nearer the American shore, the U-140 had been encountered by the *Melitia* and the *British Major*, and the U-156, three days before, had bombed the *Robert and Richard* off Maine. These circumstances located the newcomer as well on its voyage. Further confirmation came five days later, when Admiral Sims cabled from London, announcing that a new mine-laying type of submarine was headed toward America. He estimated that it could reach the longitude of Nantucket Lightship by August 2, and described its armament as "one 6-inch gun, one 4-inch gun, two anti-aircraft guns, forty-fives; also carries torpedoes, but number of tubes unknown." [1]

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 11.

The new enemy was the U-117, which had been commissioned in late June and departed from Kiel on its initial foray shortly afterwards. It was two hundred seventy-five feet in length and carried, in addition to the weapons enumerated in the Sims cable, forty-six mines and twenty torpedoes. Its commander was Kapitanleutnant Droscher, who had previously operated in the U-87 in the North Sea and English Channel. The U-117 had slipped around the British Isles so quietly that the British information service had no knowledge of its whereabouts until the attack upon the *Baron Napier* on July 26. After this unsuccessful encounter, it again vanished and was unheard of for fifteen days. Before it reappeared Admiral Sims cabled again in reference to it. The message, sent August 7, stated that "we feel so certain that mine-laying submarine will operate in Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound August 10 that counter measures in mining are recommended." The suggestion was not carried out by the Navy Department. The special board which had formulated the defensive plan for the Atlantic coast had ruled against the subsurface mine in its report of February 6, 1918, and Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, had concurred in this "in view of the slight advantages to be derived as compared to the inordinate risk to shipping." [2]

On August 10, the U-117 finally made its début in coastal waters by an attack upon the swordfishing fleet on George's Bank, sixty miles eastward of Nantucket. The foray could not have been better timed to create the impression that a large number of raiders was at work. It was between the time of the sinking of the *Sydland* and *Penistone* by the U-156 and the same day the *Stringham*

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 151.

bombed the U-140 and Smith Island, North Carolina, reported a gas attack.

Some thirty small craft, of from fifteen to sixty tons apiece, were swordfishing on one of the best known banks along the eastern seaboard when the U-117 arrived. All were equipped with auxiliary motors in addition to sails. They were scattered in small groups over an area of about twenty-five square miles. Five of them, the *Aleda May*, thirty-one tons; *Progress*, thirty-four tons; *Reliance*, nineteen tons; *William H. Starbuck*, fifty-three tons, and *Earl and Nettie*, twenty-four tons, were on the northern part of the bank in 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. At 9.50 A.M. on August 10, "the man on the lookout on the *Starbuck* first sighted the submarine." It was coming from "E by SE and was about five miles off." No one on the other schooners had as yet taken the alarm, and, before the *Starbuck* could get under way, the U-boat, moving rapidly and showing "a great deal of foam", opened fire at a distance of three miles. Several shells burst so near the *Starbuck* that fragments fell on the deck and by 10.30 A.M. the crew had abandoned the schooner.

At the sound of the firing the other small craft made haste to start their motors. The U-117 came up rapidly. A shell fired from a quarter mile distant cut off the mainsail of the *Aleda May*, and the *Reliance* escaped two shells by fifty and one hundred fifty feet respectively. The *Progress* and the *Earl and Nettie* also were gunned and the four crews followed the example set by the men from the *Starbuck* and put off in their dories. Captain James Nickerson, of the *Reliance*, realizing the futility of trying to row out of danger and noticing that the U-boat had ceased firing, turned back and boarded his schooner to await whatever fate might be in store.

With five small vessels lying idle and at his mercy, the commander of the U-117 picked out the nearest, the *Aleda May*. Captain Frank Lynch and the five men of the crew were in two dories. The U-boat ran alongside these and an officer and two German seamen boarded the captain's boat and compelled the men in it to row them back to the schooner. A photograph of this proceeding was taken from the bridge of the submersible. Two different versions of what transpired on the *Aleda May* were given subsequently. One was a story accredited to "the mate" of the schooner, and which described the German officer as "being half drunk" and performing a grotesque dance with the schooner's American flag, finally hurling it to his feet and trampling on it amid cheers from his men.[3]

Fred Doucette, engineer of the *Aleda May*, and one of the men who, with Captain Lynch, rowed the German officer to the vessel, told a different story to the naval authorities. He described the bombing of the craft and quoted the boarding officer as saying: "There she is. That is war," as the boat settled.

Because they desired to make use of the *Aleda May's* one dory, the Germans, after returning to the U-117, ordered Captain Lynch, Doucette, and a fisherman on the deck, but permitted the other dory to row away. The trio of prisoners were kept standing, with an armed guard of four over them, for about an hour. During this time, the U-boat ran over toward the *Progress*, arriving near it at 1 P.M. Captain Robert Jackson and his crew had been standing by the schooner in a dory and were motioned out of the way by an officer on the deck of the enemy.

[3] New York *Times* and all other New York, Philadelphia and Boston daily papers of August 14, 1918. From the similarity of the text in each instance, the account probably originated with a press service.

All of this was seen by the men from the *Aleda May*, but at this point, and before the *Progress* was bombed, they were suddenly ordered below deck. After disposing of the second schooner, the U-117 turned toward the *Reliance*. Captain Nickerson and his three dories were lying about three hundred yards off and saw the bombs placed and the schooner destroyed. They then started to row westward, observing the enemy approaching the *Starbuck* to the north. The crew of the *Reliance* also saw three more schooners some distance away, one of which was probably the *Earl and Nettie*. The destruction of the *Starbuck*, also by a bomb, and witnessed by its crew, occurred at about 2 P.M. Then the submarine started for the *Earl and Nettie*. Later, when they reached shore, the men from the latter schooner reported that they had been subjected to many indignities; that they had been jeered at by the Germans and had been refused permission to save some trinkets which they had left on board.

Two schooners, which escaped, witnessed the destruction of the *Earl and Nettie*. They were the *Albert Black* and the *Gleanor*, the former being fired upon and almost struck and the other getting away apparently without being seen.

Several miles farther west another cluster of fishing boats, three in number, had heard distant firing, but, as there had been frequent rumors of submarines for some weeks, little attention was paid to it. This trio consisted of the *Cruiser*, twenty-eight tons; *Old Time*, eighteen tons, and *Mary E. Sennett*, twenty-seven tons. When the submarine approached from the eastward it was about 4 P.M. Just previous to this the U-117 had released the men from the *Aleda May* and sent them off in their dory. The U-boat zigzagged as it drew near the new quarry but all

three boats sought to run away to the northwestward. What happened was related by Captain Manael Dias, of the *Mary E. Sennett:*

When about a mile off three shots were fired at the same time, one at each of the fishing boats. Then we face vessel SE and then two more shots were fired, one at stern and one at bow. Then we took to dories and went WNW and the vessel SE jogging along by itself. Only saw one shot hit water and went under keel. Cruiser was sunk and Old Time was also sunk. Germans were not seen going on board these vessels. After Cruiser and Old Time were sunk, submarine went toward Mary E. Sennett. Lost sight of vessel and did not pay much attention as we were using our best efforts to get away.[4]

The ninth and final victim of the day was the *Katie L. Palmer*, of thirty-one tons. It was some six miles or more west of the spot where the first five vessels were destroyed. It had received warning around three o'clock in the afternoon, when the crew of the *Reliance* reached it after a hard pull. Taking alarm at once, the motor was started and the little craft tried to get away from the dangerous locality. Fate was against it as, about 5.30 P.M., the U-117 loomed into sight from the northeast. With the *Katie L. Palmer* making six knots an hour and the enemy about twelve knots, the end was inevitable. The Germans did not bother using their guns. They ran up close and, when one hundred yards away, the crew of the *Reliance* and the crew of the *Palmer* put off in their dories. Captain Edward Russell and three French-Canadians in one dory were beckoned to the side of the U-boat and invited on board. They were kept on deck about a half hour, while preparations were under way to bomb their vessel, and were then

[4] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 88.

sent below. Captain Russell was interrogated by the commander of the U-117 regarding American mine fields. The German also boasted that his vessel had twenty-one knots speed, a cruising radius of seventeen thousand miles and provisions and oil sufficient for a six-months' cruise. At 6 P.M., after the U-boat had proceeded slowly westward, they were cast adrift in their dory, the parting admonition from the commander being, "We are not baby killers, so don't tell any lies about us when you reach land."[5]

A heavy fog, which covered the Bank during the night of August 10, separated many of the dories. The most fortunate boat was the one from the *Katie L. Palmer*, which was picked up about 11 P.M. by the auxiliary schooner *Helen Murley*. The crew arrived at New Bedford, Massachusetts, on August 12, but the story of the attack had preceded them as a naval patrol vessel had encountered the *Helen Murley*, secured their statements and put into Nantucket the night before. The trawler *Acushla* picked up six dories with fourteen men from the crews of the *Progress*, *William H. Starbuck* and *Aleda May*, after they had been drifting for twenty-four hours, and reached Boston with them on August 13. The same day the six men from the *Cruiser*, who had rowed one hundred eighty miles, were rescued, as were the crews of the *Earl and Nettie* and *Old Time* and the balance of the men from the *Aleda May*. These were taken into Nantucket by another fishing schooner which had run across them one hundred miles at sea. The trawler *Goodspeed* rescued the men from the *Mary E. Sennett* and the *Reliance* on the afternoon of August 11 and transferred them to a sub-chaser which took them to Provincetown on Au-

[5] Philadelphia *Press*, August 14, 1918.

gust 13. On August 15 the final rescue was achieved when four more of the men from the *Progress* were carried into Boston, having been picked up after seventy-two hours in their dory without a compass and with little food or water.

The German foray upon the fishing fleet, conceived undoubtedly with the dual purpose of shaking American morale and destroying a very important commercial enterprise, resulted in the Assistant States Administrator of Massachusetts, James J. Phelan, appealing, at the instance of the Mayor of Gloucester, Massachusetts, for naval protection for the fishermen. He reported that the fishermen's families were greatly alarmed and that steps would have to be taken to reassure them. As a result, the Food Administration, on August 17, issued the following announcement:

> As a food conservation measure and to prevent destruction of fishing vessels by German submarines, the Navy Department has established a patrol of certain fishing grounds off the Atlantic coast, after discussion of the situation with the Food Administration. . . . The naval patrol will be accomplished without weakening the convoy system that has made it possible for troops and supplies to voyage in safety to Europe. Submarines recently have sunk vessels engaged in cod fishing and have committed depredations among smaller craft after sword fish.[6]

Following the raid upon the swordfishermen, on August 10, the U-117 turned southwest, running undetected through the next day, and, on the morning of August 12, torpedoed the Norwegian steamer *Sommerstadt*, of 3,875 gross tons in 40° 10′ N., 72° 45′ W., or about twenty-five miles southeast of Fire Island, and fifteen miles from

[6] Official United States Bulletin, August 17, 1918.

where the *San Diego* had struck a mine about three weeks before.

If Captain George Hansen, master of the Norwegian, and members of his crew were not mistaken in their description of the erratic course of the torpedo, the destruction of the vessel can be nothing more than a bit of luck for the enemy. The *Sommerstadt* was bound for New York from Bergen, Norway, in ballast, operating for the United States Government. It had stopped at Halifax, departing from there on August 9 and skirting the coast on the southward trip. At 8.15 A.M. on August 12, a lookout sighted the wake of a torpedo traveling broadside with the steamer, but in the opposite direction and some distance off to port. Captain Hansen ordered the ship's boats — a motor launch and a lifeboat — made ready. How the torpedo behaved while the boats were being manned forms an interesting narrative as related later by the skipper:

> The torpedo suddenly turned and appeared to be coming directly toward us, when it suddenly disappeared. A moment later it bobbed up off our starboard, proving that it had passed under our ship after making its detour. We watched it turning southward, in the same direction we were going and then we saw it crossing our bow and describing a wide circle. The second time that it came toward us, which was half a mile off after it had crossed our bow from starboard to port, it came straight and struck the Sommerstadt on her port side between Nos. 3 and 4 hatches. There was a terrific explosion but it hurt nobody. One sailor was slightly injured jumping into the lifeboat and I got a sprained ankle doing the same thing. We had not taken time to save anything personal with us.[7]

[7] New York *Times*, August 14, 1918.

To add to the element of luck, the *Sommerstadt*, after the first appearance of the torpedo, went full speed astern, and then full speed ahead. No stranger account of the vagaries of a torpedo are on record. Its final success was complete, as the vessel began to settle in four minutes after being struck and sank rapidly by the stern. The crew rowed all day toward shore and were picked up by a Third District patrol craft at 6.40 P.M.

The following morning, August 13, the British armed freighter *Pyrrhus* engaged in a forty-five-minute running fight with the U-117, about forty-five miles off the North Jersey coast, in which the Britisher did all the firing. The *Pyrrhus* first sighted a periscope abeam and a little later saw it astern. It opened fire at two thousand six hundred yards and the enemy finally gave over the pursuit.

The U-117 remained in the waters off the mouth of New York Harbor for more than twenty-four hours after the torpedoing of the *Sommerstadt*, the incident of the *Pyrrhus* not driving it away. Although patrols of subchasers combed the area, they found no trace. It remained for the American tanker *Frederick R. Kellogg*, of 7,127 gross tons, to fall afoul of the raider, the encounter occurring within eleven miles of the New Jersey coast and about thirty miles south of Ambrose Channel Lightship. The tanker, laden with seventy thousand barrels of crude oil, was northward bound from Tampico to Boston and was keeping close to the shore under navy regulations. At 5.10 P.M. on August 13, it was struck abaft the after section of the engine room by a torpedo, the explosion instantly killing Samuel L. Johnson, the second assistant engineer; Alex. A. Jorgensen, a fireman, and John M. Carlsen, an oiler. The first officer, John Quigley, was on the bridge at the time and had seen no warning torpedo wake.

Captain C. H. White, rushing up from supper, ordered four blasts on the whistle, the order to abandon ship, and the men hurried aft to two lifeboats, both of which they found had been smashed by the explosion. There were two more boats forward, one of which was a motor launch. These were lowered and several men jumped into them and pulled away from the ship. The tanker went down so rapidly that the majority of the crew had to jump far out and swim desperately to avoid the suction. A rather heavy sea was running and one man drowned before he could be picked up by the boats. Three others lost their lives when they went to their quarters for personal effects and were carried down in the sinking vessel. In addition to the three killed in the explosion, the fatalities were Chester Curtis Cubberley and William T. Stillman, quartermasters, 3d class, U.S.N.R.F., who had been detailed to the *Frederick R. Kellogg* for training purposes;[8] James Kramer, third assistant engineer, and Francisco deSouza, messboy. One man, Leo Voglemuth, a seaman, was slightly injured.

When the tanker was awash and the boats were about three hundred yards away, the U-117 stuck its periscope out of the water and then came to the surface, according to the men in one of the boats. It remained in sight only five minutes. Captain White, in his statement to the naval authorities, declared that he did not see a U-boat at any time.

The thirty-six men in the two boats rigged a line from the motor boat to the lifeboat and then found the engine of the former would not work. They set up a sail on the motor launch and started for the shore. A little more than

[8] Schedule C, Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

three hours later they were sighted by an American coastwise steamer and picked up near Sandy Hook.

The *Frederick R. Kellogg* was not a war loss. It had sunk in shallow water and a portion of the bow stuck above the surface. The stern rested on the bottom in fifteen fathoms, the bridge was awash and the smokestacks were three feet under water. Salvaging operations were begun on August 15, and, after much interference by rough weather, the ship was floated, on August 27, and towed into New York. The success of the salvaging efforts was credited to four navy men, Lieutenant Commander Walter N. Davis, Lieutenant Commander John Johnson, Lieutenant (J.G.) John E. Dahl, and Carpenter Olof Soderberg. The latter "displayed extraordinary courage in getting to the firerooms and opening and closing necessary valves." [9] The bulk of the oil cargo was a total loss, great quantities of it drifting to the New Jersey shore resorts from Long Branch south to Ocean City and interfering with bathing and even playing on the beaches.

The U-117 began its mine-laying operations right after the tanker was torpedoed. It ran south until off Barnegat Inlet, where it laid nine mines 985 yards apart over a distance of four nautical miles. An S.O.S. call from the *Frederick R. Kellogg*, which was picked up shortly before six o'clock by the Third District and relayed to the Fourth, resulted in an effort to head off the enemy, a listening patrol being rushed to the district boundary, running seaward from Barnegat. It was formed probably after the U-117 had finished its mine-laying and, despite it, the enemy continued southward.

The next reported contact with the enemy was about eight hours after the sinking of the *Frederick R. Kellogg*

[9] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 282.

Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*The tanker* Frederick R. Kellogg *torpedoed off Ambrose Channel Lightship, but later salvaged*

Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*The "unsinkable"* Lucia *settling some twelve hours after being torpedoed*



Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*The tanker* Herbert L. Pratt *mined off the mouth of the Delaware, but later salvaged*

and at a point south of Barnegat Inlet, in 39° 28′ N., 74° W. The vessel was the U.S.S. *Henderson*, bound up the coast to resume transport duty after a thorough overhauling and outfitting which had removed all vestige of the fire damage sustained more than a month before.[10] Because of an erroneous impression that the transport had rammed the U-139 — a German submarine which never operated upon the American coast — the incident is interesting. Farther along will be found an account of the U-139 which indicates clearly it was nowhere near Barnegat Inlet in the early morning of August 14, when the *Henderson* sighted "an object, thought to be a submarine." The transport had left the Philadelphia Navy Yard, at 9.30 A.M., August 13, and it was one-thirty-five o'clock the following morning that a lookout observed a suspicious object "bearing thirty-three degrees on starboard bow."[11] Very likely the *Henderson* had come upon the U-117 as the enemy was completing its mine-laying job, several mines being later swept up in the immediate vicinity of the encounter. Says the log of the transport:

> Put rudder hard right for about 3 minutes, sounded general quarters, loaded Nos. 1 and 3 5″ guns. Object . . . disappeared. . . . At 1:50 sounded retreat from general quarters. At 2:49 changed course 10° to the left. . . . Captain and Navigator on bridge during entire watch.

The U-117 — if it was the object seen — made no effort to attack the *Henderson*. When, sometime later, the transport was docked and its starboard bilge keel was found to be partly bent and broken, the conclusion was

[10] Extract: log of U.S.S. *Henderson*, August 14, 1918, Navy Dept.
[11] *Ibid.*

reached that the submarine had been rammed and damaged.[12] "There is nothing, however, to show that the *Henderson* struck the U-117 as that submarine continued to operate," the Navy Department reports.[13] Less than eight hours after the incident of the transport, in fact, the U-117 was again heard from and, this time, its presence was unmistakable.

At 10 A.M. on August 14, it sent a warning shot across the bow of the five-masted schooner *Dorothy B. Barrett*, of 2,088 tons. The schooner was bound from New York to Norfolk and was attacked five miles southeast of Northeast End Lightship, a point about twenty-two miles due east of the Fourth District section base at Cape May. William Merritt, master of the schooner, and his crew of ten, abandoned the ship in a motor boat, after letting the forward sails go on the run, and made toward the submarine, which submerged. The motor boat ran northwest and the U-boat came up again between the boat and the schooner. For some time, without molesting the boat, the U-117 followed it northwestward. Then it turned back toward the schooner. Ten minutes later Captain Merritt sighted the American steel mine-trawler *Kingfisher* and was taken on board. Captain Merritt told the story later:

I asked the captain what he had to fight with. He said he had three-inch guns. I told him the submarine was too big for him to tackle with that kind of gun. I then went up on the bridge and asked him what he was going to do. He said he was going to run for shoal water. We had been running about west only a short time when we sighted the oil tanker [American steamer William Green].

[12] Gleaves, "A History of the Transport Service, 1917–1918"; New York, 1921, pp. 164–166.

[13] Letter, Navy Department to author, December 20, 1928.

I said to the captain, " He is going to get that fellow also, and to shift our course to warn the tanker." The submarine was on our starboard quarter and we commenced firing. We were then heading about west and that submarine was about 2½ miles on our stern, just so we could fire by the pilot house. I did not see the conning tower then, but the gunner said he saw it, and he fired a couple of shots. When I saw the tanker she was headed SE. By this time she had also seen the submarine, I guess. We did not have but little time to go down toward him, and started to fire on this submarine, and then we had to watch the fellows. We kept right on down that way toward him and started to fire and put on all steam we could; but, as I said before, we wanted to get in shoal water. Then the submarine came up and went right ahead of us and we fired about three shots. From the time we abandoned our ship to the time these shots were fired, I judge it was about three-quarters of an hour.[14]

In the meanwhile, the U-117 had paused long enough to shell the schooner, until it caught fire and was seen to be sinking, and then started after the tanker and the armed mine-sweeper. At the first alarm, the *William Green* had sent out a wireless call giving the position. The message was picked up by the sub-chasers numbered 71, 72 and 73, about ten miles from the scene. They were accompanied by the submarine N-7, which was making practise dives and approaches. The message was also intercepted by sub-chaser Number 144, which was near Cold Spring Inlet at Cape May. All of these vessels made full speed for the spot. Number 144 met the *Kingfisher* running away and the mine-sweeper then turned and again started for the field of operations. A little later they sighted a supposed

[14] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 93.

submarine and Number 144 made a direct hit — on a spar from the abandoned seaplane A-1737, which had been lost several days before. None of the small vessels arrived in time to sight the submarine, but all witnessed the sinking of the *Dorothy B. Barrett.* What was supposed to have been a wake was spotted by sub-chaser Number 71 and the vicinity was heavily bombarded by depth charges from the chasers and bombs from seaplane Number 1859. A large oil slick appeared on the water, but no further evidence was obtained. The timely arrival had driven the U-117 from the attack on the tanker, which was convoyed to safety.[15]

Sweeping on down the coast, the raider deposited seven mines over a length of three nautical miles a short distance south of Fenwick Island Lighthouse and eight more south of Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship.[16] It completed its task by the morning of August 15, and at 7.15 A.M. came upon the American motor schooner *Madrugada*, of 1,613 tons, in 37° 50′ N., 74° 55′ W., a short distance southwest of Winter Quarter. The U-117 emerged about two miles away and opened fire. The first shot fell one hundred feet over the starboard bow; the second, twenty feet ahead; the third, slightly off the port bow, and the fourth struck the engine room. After the third shot Captain Frederick Rouse and his twenty men cleared a lifeboat over the starboard rail and kept in the lee of the ship until the submarine ceased firing. Not so Frederick L. Cook, a navy electrician on board. Cook stuck to the ship under shell fire until he had sent out a wireless call. Then, with the vessel sinking under him, he jumped overboard and swam to the boat. While Cook remained on board, two more

[15] Manuscript narrative, Ensign Karl F. Knipe, U.S.N.R.F.

[16] Chart, mine-laying activities on the American coast, Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., Appendix.

shots were fired. Then the U-117 moved up closer and put three shots into the stern and cabin at a distance of twenty feet. An oil tank caught fire and the *Madrugada* was ablaze as it sank. Four hours later the steamer *Taunton* picked up the crew. They had saved nothing, many of them being half-dressed and shoeless. The schooner, due to one thousand tons of cement in its hold which settled into the stern, remained a menace to navigation for more than a week, with its bowsprit sticking out of the water. It was then destroyed by the Coast Guard cutter *Gresham*, whose captain, C. M. Chiswell, and boatswain, H. B. Berg, were commended by the Secretary of the Navy for their achievement.[17]

At 6.30 A.M. on August 16, about twenty-four hours after the destruction of the *Madrugada*, and one hundred twenty miles farther south, the British tanker *Mirlo*, of 6,978 gross tons, was badly shattered by an explosion which came without warning, when one-half mile west from Wimble Shoal buoy off the coast of North Carolina. Captain W. R. Williams, master of the *Mirlo*, declared "she was struck on the starboard side aft by a torpedo, bursting Number 2 tank and blowing up the decks, which was immediately followed by another torpedo which struck farther aft and set fire to ship in stokehold and after end." The Navy Department stated that it "seems highly probable that the *Mirlo* was sunk by a submerged anchored mine, notwithstanding the captain's very positive statement that the ship was torpedoed." The U-117 must have been in the vicinity to lay the mine and it could not have been very far away, as the next day it operated offshore not more than one hundred twenty miles from the spot.

[17] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, pp. 362, 363.

Mine or torpedo, however, the effect was the same. The explosion had put the dynamos out of commission, destroyed the telegraph and broken open the engine room. The crew managed to head the ship toward shore, but, with a fire raging around them and the vessel dropping away under their feet, Captain Williams ordered the boats launched. The starboard lifeboat got away from the ship, but the port lifeboat's tiller fouled the after falls, sheered off and capsized. Its occupants were thrown into the water. Some of them were drowned and others, seeing the flames around them, the burning oil having run out on the surface of the ocean, leaped overboard and then were unable to get back. Ten men lost their lives from this boat. Six clung to it. The balance of the crew got clear of the ship in the after boats, the falls catching fire as they were being lowered. A few minutes later the *Mirlo* blew up and the burning oil was hurled in all directions.[18]

Ten miles to the westward, on the Carolina coast, the lookout at Life Saving Station Number 179 had seen "a great mass of water shoot up in the air which seemed to cover the after part of a steamer which was east by south from the station." The lookout had watched while the steamer headed for the beach and, when fire was observed on the stern and several explosions were heard, the Coast Guard crew of six men put off in their power surfboat through a heavy sea. Five miles offshore they came upon a lifeboat containing Captain Williams and sixteen men, who told them that other boats, one of which had capsized, were somewhere in the smoke cloud which surrounded the scene. Directing the lifeboat to row in toward shore and wait outside the breakers, the Coast Guard crew

[18] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 128.

kept on. Their action, which brought a commendation for each from Secretary Daniels,[19] is related by Keeper John A. Midgett:

The lifeboat then headed to the burning mass of wreckage and oil. Upon arrival the sea was found to be covered with blazing gas and oil. There appeared to be great volumes of flames about 100 yards apart, and the ocean for hundreds of yards covered with flame. In between the two large bodies of flame, at times when the smoke lifted, a boat would be seen bottom up with six men clinging to it and a heavy swell washing over it. With extreme difficulty the coast guard boat ran through the smoke and floating wreckage and rescued the six men from the upturned boat. The rescued men stated that many times they had been compelled to dive under the water to save themselves from being burned to death. All had burns, but none was in a very serious condition. They also stated that they had seen some of their crew sink and disappear in the burning sea. The life-savers continued their search in the vicinity, but no more men could be found. As one boat was still missing, the lifeboat headed before the wind and sea and in a short time the third boat, with nineteen men, was sighted. It was found to be overloaded and so much crowded that the men in it could not row and were drifting helplessly with the wind and sea about nine miles southeast of the station. The lifeboat ran alongside and took the steamer's boat in tow.[20]

Boatswain Donalds, one of the nineteen men in the last boat, said they had expected every minute to be burned to death. Three of his men were completely exhausted and

[19] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, pp. 358–359. The coast-guard crew were: John A. Midgett, keeper; A. V. Midgett, C. E. Midgett, L. S. Midgett, Z. S. Midgett and P. L. O'Neal, surfmen.

[20] Official United States Bulletin, September 5, 1918.

eight burned, including himself, four seriously. They had first used their coats in an effort to beat out the flames licking the sides of their small craft. The coats caught fire and "we took off our pants, and when our pants burned up we took our slippers." After the Coast Guard boat reached them, they were towed toward shore until they caught up with the captain's boat. The wind from the northeast had freshened and a heavy sea was running. It had also become quite dark, but Keeper Midgett decided to make a landing. The two ship's boats were anchored about six hundred yards offshore and the motor launch took the crew through the surf to safety. The next day the *Mirlo's* survivors were taken to Norfolk, where seven men were placed in a hospital because of their burns.

Nothing had been seen of a submarine in the vicinity where the *Mirlo* was destroyed although nine other vessels were near-by and one was in sight of the tragedy. In fact, the U-117 remained concealed from the time it sank the *Madrugada*, on August 15, until 6.30 A.M., August 17. On that day and hour, when one hundred twenty miles southeast of Cape Henry, in 35° 42′ N., 74° 05′ W., the U-boat came up one and one-half miles astern of the Norwegian bark *Nordhav*, of 2,846 gross tons, proceeded to a point off the port side and fired a shot overhead. Captain Sven Marcussen brought the bark to, and, upon signal, rowed over to the enemy with the papers. An officer, who spoke English, returned with the Norwegian to the *Nordhav*, and, after learning that the vessel was bound from Buenos Aires to New York with a cargo of linseed, announced that it would be destroyed. Three bombs were placed on board and the bark sank in five hours. The crew were held on the U-117 for four hours and came on deck

to see the end of their vessel. Captain Marcussen was given a receipt for his vessel, it being signed "Droscher." The twenty-six men were then cast adrift in two small boats and after twenty-nine hours were picked up about 6 P.M., August 18, by the U.S.S. *Kearsarge* and carried to Boston, arriving August 20.[21]

[21] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 95.

## CHAPTER XV

# THE U-140

# STARTS HOME

AFTER its narrow escape from the U.S. destroyer *Stringham,* on August 10, the U-140, fearing that it might be traced through oil leakage caused by damage from depth bombs, moved "under water for six days, steering east and west, I presume, a distance of 100 miles", according to the captive officer from the tanker *O. B. Jennings.* Second Officer Bastin described later the alarm expressed by the Germans, stating that the U-boat never came any nearer the surface than was required to use the periscope and that it was finally decided at a meeting of "the captain, officers and all the crew" to emerge the next day and make a running fight for it if the destroyers were still on the trail. So, on the following morning, the U-140 came to the surface and the prisoner, not allowed on deck, at once "felt the concussion of gunfire." He thought that the submarine had been hit and from the vibrations judged it was "steaming at utmost speed." The gunfire, he said, lasted an hour, after which the crew rushed below and gave three cheers. He noticed that "sailors were coming along with bottles of spirits and cheering all over the

place." The story they told him was that the submarine had run away from the destroyers; that it had headed into the sea at twenty-five knots, firing the after gun only, and the destroyers could not reply because "they would smash themselves up." [1] As a matter of fact, the U-140 had not encountered any destroyers, nor was it six days after the experience with the *Stringham* when the foregoing occurred, although the matter of time was one which the captive could only tell by guesswork.

It was 5.32 P.M. when the U-140 emerged after three days under water, and it was August 13, three days after it had been bombed by the destroyer. The point was in 35° 30′ N., 69° 43′ W., or several hundred miles due east of Cape Hatteras, and, instead of being pursued by more destroyers, it attacked and was driven away by the U.S.S. *Pastores*, a navy cargo-carrier. The U-140 found the *Pastores* about seven miles away and, at 5.43 P.M., sent a shell which struck on the starboard quarter about twenty-five hundred yards distant. Other shells followed and, by the aid of a glass, the officer of the deck on the *Pastores* saw the enemy was using two guns. Three minutes later, the after 5-inch gun on the cargo-carrier returned the fire, but it was noticed that the shells were falling three thousand yards short. After nine rounds, fired in the space of four minutes, the American vessel stopped replying. The U-140 used fifteen shells, none of which came closer than fifteen hundred yards, after which "she headed around toward us or away from us and ceased firing." The *Pastores* sped from the spot and five minutes later the submarine disappeared.[2]

[1] Narrative of Rene Henry Bastin, 2d Officer, tanker *O. B. Jennings* in *The Lamp*, Standard Oil publication, April, 1919.

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 79.

Nothing was heard from the U-boat for the next six days. Bastin related how, during a large portion of this time, it ran on the surface at high speed, and at night rested while the crew repaired leaks caused by the *Stringham's* depth bombs. When it again came within the knowledge of the navy it was much farther north and in 40° 43′ N., 65° 15′ W., or about 393 miles east of Sandy Hook. In that location, on August 21, it made its final "kill" of the raid. The last victim of the U-140 was the British steamer *Diomed*, of 7,523 gross tons, a transport returning to New York from Liverpool.[3]

Chief Officer Alfred E. Batt, of the *Diomed*, was on the bridge when "an object was sighted on the starboard beam, distant about four miles." It was nearing dawn and the chief officer, after sending a midshipman to tell the gunners to "stand by", brought the object astern by having the helm swung "hard a starboard." He was not certain whether the distant vessel was a submarine or a torpedo boat, but found out while the maneuver was being executed. The enemy opened fire when "about a point off the starboard quarter." The distance was about five thousand yards and the shot passed across the steamer's bow. Captain Baker, R.N.R., had been in the chart room when the enemy was sighted and came on deck as the *Diomed* was swinging around, immediately taking over control of the ship's movements while the chief officer went aft to command the 4.7 British gun. This weapon, which had been trained on the U-boat, had fired after the enemy's first shot, but the shell flew wide. The *Diomed* was good for fifteen and one-half knots an hour and full steam was crowded on the moment the identity of the craft astern was established. The U-140 hung on, presenting only its

[3] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 80.

bow, a difficult mark for the British gunners. It continued firing and, on the fourth shot, got the exact range. This fourth shell struck the *Diomed's* starboard quarter. The Britisher could see the submarine plainly, and noted that two large guns, one forward and one aft, were both being used. After registering the first hit, the U-140 began to pound the steamer to pieces. It was just a question of time until one of the big shells found a vulnerable spot. Finally, after the *Diomed* had fired twelve rounds, none of which had scored, the U-140 sent a projectile crashing into the poop below the gun platform and carried away the steam-pipe to the steering gear. Dense volumes of steam cut off the gun crew from the ammunition locker which was located " just on the foreside and underneath the steering engine house." The same shot disabled the steering gear and the steamer immediately "swung to port", losing headway. Chief Officer Batt, who had been using the roof of a locker for spotting, found that the officer in charge of the ammunition party and a petty officer had been wounded and that it was impossible to serve any more projectiles for the after gun. An effort was made to ignite smoke boxes but these were defective. Realizing the impossibility of rigging a hand-steering gear in so short a space of time, the chief officer ordered the poop vacated in an effort to prevent casualties. In the meanwhile, another of the U-140's shells had exploded in the boiler room, killing one sailor and seriously wounding another who died later. Captain Baker ordered the crew to abandon the ship. Among the hands were a number of Chinamen from the fire gang, several of whom were suffering from slight shrapnel wounds. The captain's boat was the last to leave the steamer and the other boats, waiting about a quarter mile off, were approached by the U-boat. The

submarine ran close enough for an officer on its deck to call, "Send your men on board here. I have a surgeon who will attend to the wounded." No reply was made, as the men feared a ruse to detect the captain or chief engineer and take him prisoner. The captive officer from the *O. B. Jennings*, however, stated afterwards that one man was taken on board the U-140 and had a large "No. 6" chalked on his back. The submarine remained in the vicinity for some time after three salvos of two rounds each from a distance of three hundred yards had despatched the *Diomed*. When it did depart, it was at a speed of eighteen knots toward the smoke of another steamer on the horizon. After drifting for sixteen hours in two crowded lifeboats, the one hundred four survivors from the *Diomed* were picked up by another British steamer and reached New York on August 23.

The next contact with the U-140 was on August 22, when the American cargo vessel *Pleiades*, from Havre to New York, was attacked at 8 P.M. in 39° 34′ N., 63° 25′ W. Prior to opening fire, the enemy was observed about six miles off the starboard bow, but submerged and then reappeared four miles distant. It chose an unlucky position, however, as a full moon threw its rays directly upon it. The target was excellent and the *Pleiades*' gunners got the approximate range on the fourth shot and "thereafter the shells fell close, although none of them hit the submarine." The enemy moved out of the moon's rays, heading south. It fired only four shots, the first two falling off the port quarter from five hundred to one thousand yards and the last two astern by seven hundred to one thousand yards. At 8.15 P.M. the U-140 gave over the fight and submerged. The *Pleiades* reached New York with its story on August 25.

From the positions of the attacks on the *Diomed* and *Pleiades*, it was apparent to the Navy Department that the U-140 was headed homeward and such was proved to be the case when on September 5, past mid-ocean, the submarine made the final attack of its eventful raid. The prey was the British tanker *War Ranee*, which narrowly escaped a torpedo in 51° 27′ N., 33° 24′ W. The torpedo passed under the engine room but did not hit the ship, probably because the tanker was riding high, en route from England to Halifax, in ballast. The *War Ranee* should have been easy prey as it had stopped because of minor engine trouble at the time of the attack. There was a five-minute delay in getting started after the torpedo was observed, but the Britisher finally got away westward, zigzagging as it did so. The U-140 came up astern and fired two rounds at three-minute intervals, but did not attempt much of a pursuit. When last seen from the *War Ranee*, it was heading south.

The reason for the failure to pursue either the *Pleiades* or the *War Ranee* may be found in the subsequent story of Second Officer Bastin. The prisoner said that when he was allowed on deck, following the last encounter of the voyage, he found that "the aft deck was smashed and one of the 6-inch guns had disappeared altogether; the wireless was completely gone and the fat part of the conning tower bent to pieces." In addition to that, the submarine "was leaving a big oil track behind her from the leaky tanks — a track by which she could easily be traced by cruisers — and she was in no condition to dive on account of leaking very badly."

All told, the U-140 had received a rather rough mauling during its raid, most of the damage undoubtedly being sustained at the hands of the *Stringham* on August

10. Its visit to the Atlantic coast had not been as productive as the pioneer U-151, and it sank only seven vessels as against the twenty credited to the U-151. However, the U-140 has this distinction: its victims, barring the Diamond Shoal Lightship, were ships of considerable cargo space, and four of the seven were steamers of from three thousand to ten thousand gross tons. Likewise, it left nothing unfinished. There was no salvaging possible where it sank a ship. Arriving off the American coast on July 27, when the Portuguese bark *Porto* was sent down, it operated until August 21, the date of the sinking of the *Diomed*, and then started home. Its seven victims totalled 30,594 gross tons.[4] Loss of life from its foray was small. One man was killed on the tanker *O. B. Jennings* and two on the *Diomed*. In addition, a number of men on these two ships were wounded by shrapnel. There were no casualties on the other five vessels destroyed.

[4] See Table III, Appendix.

# CHAPTER XVI

## THE *TRIUMPH* AND THE U-156

After sinking the Norwegian steamer *San Jose*, on August 17, and disposing of Captain Evans, of the *Penistone*, the U-156 turned once more northward toward the Nova Scotian fishing fields which it had already raided during August 3, 4 and 5. On August 20, it embarked upon a new venture which was one of the most sensational in the entire history of the U-boat activities in the western Atlantic. On that day, about sixty miles south by west of Canso, Nova Scotia, in the center of the Grand Banks, a fishing area eclipsing the New England banks, it emerged two miles astern of the Canadian steam trawler *Triumph*, of 239 tons. Five minutes later it fired a shot which landed in the water over the port side amidships and the trawler stopped its engines, the crew putting off with " no belongings except a box of biscuits for each boat." The U-156 ran up to within fifty yards and Captain G. Myrrhe, of the *Triumph*, rowed over in a dinghy with the ship's papers. He was ordered on board, as was another boatload of eleven men.[1] The *Triumph* had just arrived on the Banks.

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 65.

It had sailed from Portland, Maine, on August 18, loaded with a ten-day supply of coal.

When he learned of the fuel, the German commander gave orders which resulted in great activity on the part of his crew. The large boat from the trawler was used, the enemy placing in it "either one or two 3-pounders, not assembled, including base and all"; about twenty-five high explosive bombs, two large boxes of 3-pound shells, and a large sea bag "the contents of which were not visible or possible to learn." Two of the men from the *Triumph* rowed the boat over to the trawler, where the guns were set up and, at 12.35 P.M., fifteen minutes after the vessel had been seized, enough additional Germans had gone on board the captive craft to form a crew of twenty-one men. The German commander, in answer to an inquiry, told Captain Myrrhe, "We intend to destroy the fishing fleets." The German also volunteered the information that his was one of the six U-boats operating off the American coast.

A longer conversation was carried on between Alton R. Geyer, steward of the *Triumph*, and the second officer of the U-156. The latter told Geyer that his craft had sunk a big oil tanker off Sandy Hook and had held the captain a prisoner for a week. (This referred to the *Penistone* and Captain Evans.) The German also wanted to know if it was true that the United States cruiser *San Diego* had been sunk south of Long Island and, when informed it was, stated that his submarine had torpedoed it. (The *San Diego* was mined, and the mines were laid by the U-156.) The crew of the trawler were entertained on the U-boat with brandy and cigars and were photographed. They were released at 1.15 P.M. and, when they rowed away, the trawler was still standing by the submarine.

Shortly afterwards it steamed north and the men in the boats later, from a great distance, saw it sink two fishing schooners.

The metamorphosis of the trawler had been complete. Working rapidly, the Germans had mounted the 3-pounders, both rapid-fire guns, fore and aft. This warlike craft, with the U-156 keeping in the distance, but within call, bore down upon the American fishing schooner *A. Piatt Andrew*, of 141 gross tons, approaching to within half a mile and then "firing shots or shells which fell in the water ahead of the schooner." Captain Wallace Bruce was ordered to row alongside the trawler with his papers and "found that she had been seized by the crew of a German submarine and converted into a raider." Not until then could he understand the seemingly inexplicable attack. Three of the Germans boarded the captain's dory and carried bombs on board the schooner. While this was going on, the American fishing schooner *Francis J. O'Hara, Jr.*, of 117 gross tons, hove into sight. Joseph P. Mesquita, master of the *Francis J. O'Hara, Jr.*, observed two vessels to the eastward, both of which appeared to be fishing, and a "beam trawler steaming up between the two of them." He decided to run over and find out what "kind of fishing they were having." He received a hail from the trawler, ordering him to heave to. Mesquita knew the *Triumph* quite well and thought it was a joke until four rifle shots were fired across his bow. He, like Captain Bruce, rowed over to the raider and returned with three Germans and a time bomb. About the time they reached the *Francis J. O'Hara, Jr.*, the *A. Piatt Andrew*, lying not far away, after a "muffled explosion" went down. At 3.30 P.M. the same thing happened to the *Francis J. O'Hara, Jr.*, and the fishermen in their dories rowed

away and were picked up and carried into Canso on August 25.

The crew of the *A. Piatt Andrew* had seen the U-156 loitering some five miles south by southwest. While the *Triumph* was disposing of the two schooners, the submarine had taken care of the third one, the one mentioned by Captain Mesquita as having been near-by, and which was the *Uda A. Saunders,* of 124 gross tons. Captain Publicover, of the *Uda A. Saunders,* told how it happened:

The submarine came up on our bow and came right alongside, her deck awash. She was about 280 feet long, with guns fore and aft. I was practically alone on the vessel all but three of the crew being out in the boats from half mile to a mile away. The Huns hailed us and ordered a dory alongside. I sent two men out to her in a dory and three of the raider's crew came aboard. "Don't be afraid," said the one who appeared to be in command. "We are going to sink your vessel. I will give you ten minutes to gather up food and water enough to last you until you get ashore." One of the Boches set about storing bombs below and soon after we left the Uda A., I heard a muffled explosion, the two masts broke off short, she seemed to crumple in the center and immediately went under.[2]

Long after dark, and a few miles south of the position where the afternoon sinkings had occurred, the *Triumph* ran across the Canadian fishing schooner *Lucille Schnare,* of 121 gross tons, fired at it with one of the light guns, and boarded it a few minutes later. The crew vacated hastily in a dory and the schooner was bombed. At midnight another Canadian fishermen, the *Pasadena,* of 119 gross tons, was stopped. Captain Enos Wentzell was held

[2] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 67.

on the *Triumph* while his crew were launching their boats. Then he was permitted to row away in one of them. He saw the prize crew sling bombs on the *Pasadena* before he departed.

About dawn on August 21, the French fishing schooner *Notre Dame de la Garde*, 145 gross tons, hailing from Gabarus, Cape Breton, was captured. The vessel was laden with six hundred forty thousand pounds of fish and was sunk, the crew being given scant time to get away. The destruction of the French vessel was witnessed by the American fisherman *Sylvania*, of 136 tons, which clapped on all sail but was overhauled in short order by the trawler. Captain Jeff Thomas, of the *Sylvania*, when pulling away from his schooner, saw a submarine lying on the surface about two miles distant. The *Slyvania* was the seventh and last of the fishermen destroyed in the combined raid of the *Triumph* and the U-156. By that time the two vessels had gone some ninety miles southwest of Canso in 45° 32′ N., 58° 57′ W., and it was in this location that the Germans, having no more use for it, abandoned the trawler and sank it with bombs.

The first news of the raid of the *Triumph* was brought to shore by the trawler's crew. Men from the *A. Piatt Andrew*, *Uda A. Saunders* and *Francis J. O'Hara, Jr.*, began to arrive at various points along the Nova Scotian coast shortly afterwards with confirmation of the story. The Navy Department took steps at once to thwart the raid, augmenting the patrol forces of the First District and starting out destroyers, sub-chasers and submarines in an effort to throw a cordon around the Grand Banks. The measures were sufficient to capture the trawler were it still afloat, but neither naval operations nor commanders of patrol vessels had any expectations of finding it. They

anticipated just what did happen — the destruction of the *Triumph* by its captors. Meanwhile, the entire New England coast was deeply agitated. The Maine Committee of Public Safety, working on the theory of collusion with the shore, sent out a special order to all members to keep vigilant lookout for spies.

Coupled with this, a young woman on Canadian Island, Campobello, New Brunswick, was held up, on August 21, by two strangers wearing linen dusters, who threatened her with a revolver, asked her about Eastport, Maine, and other border towns, and gave her the impression they were officers from a German submarine.

The search for spies was conducted with unremitting energy for several days while the hunt for the trawler was being prosecuted at sea, but neither was successful. Word of operations by the U-boat in a new field finally swung attention from the Grand Banks and its neighboring shores.

After the destruction of the *Triumph*, the U-156 sped away from what would have become dangerous territory for it, and three days later, about 1.30 A.M. August 25, appeared in an entirely new region — the entrance to Cabot Strait, Gulf of St. Lawrence. Its arrival in these northern waters was signalled by the sinking of the small unarmed British steamer *Eric*, of 610 gross tons, which was about seventy miles west of St. Pierre, Miquelon, steaming for Sydney, Nova Scotia.

The first knowledge the *Eric* had of its danger was when a shot hit it, followed by six more in rapid succession, four of which also struck the small craft. The first shell had put the steamer's wireless equipment out of commission and a subsequent one knocked down the smokestack, while fragments of shrapnel wounded the captain and four men. The *Eric* stopped immediately and a few

minutes later the U-156 came up astern. A hail from the enemy inquired if any one had been killed, and on being told that no one had, the same voice replied that he was glad, as he was after ships and not lives. The steamer's crew was ordered to go aboard the submarine. However, all but one lifeboat had been shot away and the transfer of the men proved a long task, the single boat making a number of trips, carrying four men each time. After the crew was off, the Germans placed bombs on the *Eric* and sank it. The German commander said he would hold the Britishers on the submarine until he found a vessel with sufficient boats to accommodate them all. The wounded men were taken below and their injuries dressed by a German surgeon, while the rest of the crew was given coffee and the officers "coffee, brandy and cigarettes."

The U-156, with the *Eric's* crew scattered both below and above deck, proceeded eastward on the surface until 6 A.M., when, about twenty-five miles off St. Pierre, the Newfoundland schooner *Willie G.* was encountered. The U-boat ran alongside and the commander hailed from the deck, asking the master of the schooner how many boats he carried. The answer was, "Six." As this number would not be sufficient for both crews, the German decided to spare the schooner and placed the *Eric's* men on it. It arrived in St. Pierre at 10 A.M., the next day, August 26.[3]

After releasing the British crew, the U-156 cruised along slowly and at 10.30 A.M., August 25, about three hours after the *Willie G.* had been permitted to go in safety, it sighted four fishing schooners in 46° 33′ N., 57° 33′ W. It bore down upon them and was first observed by the *E. B. Walters*, of 126 tons, which mistook it for a Canadian patrol boat. The crew of the schooner was dis-

[3] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 69.

illusioned when the German flag was seen on a small staff "just behind the small deck house or conning tower." An officer on the U-boat ordered the skipper of the *E. B. Walters* to row over with his papers. Captain Cyrus Walters obeyed, saying, as he got alongside, "You are not going to sink my schooner, are you?" A voice from the deck of the submarine answered, "That's just exactly what we are going to do." Four of the U-boat's crew entered the captain's dory and were rowed back to the schooner. They ransacked the vessel before placing bombs and ten minutes after all hands were clear the bombs exploded and the *E. B. Walters* sank.

The other three schooners, realizing the futility of attempting to escape, had stood by awaiting their fate. The nearest was the *C. M. Walters*, of 107 gross tons, which was at anchor about half a mile distant. The Germans, who had bombed the first schooner, had retained the dory and they were towed in this by the submarine to within twenty-five yards of the next victim, where the same proceeding took place. The bomb was put under the keel of the vessel amidship and the *C. M. Walters* sank in three minutes after the explosion. Third in line was the Canadian fisherman *Verna D. Adams*, of 132 tons. Captain Mosher and his crew had abandoned it before the U-156 arrived, but were near enough to see the boarding party ransack it and remove a large supply of stores before attaching the bomb. After it had been destroyed, the U-156 proceeded to the American fishing schooner *J. J. Flaherty*, of 162 tons, which carried a cargo of two hundred thousand pounds of fish and was worth fifty thousand dollars. The schooner was boarded and sunk in the same manner. The crews of the four schooners rowed all that night and reached St. Pierre the next day, join-

ing the crew of the *Eric* and making a total of ninety survivors.

On the night of August 25, the U-156 headed due south and, on the morning of August 26, sank its final victim. This was the Canadian fishing schooner *Gloaming*, of 130 gross tons, which was bombed in 46° 02′ N., 57° 35′ W., the crew getting away in dories and reaching St. Pierre a day or two later. After this attack, the U-156 turned homeward. Admiral Sims, in a cable dated August 10, had predicted that the U-156 would return "approximately along parallel 44 north from longitude Halifax to about 50 degrees west." How true this turned out to be is evidenced by the last recorded encounter with the enemy. On August 31, in 44° 20′ N., 51° 09′ W., the U.S.N. O.T.S. *West Haven* met the U-boat at 8.25 A.M. and was gunned. The navy gunners on the cargo boat immediately answered and, after a duel of about twenty minutes, the U-156 gave up the fight, turning broadside on and moving away at 8.46 A.M.

The U-156 was perhaps the most effective of all the submarines sent to these shores. It destroyed 33,582 gross tons, three thousand more than that accounted for by the U-140, and about seventeen thousand less than the record of the U-151, but it has to its credit thirty-four vessels, one of which was the armored cruiser *San Diego*, and twenty of which were fishing craft. Its depredations upon the American and Canadian cod-fishermen on the Nova Scotian Banks were conducted with skill and badly crippled the industry for the period of the raid. The U-boat appeared to be handled well throughout. Laying aside the strategic importance of some of its deeds, there is no question that it was a daring commander who ran into the shoal water off Cape Cod to gun a tug and four barges, who lay

in wait and torpedoed a steamer three miles behind its convoy and but a short distance off Nantucket, and who negotiated the shallow waters in the Gulf of Maine as though familiar with them. During its operations, it caused twenty-two deaths: six navy men in the mining of the *San Diego*, two Canadians killed on the *Luz Blanca*, two Britishers killed on the *Penistone*, and twelve on the *Tortuguero*.

# CHAPTER XVII

## CONCLUSION

## OF AUGUST ACTIVITIES

As early as August 10, the same day that the U-117 inaugurated its raid by sinking nine small fishing schooners on Georges Bank, Admiral Sims had predicted that the mine-laying submarine, after depositing its mines, was expected "to operate between Cape Race and Halifax." How the enemy craft fulfilled this prophesied schedule, its movements after sinking the Norwegian bark *Nordhav*, on August 17, show. Prior to that date, between August 13 and 16, in fact, it had set four mine fields with a total of thirty-three mines — nine off Barnegat, seven south of Fenwick Island Lighthouse, eight south of Winter Quarter Light Vessel and nine off Wimble Shoal. When the *Nordhav* was sent down, the U-boat was more than one hundred miles off the coast, and somewhat east by north of the Wimble Shoal mine field. From this point it turned north by east and evidently traveled at a good speed for, when next reported, on August 20, it had reached 38° 57′ N., 70° 48′ W., and was approximately 175 miles due east of Cape May, New Jersey. That day, at 7 A.M., the enemy sighted the Italian armed steamer

*Ansaldo III*. At the same time, a lookout on the steamer spied the enemy about two points forward of the port beam and four miles distant. The U-117 tried first to cut across the bow of the *Ansaldo III* but was prevented by accurate gunfire from the Italian. When two and one-half miles off, the U-boat opened return gunfire. A brisk engagement followed. Shells from the submarine caused considerable damage to the after part of the steamer, putting the stern gun out of commission by a lucky hit, seriously wounding one member of the crew and slightly injuring another. Every bit of ammunition on the Italian boat was used up. In the meanwhile, under a forced head of steam, the *Ansaldo III* gradually drew away from the pursuer, the engagement concluding at the end of three hours and after two hundred shots were exchanged. The steamer reached the Delaware the next day. As the U-156 had captured the trawler *Triumph* on the same day in the vicinity of Nova Scotia, and the U-140 sank the *Diomed* several hundred miles off Nantucket the following day, the Navy Department was soon able to determine that all the raiders were working northward.

Swerving from north by east to due northeast, the U-117, at 9 A.M. the following morning, August 21, was sighted by the British freighter *Thespis* in 39° 54′ N., 69° 25′ W., about fifty miles south by west of Nantucket Shoals Lightship. The *Thespis* proceeded to show a clean pair of heels to the enemy and, when the U-boat dove and disappeared, believed it had safely escaped. However, the U-117 could not yet be counted out. At 10.40 A.M., it came within torpedoing distance of the Britisher and one of the deadly missiles missed the steamer by twenty feet. The submarine then came to the surface and began

shelling. After a running fight of about an hour, the *Thespis* finally outdistanced the pursuer and reached New York on August 22.

That same day, at 6 P.M., the U-117, still swinging northwestward around Nantucket, arrived undetected within a mile of the Swedish steamer *Algeria*, and fired a shot over the port beam in 40° 30′ N., 68° 35′ W. Captain Eric Risberg stopped the engines and blew his whistle twice to indicate "there was no headway on his ship." The U-boat hoisted the international code letters "T.A.R.", which the Swede saw but could not understand. He replied to that effect and was answered by a second shot which fell close to port. Captain Risberg then lowered a boat and rowed over to the U-boat. He was met on the deck of the U-117 by the commander with these words, "Why did you not lower a boat at once when you saw the submarine; your actions were not those of a neutral?"

The Swedish captain replied, "You were showing no flag, and it not being the first submarine I had seen and being so close to American waters, I assumed it to be an American submarine."

Being further questioned, Captain Risberg said he was bound from Gothenburg to Sandy Hook for orders. He had taken the ship's log with him and the German examined it. Noting that the vessel had been operating on the United States coast in the past, he then announced he would sink it. The Swede pleaded for his ship, saying that the German should not be guided by what the *Algeria* had been doing in the past but "by what I am doing in the present." The chief officer of the U-117 chimed in, siding with the neutral and the other officers also entered the conversation, taking the side of the chief officer. The

discussion, conducted in German, lasted more than forty-five minutes. Finally the commander told Captain Risberg he was sorry he had to let him go and that if he met him again he would sink him without warning. He asked the Swede to "give him his word of honor" the *Algeria* was not under charter by the United States Shipping Board. Captain Risberg assured him he was not so chartered, but added that all he knew was that he was under orders to report in New York and did not know what he was destined for after that. The Swede returned to his ship and lost no time continuing on his journey, arriving in New York the following day and giving a full report of the occurrence to the naval authorities.[1]

This case; the cases of the two American whalers stopped by the U-151; of the Belgian relief ship *Elizabeth Van Belgie* and of the schooner *Willie G.*, used by the U-156 to carry the crew of the steamer *Eric* to safety, are the only instances where raiders off this coast permitted their prey to escape.

Resuming its course to the north, the U-117 was unheard-of for three days. Finally it appeared, on the night of August 24, southwest of Sable Island, in 43° 13′ N., 61° 05′ W., and attacked the three-masted schooner *Bianca*, of 408 gross tons, inward bound from Brazil with a cargo of tobacco. A party from the submarine attached bombs while an officer, in ordering Captain Burke and his men to abandon their vessel, informed him that they had sunk an oil ship (they did not say where) and intended to sink eight more steamships bound for Halifax. The crew reached shore two days later and, on August 29, the *Bianca*, badly damaged, but kept afloat by its cargo of tobacco, which swelled and filled the leaks,

[1] New York *Times*, August 23, 1918.

was towed to Halifax by a Boston fisherman which had picked it up on August 26.

After this, the U-117 circled around Sable Island and, on the morning of August 26, in 44° 30′ N., 58° 02′ W., or about 135 miles southeast of Canso, approached to within fifty feet of the stern of the American steam-trawler *Rush*, of 162 gross tons. Captain Alvro P. Quadros and three men were ordered to row to the submarine, the other sixteen men of the crew being permitted to get away in their dories. The four prisoners were kept on the U-boat for three hours, from about 5.45 to 8.35 A.M., during which time they were entertained below by the German crew. The commander showed Joseph Golart, one of the four, a list of vessels destroyed by his vessel, which list, as the latter recalled it, included the fishing schooners "*Progress, Old Time, Katie Palmer* and *Mary Sennett*." Members of the crew also told Golart that "they had sunk nine vessels off Georges Bank." Captain Quadros later quoted the German commander as saying, "When my vessel left Germany it was under instructions to sink only three-masters, but, because of the attitude of the American press, orders came to me by wireless to sink everything in sight."[2] After the crew of the *Rush* was released, the wreckage of the trawler was seen floating on the surface. The men rowed for two miles and were picked up by the schooner *John J. Fallon* and landed at Canso on August 27.

The U-117 turned homeward after despatching the *Rush* and the next day, August 27, while one hundred ten miles southwest of Cape Race, in 45° 10′ N., 55° 10′ W., torpedoed, without warning, the Norwegian steamer *Bergsdalen*, of 2,550 gross tons. The ship sank so quickly

[2] New York *Times*, September 4, 1918.

that the boats could not all be lowered and many of the crew were compelled to leap into the water. One man was drowned. The remainder crowded into the few boats and were picked up some days later by a trawler which carried them into a Canadian port on September 3. They had seen nothing of the submarine which torpedoed the *Bergsdalen.*

From the spot where the Norwegian had been sent down, the U-117 ran east by north, passing around the lower end of Newfoundland, and made its final "kills" on August 30 in 50° 30′ N., 47° W., when it sank two Canadian fishing schooners, the *Elsie Porter*, of 136 tons, and the *Potentate*, of the same tonnage. It did not bother using a shell to stop the schooners, firing instead a couple of rifle shots which had the same effect. Captain W. M. Rheinhard, of the *Elsie Porter*, said that when he told the German commander he did not know the route usually taken by steamers from Newfoundland to Canada, the latter threatened to " take him to Germany or make him do pilot work." The crew of the *Elsie Porter* was held for awhile on the submarine as was the crew of the *Potentate.*

All but the boats of the two captains were finally released and arrived at St. Johns, Newfoundland, on September 2, with the report that both captains were being held prisoners. This report was premature and probably came from some of the fishermen overhearing the German commander's threat. The other two boats were released by the U-117 a few hours afterwards and on September 1, the steamer *Solberg* picked them up in 47° 40′ N., 51° 08′ W., landing them several days later.[3]

The final movements of the U-117, as well as those of the U-140 and U-156, are followed through the narrative of Second Officer Bastin, of the tanker *O. B. Jennings,* a

[3] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 99.

prisoner on the U-140. On September 9, the U-117 joined the U-140, in 54° 10′ N., 22° 30′ W., and the two moved eastward together "for about seven days." About three hundred miles west of Scotland, the U-140 ran out of oil "on account of leaky tanks" and for two days and nights the U-boats lay close together, while oil cans were passed on a rope from the U-117 to the companion submarine. About forty-three gallons were transshipped in this manner. The U-140 then signalled the U-117 that it was going to steam at a speed of ten knots until it reached the Faraway Islands, where it would await other submarines, "the 102, 156, 100 and 117" and they would all "go together through the mine fields in the North Sea and through the nets." The passage of the mine field, after the concentration off the Faraway Islands, is related by Bastin:

The 22nd of October we were ordered below and not to come up any more. Every water-tight compartment was closed. There were seven of them. We were allowed to go to the conning tower for fresh air, as the air was very bad in the submarine. During the night the air was so bad that everyone had a dry throat and could not speak. We could feel down below that the submarine must be steaming at high speed. When we came up and looked through the hatch we could see the submarines steaming after us and I noticed that we passed through net buoys. I recognized them because I had seen them in the channel when I was in the British naval transport service. The submarine was in the mine field between Norway and Scotland. The air was clear and cold and you could tell you were in the North Sea by the water. While I was up in the conning tower, I suddenly saw a submarine blown up — it was the German U-156. She was on our port quarter and steaming in line with the 100, which was a small

sub. She must have struck a mine and was blown 500 feet in the air. A few seconds and everything had disappeared. All the other submarines kept on their courses and took no notice of it. All I heard was that one of the boats had been blown up and was gone. In the evening of the 23rd — she must have been near the Norwegian coast — they sighted destroyers and patrol trawlers and scattered in all directions.[4]

The U-156, as Bastin related, had indeed struck a mine and been blown up. The submarine, which had preyed so extensively on the fishing industry and which had to its credit the mining of the cruiser *San Diego*, was the only one of all the raiders on the American coast which did not reach home. There is discrepancy as to the date it was destroyed. Bastin places it as October 22, and the naval authorities, while not stating the exact day, declare "that about November 15, 1918, she struck a mine and sank in a short time. Twenty-one survivors were landed on the Norwegian coast shortly after the signing of the armistice. The fate of the rest of the crew is unknown but it is probable that they perished with the U-boat."[5] Bastin's date is more logical and supported by better evidence.

After the submarines separated, the U-140 continued at a speed of twenty-five knots, zigzagging past all mine buoys and, on the morning of October 24, sighted the Danish coast. Shortly afterwards the U-117 arrived at the same spot and stopped a Danish fishing smack, taking all the fish on board. During the day both vessels observed British submarines, Bastin stating that the water was "just full" of them. By the night of October 24, the U-140

[4] Narrative of Rene Henry Bastin, Second Officer, tanker *O. B. Jennings*, in *The Lamp*, Standard Oil publication, April, 1919.

[5] Letter, Historical Section, U.S.N., to the author, January 5, 1921.

had exhausted its oil supply. It lay on the surface, running at a very low speed with what oil "she had left in her batteries." At 10 P.M., a German destroyer arrived and for three hours the crews were busy taking on a new supply. Early in the morning of October 25, the U-140 started off at high speed and traveled four hundred miles, dodging a new British mine field in the Baltic Sea and reaching Kiel at three o'clock in the afternoon.

The U-117, which was also without fuel, was towed into port by German destroyers. The latter's record of tonnage destroyed was not complete at that time. Up until its departure from the American coast it had attacked with success twenty vessels, although two of these were salvaged subsequently. Its mines, however, were yet to be heard from, and, as will be seen (See Table IV), accounted for additional tonnage.

# CHAPTER XVIII

## LATE AUGUST ACTIVITIES ON THE AMERICAN SIDE

After the passage of the U-117 down the Atlantic coast from Fire Island to Hatteras, a general warning to be on the lookout for floating mines was given to all naval craft and vessels to be convoyed in coastal waters, and extensive mine-sweeping operations were carried on, particularly at the mouths of the Delaware and Chesapeake bays. Several mines were swept up during the week between August 14 and 21, and one was destroyed by gunfire by the tanker *Bedford* about five miles east-northeast from Five Fathom Bank Lightship, or approximately twenty miles from the Delaware Breakwater.

On August 15, an informal statement was made by the Navy Department, describing in general terms the type of submarines being used in the operations off the American coast, pointing out that their activities had been confined to attacks on unconvoyed merchantmen and that in no instance had a troopship been molested. The U-boats were said to be of the cruiser type with a low speed but large cruising radius and armed with 5.9-inch guns, torpedoes and mine-laying equipment. The estimate was

made that the largest of the raiders was not more than three hundred feet long and that investigation had shown that none of the so-called super-submarines had as yet put in an appearance in shore waters.

Strangely enough, it was not until August 19 that the cable-cutting activities of the U-151 leaked out, although they had occurred months before. In the publication of the news at that time, they were accredited to one of the later visitors and not the first of the raiders. A despatch from Washington, on August 19, said that "of the three U-boats, one was a cable cutter and it had been successful in cutting two southern cables, one of them being the French cable to the West Indies." The article went on to say that an American cable boat, accompanied by an escort, had succeeded within a short time in locating the breaks and repairing them, and concluded with the statement that "some officials are inclined to believe that attacks on American cable communications with Europe may be expected from the submarines and steps have been taken to repair, within the shortest possible time, any damage of this nature."

During this period, the navy continued to develop the use of the coast-defense submarine, establishing fleets of these, with mother ships, at each naval district and sending them out on regular patrol duty, generally accompanied by surface craft. One of these submarines, the N-5, collided with the convoy, the armed schooner *Charles Wittemore*, on August 21, in 39° 39′ N., 72° 15′ W., developing a leak in the battery compartment which threatened to put the N-5 out of action through flooding of the battery and the development of chlorine gas. In this emergency, Lieutenant Commander Guy E. Davis, commanding the N-5, Lieutenant Walter Seibert, and Lieutenant Commander

Eugene F. DuBois, the surgeon attached, entered the flooded compartment and worked for four hours in a successful effort to save the vessel. While Lieutenant Commander DuBois bailed constantly, Lieutenant Commander Davis and Lieutenant Seibert alternated in lying on their backs in the water and calking the leaking seams. Members of the crew also joined in the bailing and succeeded in keeping the water just below the top of the battery. Finally, to test the success of their work, the N-5 was submerged to a depth of forty feet, when some of the calking was blown out by the water pressure, and the two officers recalked the leaks in the same manner. Lieutenant Commander Davis received the Distinguished Service Medal, and Lieutenant Commander DuBois and Lieutenant Seibert, Navy Crosses, for their heroism.[1]

Indirectly, the activity of the U-117 off North Carolina, during which the *Mirlo* was sunk on August 16, resulted in the loss of an American steamer a few days later. The Southern Pacific steamer *Proteus* of three thousand tons, while proceeding without lights about thirty-four miles southwest of Diamond Shoals, off the coast, collided, on the morning of August 19, with the steamer *Cushing*. The latter escaped with slight damage, but the *Proteus* received a death blow. It sank within a short time. All members of the crew were rescued by the *Cushing* which stood by until the end.[2]

A circumstantial story of a collison with an enemy submarine was made public by the Navy Department on August 20. It was to the effect that an American ship had run down a U-boat off Winter Quarter Shoal on August 17. The story of the American captain related how,

[1] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, pp. 54, 67, 98.

[2] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 243.

at 9.30 P.M., his vessel rammed the submarine on the port bow, bringing it alongside, and how voices hailed in strong German accents, saying they were friends. He replied they were no friends of his and kept on his course. The account gained credence because an investigation showed the American ship to have sustained a damaged bow.

A flood of rumors of collusion between the raiders and the shore was in circulation in the public press. One of the most remarkable of these was the claim of the first officer of the tanker *O. B. Jennings* that he had met, in a New York saloon, an officer from the submarine which had destroyed his vessel and that the recognition was mutual. The German had escaped, he said, while he was appealing to a brother officer for confirmation of his suspicions.

Another rumor, which came from Massachusetts on August 20, told how a member of the crew of the schooner *Aleda May,* sunk August 10, had asked one of the Germans on the submarine whether he had ever been in New York, and was shown two seat checks for a Broadway theater, dated August 8. This rumor did not specify the year.

There were also frequent reports of flashing lights along shore points and of suspicious-looking individuals chased from the beaches by coast guards and naval reserves. On August 27, two men fired from a clump of bushes upon Daniel Gallagher, a naval patrol guard near Avalon, New Jersey, and escaped after a running battle. Two days later a man, subsequently found to have been demented, was shot and killed by a reservist at Ocean City, New Jersey. His actions had been suspicious, and a number of rockets had been seen shortly before the encounter with him. Naval authorities believed he had been responsible for

much of the supposed signalling, as it ceased after his death.

Nevertheless, it was determined to put an effectual stop to any chances of communication between the land and the enemy boats. On August 25, an initial barred zone to enemy aliens had been created along the shore between Mattawan and Port Pleasant, New Jersey. Later the zone was extended until the entire Atlantic shore line was forbidden ground to foreigners of German and Austrian birth.

After the news of the capture of the trawler *Triumph* and its subsequent operations as a raider, the Navy Department notified all districts to have their patrol stations watch out for an effort on the part of the enemy to send the small craft on a foray into some harbor or bay. Hunt squadrons, one from each of the four upper districts, Boston, Newport, New York and Philadelphia, were sent to cover the water for several hundred miles out to sea, and the aerial patrols were increased. On August 24, when twelve miles southeast of Fire Island Lightship, two seaplanes from the Third District had a tragic collision high in the air. There was a heavy fog at the time and each machine went into a tail-spin from which Ensign H. Stevens, piloting one, managed to extricate himself. The other machine, containing Ensign Donald C. Pero, Chief Machinist's Mate William C. Jaegle and Machinist's Mate 2d class Frederick A. Newman, plunged into the water and all were lost.

Far more tragic than this was the loss of sub-chaser Number 209, which was sunk by gunfire from the armed steamer *Felix Taussig*, at two-thirty o'clock on the morning of August 27, when twenty miles south of Fire Island Light, in 40° 08′ N., 73° 18′ W. The *Felix Taussig* glimpsed the low-lying craft in the darkness and mistook

it for an enemy submarine. Both guns on the freighter were trained instantly upon the suspicious object and fired, the forward weapon four times, the after weapon once. After the fifth shot, the *Felix Taussig* discovered its mistake and a blast from the siren to "cease firing" was obeyed at once. But the damage had been done. The sub-chaser was badly shattered, the conning tower and everything above it having been shot away.

There were twenty-six men on board, including two officers, Lieutenant Henry J. Bowes, U.S.N.R., the commander, and Ensign George Fitz Randolph. Neither of these latter were seen after the shells struck. Both were killed, probably, in their quarters. One man was known to have been hurled overboard when the crow's nest was carried away with the conning tower. Only those in the forward part of the vessel escaped injury. They were five in number and they acted heroically in an effort to save their comrades. In this they were aided by Machinist's Mate Claude Wilde, who was slightly wounded. Wilde found that the life-preserver locker had been shot away. He went down into the forecastle and got two Kapok transom cushions and brought them on deck. He carried two seriously wounded survivors to the deck and placed them on these cushions. Seaman Claude A. Kalmey also carried two injured men forward, but they died before the boat sank. The unwounded men, Kalmey, Radio Operator Elmer S. Kirby, Gunner's Mate George B. Weigand, Machinist's Mate Elmer E. Gleason and Seaman Charles M. Thomas had no time for further search of the wreck. The sub-chaser sank under them. Wilde, although suffering considerably, refused to stay on one of the two cushions, but slid into the water and kept afloat by touching it now and then. Kalmey and Weigand steadied the cushion con-

taining Chief Boatswain's Mate Thomas B. Haran, one of the wounded men saved by Wilde, and later managed to get two life preservers around him. Machinist's Mate Clarence S. Evans, the other badly injured man, was held upon a cushion by Thomas and Gleason. He died a few hours after reaching shore. A fourth wounded man, Quartermaster Robert A. Corcoran, was aided in keeping afloat by Kirby.[3]

The sub-chaser had been one of the hunt squadron headed by the U.S. destroyer *Patterson*, and a short time after the sinking, the *Patterson* and sub-chasers Number 188 and Number 270 reached the spot. These ships picked up the nine men and searched for some time but were unable to find any additional survivors. With the subsequent death of Evans, the fatalities totalled eighteen. On August 29, a board of investigation at the Philadelphia Navy Yard decided that the accident had been due to the failure to keep a proper lookout on the sub-chaser and also to absence of specific orders governing the conduct of the ship after the *Felix Taussig* was sighted.

The feat of the trawler *Triumph* in the hands of the enemy provoked a discussion of the submarine menace in the United States Senate on August 24. It was opened by Senator McCumber, of North Dakota, who said he

[3] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, August 31, 1918. The fifteen enlisted men killed or drowned at the time of the destruction of the sub-chaser 209 were Alwyn C. Crowe, M.M. 2c; Harry S. Denney, G.M. 1c; Gordon J. Groves, Sea. 2c; George C. Gunderman, Jr., H.A. 2c; Richard C. Hasinger, Q.M. 3c; Leonard A. Haskett, B.M. 2c; Edwin F. Hogdon, F. 3c; Frank R. Hullette, S.C. 1c; Frederick W. Keihn, M.M. 1c; Frank M. Patterson, Jr., M.M. 2c; Harold Peverill, M.M. 2c; Casper G. Shroder, S.C. 3c; Irwin J. Sheehan, oiler; Timothy F. Treacy, E. 3c; John A. McBride, Q.M. 1c; Those wounded; Robert A. Corcoran, Q.M. 3c; Thomas B. Haran, C.B.M., Claude Wilde, M.M. 2c; and Charles S. Evans, M.M. 2c. Evans died ashore. (Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 244.)

wanted to ask a member of the Naval Affairs Committee how it was possible for a little trawler, whose speed could not exceed twelve knots per hour, to destroy "fleet after fleet of our fishing smacks." The Senator, going into details as to the capture of the *Triumph*, asked, "Where are those swift U-boat chasers that we have been hearing about?" and "Where is there an end?"

His inquiry was taken up by Senator Penrose, of Pennsylvania, who charged that the fault lay with the Secretary of the Navy for alleged failure to start the building program in time, with the result that "this fleet of destroyers, which ought to have been gotten ready long before they were, are now being built and very few of them have been turned out."

Senator Chamberlain, securing permission to interrupt, said that he thought the Senate should consider the magnificent work done by the navy in convoying troops overseas. Whereupon, Senator McCumber, returning to the subject, asked him, "Have we not one little warship on the Atlantic coast that can do battle with this trawler?" Senator Chamberlain replied that he was not particularly posted regarding the navy and that it might be possible that no ships were available because all resources were being strained to take men and supplies to Europe. Some desultory remarks followed, after which the subject was changed.[4]

A little later in the same day, Senator Gerry brought the question up again, delivering an address upon the accomplishments of the navy and concluding by pointing out that to hunt for the enemy in the fifteen hundred

[4] Congressional Record, Vol. 56, Part 9, 65th Congress, 2d Session, p. 9461.

miles of water off the American coast and the area off the Canadian coast and the fishing banks was like seeking a needle in a haystack. He and Senator McCumber exchanged varying views upon the success of the trawler, the failure of the bombs to explode when dropped upon the U-156 off Cape Cod, on July 21, being brought into the discussion. Finally, Senator Lodge, of Massachusetts, who had defended the navy during the controversy in the Senate on June 6, took the floor and delivered an able resumé of the situation. He said in part:

If I remember correctly, the trawler was seized, or made her first appearance, on the 20th of August, and I think I am right in saying that the information was received by the Navy Department on the 21st. Today is the 24th. Three days is not a long time in which to find a small vessel on the Atlantic Ocean. I am at liberty to state that every possible vessel in the way of destroyers or submarines or any other kind of craft useful for the capture or destruction of such a vessel as the Triumph has been sent to the area where the trawler has been at work. They are covering this area with all the vessels possible without interfering with what are necessary for convoys, which have first to be considered, and, of course, without bringing home destroyers from British and French waters, which would be a great misfortune and a great mistake. But a large number of vessels suitable for the work of capturing the Triumph or destroying her are on the ground or on the way to the ground.

The trawler is in the region, as I understand, of the Grand Banks. That is a region of mists. An almost perpetual fog hangs about the Banks. It is not an easy place to hunt a trawler or any other comparatively small vessel. All that I desired to say was that the Navy Department, of course, feel a keener anxiety about this matter than

any other branch of our Government. Their attention is concentrated upon it. They are doing, I am sure — in fact, I know — everything that can be done to capture that boat which is on the surface. I believe they will succeed in doing so, for I do not believe a surface boat can long escape, even in the great expanse of the Atlantic Ocean.

As for getting the U-boat, that is necessarily a matter, to a certain extent, of chance; but there again they are using every resource that they have in submarine chasers, in hydroplanes, in wireless telegraph to get at the submarine. I think the Senate and the country may rest assured that there is nothing which knowledge and ingenuity can suggest which is not being done by the Navy Department at this moment to try to reach and capture or destroy the trawler and also the submarine.[5]

The transportation of troops overseas for the months of July and August, during a great part of which period the U-156, U-140 and U-117 were operating off the coast, warranted all the eulogy which Senator Gerry had given it. At the time of the Senate debate no figures were available; in fact, nothing but generalities were indulged in during the entire war period. After the Armistice, when the totals were made known, it was found that the figures for these two months eclipsed all others, including the high total of 280,434 for June, 1918. In July, 1918, 147 ships carried 311,359 men to France, and in August, 140 ships carried 286,375 men,[6] making a total for the two months of 597,734 in 287 ships. Not one of these vessels had been attacked by either the U-156, U-140 or U-117. Amusingly enough, in connection with this achievement, the Berlin *Zeitung Mittag*, of August 20, 1918,

[5] Congressional Record Vol. 56, Part 9, 65th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 9467–9468.

[6] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1919, Appendix F, p. 206.

carried a statement which was reprinted in this country five days later, announcing, "According to American papers, fourteen American transports which left the United States in June were torpedoed and sunk. 722 men lost their lives."

## CHAPTER XIX

# THE LAST AMERICAN VISIT OF THE *DEUTSCHLAND*

During the height of the midsummer submarine activities, August 9, Admiral Sims had notified the Navy Department that two converted mercantile-type submarines would leave Germany about the middle of August for the American coast and that, while one of them laid mines off Atlantic City, and Currituck, Virginia, the other would do the same in Canadian waters. The once peaceful *Deutschland*, the one destined for this latter operation, made its final adventure into the waters of the western Atlantic, sailing from Kiel in August, 1918. It departed no longer as a merchant vessel, but with the full armament of the type of submersible known as the U-150 class, and under the command of Kapitanleutnant Erick Eckelman. The U-151 and U-156 had been previous visitors of this design. Like them, the U-155, which was the designation of the *Deutschland* after its transfer from the merchant marine to the Imperial Navy, was armed with two 6-inch guns, one fore and the other aft, and was equipped to lay mines. It was the fifth submarine despatched to the American coast. It was sighted headed northward off Udsire, in

59° 19′ N., 4° 50′ E., on August 16, and passed successfully through the mine fields in the North Sea. It continued undetected around the north of the British Isles, being finally discovered well out in the Atlantic, on the evening of August 27, when it attempted a surprise attack upon three westbound ships, the navy cargo boat *Ticonderoga*, the armed American steamer *Montoso*, and the unarmed American steamer *Rondo*.

What was apparently the wake of a torpedo was observed from the *Montoso* and the three ships thereupon changed course twenty degrees to starboard. At 9 P.M., a dark object came into view about two thousand yards off the port bow of the *Montoso* and the chief boatswain's mate, commanding the armed guard, upon the advice of A. O. Forsyth, master of the steamer, at once opened fire. At the same time, the *Montoso* again changed course, bringing the enemy on the port quarter but not sufficiently so to prevent its forward gun from being brought to bear. Thwarted in its effort to get close, the U-155 sent two shots after the fleeing American, both dropping a few hundred yards astern. The *Ticonderoga* had also opened fire and the three ships scattered. The *Montoso* fired ten shots, six from the after gun and four from the forward one, and the *Ticonderoga* fired two. Captain Forsyth believed that the enemy had lost sight of the quarry and was firing merely from the gun flashes. As the *Montoso* was also unable to discern the opposing craft, it ceased firing and got away unmolested. The *Ticonderoga* and *Rondo* joined their consort the next day, the captain of the former stating that the U-boat had fired four times.[1]

The U-155 apparently retraced its steps northward during the next few days and, on August 31, in 46° N., 32°

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 101.

W., stopped the Portuguese schooner *Gamo*, of 315 gross tons. The crew was ordered to the boats and the schooner destroyed by bombs. The next day, September 1, the U-boat made another unsuccessful attack, picking out another navy cargo boat, the *Frank H. Buck*, in 45° 38′ N., 37° 17′ W. The report of the captain, Lieutenant Commander George E. McDonald, U.S.N.R.F., was made public as follows:

At 8.25 A.M., an enemy submarine was sighted on the starboard beam at 14,000 yards. The submarine opened fire with two 6-inch guns. We answered fire with forward gun. We saw the shot fall about 400 yards short and immediately swung stern forward to submarine, using after gun. Our shots were very close to the submarine and the submarine's shrapnel was bursting very near to us, some of the pieces falling upon our decks amidship. We changed our course frequently, which seemed to upset the submarine's aim and range. As soon as the submarine saw our range was equal to hers, she hauled away from us. Up to that time she had been closing in on us. Before the submarine could get out of range, our twenty-eighth shot from the after gun apparently hit her stern. The twenty-ninth shot hit her just forward of the conning tower, near and under the water line. The bow immediately shot up into the air very suddenly, then settled and went down out of sight, the stern making a half turn toward us and then it disappeared. Upon the shot striking the submarine we saw very closely a terrific explosion and black smoke which enveloped the submarine. I am positive that we destroyed her as she sank almost instantly after the shot struck her. The engagement lasted twenty-nine minutes. Some of the fragments of the submarine fell on our deck and were picked up. The submarine was about 300 feet long of the early type of German submarine with high bow

and had two 6-inch guns close to the conning tower, fore and aft. She fired in salvos, using about sixty shots altogether. She was camouflaged and flew no flag.[2]

Lieutenant Commander McDonald, in his report, commended highly the naval gun crew, which had manned the 6-inch after weapon, and which was in command of Chief Gunner's Mate Joseph Steffens, U.S.N.

Despite the belief that the American ship had destroyed the U-155, it continued upon its foray. It did, however, retrace its movements after the engagement with the *Frank H. Buck*, for on the following day, September 2, when it was next heard from, it was farther east by about fifty miles. On that day, in 45° 15′ N., 30° W., it torpedoed without warning the Norwegian steamer *Shortind*, of 2,560 gross tons. The Norwegian ship went down about four hundred miles north of Fayal, and the crew took to the boats.

After that, the U-155 again started westward and traveled undetected for five days, finally encountering the British steamer *Monmouth*, in 43° N., 45° 50′ W., on September 7. The *Monmouth* was chased and gunned, reporting its escape by wireless. Immediately afterwards Admiral Sims cabled that if the *Monmouth's* report was correct, it would identify the assailant as one of the two crusier submarines he had previously referred to on August 9. This later cable stated that the other submarine had not left Kiel on September 2.

By September 12, the U-155 had begun to near the Atlantic coast and on that date, in 42° 45′ N., 51° 37′ W., just south of the Great Bank of Newfoundland, it torpedoed and sank the Portuguese steamer *Leixoes*, of 3,345 gross tons. The torpedo struck on the starboard side of

[2] New York *Times*, September 11, 1918.

Number 4 hatch. The crew immediately abandoned the steamer in three boats, leaving behind one man who was either killed in the explosion or "was probably asleep when the ship was struck and did not wake up." The U-155 appeared at about the time the *Leixoes* sank and Captain Joaquim F. Sucena directed his men to row to it. The commander of the U-boat demanded the name and register of the boat and then asked if there were any Englishmen on board. Captain Sucena said no and his crew was then ordered on deck and inspected. Later the Portuguese were ordered to shove off, being given neither provisions nor directions. The boats were separated by a storm the following day. Sixteen men in one small craft, after four days of exposure, reached Canso, Nova Scotia, on September 16, bringing with them the first account of the attack. The following day, the second boat, with the second officer and eight men, also reached Canso and reported that one man, a Negro, had died from exposure on board. The third and final boat, containing eleven men, was picked up, on September 18, by a Canadian trawler. A second member of the crew died from exposure and cold after reaching port.[3]

Continuing toward the coast after despatching the *Leixoes*, the U-155, on September 13, two days later, sought to intercept the British steamer *Newby Hall*, in 42° 18′ N., 58° 22′ W.[4] A lookout on the Britisher spied the oncoming torpedo which missed the ship by six feet. The *Newby Hall* was steaming westward at ten knots an hour at the time of attack, 10 A.M. All steam was crowded on and a few minutes later the U-155 emerged about three thousands yards behind, opening fire with two 6-

[3] Letter, Historical Section, U.S.N., to author, January 5, 1921.
[4] *Ibid.*

inch guns. The steamer began to zigzag and the skillful maneuvering seemed to foil the German fire, just as it had done in the case of the *Frank H. Buck.* Many shells broke overhead, scattering shrapnel across the deck, but not a single direct hit was made. The *Newby Hall* had two guns, a 4-inch and a 3-inch, and these were served admirably by the British gunners. During the first hour the distance between the two gradually increased. Submarine and steamer were firing rapidly, the former at the rate of almost two shells a minute, the latter a shell a minute. From the deck of the Britisher it was believed that the fifty-first shell, fired at nine thousand yards, made a hit on the bow of the U-boat. The fifty-seventh shell also appeared to strike on the bow of the enemy. At 11.30 P.M., with the range extended to 13,400 yards, the seventieth and final shell was thought to have found a mark on the stern. Immediately afterwards the U-155 submerged. It had fired 175 shells, according to the tally kept on the *Newby Hall.*

Worsted in two running fights with armed cargo ships, the U-155 vanished for awhile. From September 13 until September 20, nothing was heard from the enemy. It seemed to disappear completely, no wireless calls from vessels attacked being received and no fishermen reporting anything suspicious seen on the Banks. The U-boat, however, was not idle. In the week from September 13 to 20 it moved along the southeastern Nova Scotian coast from Cape Breton to Cape Sable, depositing mines in the channels converging into the British-Canadian port of Halifax. The mined areas covered shipping lanes more generally used than any on the eastern coast, with the possible exception of New York. Not only was coastwise traffic heavy from and to Halifax, but many of the troop convoys from

Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*The ex-*Deutschland *(U-155) on its way to surrender*

Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*The mercantile submarine* Deutschland *departing from New London, Connecticut*



Courtesy Hist. Sec., U.S.N.

*The merchant submarine* Deutschland *arriving at New London, Connecticut*

New York put in there before continuing eastward across the Atlantic. All of these mines were swept up later, none of them having proven effective.[5]

The mine-laying completed, the U-155 made its next appearance in 43° 31′ N., 61° 53′ W., stopping the American steam trawler *Kingfisher,* of 263 tons, at nine-thirty o'clock on the morning of September 20. This point was on the Grand Banks about eighty-five miles off the coast. Captain Riley, of the *Kingfisher,* gave a good description of the U-155, in telling his experiences later:

The submarine was flying the German flag which was hoisted on the corner of the bridge. There was no number on the submarine, which I estimated was about 250 feet long. The conning tower seemed to be lower than that usually seen on submarines and also was apparently of larger size. The submarine carried two 6-inch guns with portable mounts, these guns being permanently fixed. I did not notice any search-light and saw only one periscope which was in the conning tower. The submarine was equipped with wireless and had what looked like a large pair of steel scissors over her stern and rudder. [cable cutters] She was camouflaged on both sides and apparently freshly painted with grey, blue and white. She carried a boat which was probably thirty feet in length and was raised up out of the hold just aft to the gun. Most of the officers and crew wore corduroy jackets. The trousers looked old and worn and some of them were torn. Some wore wooden shoes, others were barefoot and a few had long leather boots. The officer who was on the bridge was probably twenty-five years old and wore side-whiskers. Most of them were unshaven and looked rather ill kempt and none of them wore uniforms. The three officers I saw all wore a large number of medals, probably twelve or

[5] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 139.

fifteen. We counted fifty-three members of the crew, including the three officers, and as the engines of the submarine were working, a portion of the engine crew probably was below.

The officer who interrogated me spoke good English without any foreign accent. The questions he asked were as follows: "Where are you from? When did you leave? Where are you bound for? What is the name of the captain of the trawler? Have you seen any large ships?" He then said, "Captain, I am going to sink your ship," and motioned us to row away. After we had rowed a short distance, the boat from the submarine rowed over to the trawler, carrying ten or twelve of the submarine crew who placed bombs on board the trawler, as we heard three loud explosions at about 11.35 A.M. When I last saw the trawler, which was before we heard the explosions, we were five miles away and the submarine was then alongside of her.

Rowing all that day and night, the crew of the *Kingfisher*, numbering twenty-six men, landed at West Quaddy, Nova Scotia, at 10 A.M. on September 21, none the worse for their experience.[6]

All trace of the U-155 was lost for six more days and then, on September 26, an "allo" was caught by shore stations from a steamer which reported its position as 43° 15′ N., 65° W., which was close to the Nova Scotian coast and just east of Cape Sable. The origin of this wireless was never traced successfully by the Navy Department.

Three days later, however, definite contact was established, when, on September 29, the British steamer *Reginolite* was attacked in 40° 51′ N., 66° 40′ W. The U-155 tried to gun the Britisher, opening fire at five

[6] Files of Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance, Treasury Department.

thousand yards and pursuing for forty-five minutes. The *Reginolite* zigzagged and put on all steam, drawing away in safety through superior speed.

Cruising slowly southward and approaching a little more than a degree nearer shore, the U-155 sighted the British steamship *Nevasa*, at 2.09 P.M. on October 2, in 38° 31′ N., 68° 23′ W. About eight miles separated the two and, when a single shot fell far short, the enemy abandoned the pursuit.

Veering south by west after this fruitless attack, the U-155 dropped its gunning tactics again and resorted to torpedoes. The victim was the Italian steamship *Alberto Treves*, of 3,838 gross tons, which was struck a fatal blow, in 38° 20′ N., 67° 10′ W., on October 3, and sank so quickly that the crew had barely time to launch three boats. One of these, containing thirteen men, was picked up several days later by the American steamer *Orizaba*, and the survivors brought ashore. The other two boats, one containing five and the other sixteen men, were lost with all on board.[7]

The next day the enemy made its final attack before starting homeward. It overhauled the British schooner *Industrial*, of 330 gross tons, in 37° 57′ N., 66° 41′ W., or about two hundred fifty miles southeast of Nantucket Island, and sank it with bombs, the crew getting away in boats and being picked up later.

Although not reported for eight more days, it is apparent, from the position in which it was found on October 12, that the U-boat had circled downward and seaward from the Atlantic coast. On the latter date it attacked the homeward-bound American transport *Amphion*, formerly the North German Lloyd liner *Koln*, of 7,409 gross tons.

[7] Letter, Historical Section, U.S.N., to author, January 5, 1921.

The engagement opened at ten o'clock in the morning, in 36° 06′ N., 62° 59′ W.

The *Amphion* was being operated by the United States Shipping Board and carried a navy gun crew. The first shot from the U-155 carried away the wireless equipment and the American vessel was unable to summon aid. The U-boat followed the fleeing steamer for an hour, firing about two hundred shots, some of which riddled the superstructure and five of the lifeboats. Diamond Atkinson, an American seaman, was mortally wounded, and Earl Denau, a Russian seaman, both of the Shipping Board crew, seriously wounded. Six other men were slightly wounded by shrapnel, including two of the navy gunners, Donald F. Bernard and Joseph V. LeBlanc. The *Amphion* fired seventy-two shots in return, the last of which, it was thought, registered on the enemy. As the U-155 had been gradually losing ground in the chase, it finally stopped and the transport steamed clear. The two seriously wounded seamen were landed at Bermuda, where Atkinson died.[8] The naval gun crew of the *Amphion* was commended subsequently by Secretary Daniels.

The U-155 resumed its eastward journey following this brief interruption and for five days proceeded undetected. On October 17, in 38° 05′ N., 50° 50′ W., or about twelve hundred miles off the Maryland coast, it torpedoed the American cargo carrier *Lucia*, of 6,744 gross tons, being operated for the United States Army by the Shipping Board. The *Lucia* had been named the "unsinkable ship." It had been formerly an Austrian freighter of the same name and had been taken over by our Government at the outbreak of the war, being seized at Mobile,

[8] Schedule B, Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

where it had sought safety in 1914. It had been equipped at a cost of more than two hundred thousand dollars with an "unsinkable device" approved by naval officials for experimental purposes. The buoyancy arrangement consisted of air-filled boxes which lined hold and cabins, the inventor declaring that no matter how much water was taken in through holes torn in the side, the vessel would float. The device had its first test when the U-155 sent a torpedo into the engine room on the port side, at 5.30 P.M., October 17. Four men were killed by the explosion. They were Third Engineer Daniel E. Moynihan, Cadet Engineer Michael Gaynor, Water Tender James Kenny and Oiler E. C. Young, all members of the Shipping Board crew.[9] The story of what happened subsequently is told by Chief Boatswain's Mate William F. O'Brien, commanding the armed guard.

The explosion caused a shower of dust and débris which "interfered with the men on the after-gun platform and the lookout on the after crow's nest." It also knocked the men on the platform off their feet. They leaped up and to the gun, training it to port, but saw no sign of a submarine. The U.S.S. *Hawaiian,* in command of the convoy, was communicated with by semaphore, as the dynamos in the engine room had been put out of commission and the wireless, consequently, was useless. An auxiliary wireless set was then used and S.O.S. signals were sent out at five-minute intervals. The weather was calm, darkness setting in shortly after the attack.

Expecting the U-boat to reappear to finish its work, the gun crew kept sharp lookout during the night and toward dawn, "fearing that the submarine might try to shell the

[9] Schedule B, Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

ship at daybreak," extra rounds of ammunition were brought on deck. During the entire night the ship was slowly sinking. The after-gun platform was just clear of the water "as the explosion of the torpedo had carried away the bulkhead between the engine room and the adjoining compartment."

Shortly after being torpedoed it was deemed advisable to get the Shipping Board crew off. One boat had been destroyed, and its complement of twenty-two men, reduced to eighteen by the four deaths, was distributed among the other five boats and the life raft. The boats remained near the ship during the night and, on the morning of October 18, were called alongside and the food replenished. Again, at noon on October 18, they were recalled and given fresh food and water. At 2 P.M., the after-gun platform being awash, and the water forcing its way forward into the bow compartments, the gun crew took to its boat. At 2.20 P.M., the balance of the gun crew with O'Brien, Captain C. F. Leary, of the *Lucia,* and three members of the civilian crew also pulled away. Up until that hour the navy gunners had stood at duty on their posts for twenty hours and fifty minutes. Several times O'Brien wanted to return to the sinking ship, but Captain Leary warned against it. Finally, at 3.15 P.M., the stern of the steamer started to settle. The ship rose to a vertical position, the mainmast breaking off and being carried away. At 3.20 P.M., the *Lucia* went down, stern foremost, the stack being carried away in the final plunge.

The weather had been growing unsettled, with a rising wind and a high sea. Water was being hurled into the boats and only by constant bailing and the utmost care were the small craft kept afloat. At 9.26 P.M., the U.S.S. *Fairfax* came into view and, after some maneuvering and consider-

able danger to the men in the small boats, managed to save them all. Subsequently the twenty-four men in the armed guard were commended by the Secretary of the Navy.[10]

The sinking of the "unsinkable ship" was the final exploit of the ex-*Deutschland*. It had not bothered to stay and inspect its handiwork, but had moved away eastward, and, it is believed, was responsible for the attack upon the British steamer *Clan MacArthur*, on October 25, in 41° 20′ N., 32° 30′ W. From that point the U-155 turned home, in response to orders from Kiel recalling all submarines, and arrived at its base on November 15, four days after the Armistice.

Its raid was productive of less tonnage destroyed and more lives lost than any of its predecessors. It accounted for 17,485 gross tons, including four steamers, two small sailing vessels and a trawler. Each of the steamers was a torpedo victim, the U-155 being uniformly unsuccessful in attempting to gun armed ships. Twenty-nine men were killed on vessels encountering it, the majority of these, twenty-one, being lost when the two boats of the *Alberto Treves* disappeared at sea. In addition four men were killed on the *Lucia*, three on the *Leixoes* and one on the *Amphion*.

[10] United States Official Bulletin, November 25, 1918.

## CHAPTER XX

# THE EPIC OF THE *TICONDEROGA*

THE U-152, the sixth and last of the undersea raiders despatched for the American coast, sailed from Kiel, on September 5, under command of Kapitanleutnant Franz. The U-boat was the one mentioned by Admiral Sims, in his cable of September 9, as still being in Germany on September 2, and also was referred to by him in a previous message, of August 9, as intended for mine-laying "east of Atlantic City and Currituck." Like the others of the U-150 type, the submarine was of mercantile design re-equipped for raiding purposes with two 6-inch guns and carrying mines and torpedoes. The U-152 negotiated the mine fields without incident and in six days had reached a position due north of the Shetland Islands, where, on September 11, in 62° 30′ N., 35′ W., it began its exploits by stopping the Danish schooner *Constanza*, of 199 tons, and attempting to destroy the neutral vessel with bombs. The *Constanza*, however, was salvaged.[1]

From north of the Shetland Islands, the U-152 ran southwesterly for thirteen days and, on September 24,

[1] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 112.

gunned the British steamer *Alban*, in 44° 22′ N., 29° 45′ W., a position far out to sea and in a line between Nova Scotia and the Bay of Biscay. The *Alban* escaped and the U-boat continued west by south for five more days, encountering the cargo carrier *George G. Henry*, of the naval overseas transportation service, on September 29, in 43° 40′ N., 37° 42′ W. The *George G. Henry* was running westward when the enemy was sighted, at 8.50 A.M., and the navy gunners at once opened fire. Maintaining a position astern, the U-152 commenced throwing 6-inch shells after the fleeing cargo carrier and soon secured the range. At 9.05 A.M., a shell from the submarine exploded in the magazine of the steamer, setting it afire. The navy crew fought the fire and the enemy at the same time. One navy man, 2d Class Engineer William T. Vail, climbed a red-hot iron ladder to close valve gauges in compartments near the magazine and succeeded in his task, although "suffering great physical punishment."[2] Two other men, Chief Water Tender Henry A. L. Neargardt and 1st Class Fireman Walter W. Reese, behaved as gallantly in fighting the flames.[3] All this time the U-152 was shelling the ship, fragments of shrapnel wounding seventeen men. The fire was under control at 9.50 A.M., and fifty minutes later, after a gun duel of almost two hours, the U-152 apparently had enough. It submerged and let the *George G. Henry* continue homeward without further molestation.

During the night of September 29, the U-boat still proceeded west by south and shortly before dawn on the following morning the cargo carrier *Ticonderoga*, another ship in the naval overseas transport service, fell into its

[2] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, pp. 25, 162.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 166, 167.

clutches, in 43° 05′ N., 38° 43′ W. The resultant encounter wrote another epic in the pages of American naval history. The *Ticonderoga*, of 5,130 gross tons, had been one of the German merchant ships which sought refuge in American harbors in 1914 and was seized in the spring of 1917 by the United States. Its name, under German register, had been the *Camilla Rickmers*. Thoroughly overhauled and repaired by the Navy Department, it had been placed in the overseas service and had made a number of trips to Europe with supplies. About a month before, while returning from France with the steamers *Montoso* and *Rondo*, it had been in a brush with the U-155 but had escaped undamaged.

During the night of September 29, the *Ticonderoga*, because of engine trouble, had fallen somewhat behind the convoy, which was proceeding eastward under command of the U.S. cruiser *Galveston*. The ship carried a cargo of railroad ties and also a detachment of two officers and one hundred thirteen enlisted men from the ordnance branch of the United States Army. The navy personnel consisted of fifteen officers and one hundred seven enlisted men, making a total of two hundred thirty-seven on board. By five o'clock on the morning of September 30, the *Ticonderoga* was more than five miles astern of the fleet, although its absence had not been noticed on board the *Galveston*. At 5.20 A.M., Ensign Gustav Ringelman, officer of the deck, sighted a submarine "about 200 yards off our port bow awash, the whole length showing." He reported it immediately to the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander J. J. Madison, and at the same time ordered the forward gun, a 3-inch weapon, to open fire.

Commander Madison acted promptly. At a distance of only two hundred yards there was a chance to ram the

enemy and he took it. The helm was jammed hard to starboard and the *Ticonderoga* lunged toward the U-boat, missing it by only twenty-five feet. Because of a heavy spray and rain during the night, the cargo carrier's forward gun had been covered. The gun crew, struggling with the tarpaulin, never had an opportunity to fire. The vessel's swerve to port had brought the U-152 directly off the starboard bow and from this short range, within two minutes after it had been sighted, it began to pump incendiary shells into the forward part of its unwieldy opponent. The first shell struck the bridge fairly, demolishing the wheel, killed the helmsman and set the amidships section ablaze. To complete its errand of destruction, it shattered the wireless equipment and a fragment from it struck down the captain, wounding him severely. A second shell followed in the path of the first and finished wrecking the bridge. The third missile made a direct hit in the center of the forward-gun platform, carrying away the 3-inch weapon and every member of the gun crew. Three more shells raked the forward part of the *Ticonderoga*, spreading death and devastation among seamen and soldiers pouring out on deck. Then the U-152 submerged as suddenly as it had originally appeared.[4]

Six miles away, the *Galveston* "ahead and on the right flank of the convoy" saw a distant gun flash "a short time before daybreak." An army cargo ship, the *Feltore*, was known to be "about two miles south of the convoy," but, as has been noted, the *Ticonderoga* at that time was not missed. The *Galveston* changed course and ran toward the flash, opening fire with a 5-inch gun. The first thought was that the *Feltore* had been attacked "but this soon proved to be not so." While the cruiser sped toward the

[4] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 110.

spot, "a second set of gun flashes" was seen and they were so close together that the cruiser stopped firing, for fear of "hitting a friendly vessel." Then the *Galveston* observed a fire break out but noted also that it "was soon extinguished." And then "the *Galveston* returned to her position with the convoy." Influenza among the engineer's force on the cruiser had made it necessary to reduce the boiler power; long absence from the convoy would have made it impossible, with this reduction in power, to rejoin the other vessels in time to save them from a possible submarine attack; a commander's first duty was to remain "with the large number of ships in his convoy", and lack of knowledge that the vessel attacked was one of that particular convoy: these were the reasons which influenced the *Galveston's* subsequent movements. Undoubtedly the U-152 had seen the flashing guns of the oncoming cruiser and the sight had caused it to submerge. For the moment, unknown to them, the hand of rescue had been extended to the survivors on the *Ticonderoga* — there must have been one hundred fifty men alive at that time — and then withdrawn as the *Galveston* "returned to her position with the convoy." [5]

Minutes sped like seconds on the already shattered cargo carrier after the U-boat had disappeared. Chief Quartermaster George S. Tappley, running out of his room to the bridge "which was all afire", heard the whistle blow to abandon ship and came upon the badly wounded captain, trying to make his way aft. Tappley and the paymaster picked him up and carried him. At his direction they brought a chair and sat him in it,[6] where, as Nicholas Biddle fought the *Randolph* in the days of the

[5] Official United States Bulletin, January 27, 1919.

[6] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, p. 68.

Revolution, the intrepid officer upheld traditions by as gallantly fighting the *Ticonderoga*. Ensign Clifford T. Sanghove, third engineer, awakened by the first shell which had crashed through his room, and finding the ship on fire, had gone to the engine room and began organizing "gangs to fight the fire." On the after-gun platform, Ensign Ringelman and his gun crew, who had managed to get in one or two ineffective shots with their 6-inch weapon before the U-boat dove, waited tensely for its reappearance. With the order to "abandon ship" it was found that practically all of the eighteen lifeboats were useless, the shelling having riddled them or burned away the falls. Tappley and Lieutenant F. L. Muller, the executive officer, lowered the forward boat on the port side of the bridge and saw it sink when it struck the water. Then Tappley went into the after steering quarters, disconnected the steam from the hand-steering gear and tried to steer by hand. He found the steering gear jammed and reconnected it and went down to the steering engine "to see what could be done." Twenty minutes had elapsed since the enemy had submerged; the fire was being gotten under control; wounded men were being cared for; life rafts were being carried to the rail for use in lieu of the battered boats. Just when hope was growing stronger, the U-152 "reappeared about two miles off the starboard quarter."

The sole remaining gun on the *Ticonderoga* was trained and fired. The answer was shrapnel, both weapons on the enemy concentrating salvo after salvo, sweeping the cargo carrier's decks like an avalanche. The single gun made answer, Ensign Ringelman, finding that the U-boat was moving away, first increased the range to four thousand yards and then to four miles, spotting accordingly. Men

were swept from the deck, cut down, hurled overboard by the incessant shrapnel fire. Ensign Sanghove found his fire-fighting gangs being "shot away" as fast as he organized them. Around the *Ticonderoga's* after gun the execution had been fearful. Within a few minutes only three men remained to serve it — Ensign Ringelman, a chief boatswain's mate and a gunner's mate. Finally a shell struck underneath the gun. The 6-inch piece was put out of commission, the two enlisted men killed and the ensign wounded. All resistance was at an end. Maintaining a range of ten thousand to twelve thousand yards, the U-boat continued to shell the helpless vessel. When there was no answering fire, the enemy came closer, still firing.

There were not more than fifty unwounded men left on board. The captain had fainted through loss of blood. The command devolved upon the executive officer, Lieutenant Muller. He and Lieutenant J. H. Fulcher, first assistant engineer, conferred and decided there was no alternative but surrender. A sheet was hoisted in the rigging, but the U-152 paid no attention to it, its two guns continuing to sweep the decks. Finally, Lieutenant Fulcher, although wounded in the thigh, knee and elbow, dared the sweeping fire and waved a pillow slip from a porthole. At that the submarine ceased its shelling. It had fired forty times since its reappearance. Tappley gives the number of shells fired by the enemy, however, as "in all about 200 shots." [7]

By this time it was after seven o'clock. Lieutenant Muller and the other surviving officers renewed their efforts to get some boats launched. They found that the U-152 had practically demolished all of those which before the submarine renewed the attack might have been seaworthy.

[7] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 110.

Ensign Sanghove saw two boats lowered. One of these contained eight men and " the forward falls burned away " and it capsized. At 7.15 A.M., a single boat cleared the ship, the only one to get away. It carried the captain, who was unconscious, four seamen and fourteen soldiers, all of whom were wounded. Ensign Sanghove had gone back to the engine room to see that no one was left below. While he was there, at approximately 7.25 A.M., a torpedo struck the ship. It hit right aft the engine-room bulkhead on the starboard side, pinning the officer against the bulkhead and the grating by the bulge of the bulkhead and crushing him about the chest and the hips. He managed to free himself and gain the deck.

Up above efforts were still under way to get the remaining men away. With the departure of the captain's boat there were not more than " thirty-five or forty men still left on board the ship, alive." Most of these were wounded. Three of these in most serious condition were put on a life raft on top the deck house. A line was tied to the raft and it was shoved overboard. The *Ticonderoga* had been sinking so rapidly after the torpedo exploded that the deck house at that time was only twenty feet above the water. Ensign Ringelman believed that the wounded had been lashed to the raft; Ensign Sanghove stated that two or three wounded men were clinging to it when it struck the water, and Quartermaster Tappley said that the raft capsized and the three men were thrown into the water. About fifteen men remained on the sinking ship. These pulled on the line, drew the raft close to the side and leaped down upon it.

Those known to have reached the raft in safety included Lieutenant Fulcher, Ensigns Ringelman and Sanghove, Quartermaster Tappley, Chief Machinist's Mate Rudolph

Alicke, Carpenter's Mate Edward J. Willoughby and Seaman W. M. Turner. Lieutenant Muller had embarked in a wherry, which sank as it struck the water, and he subsequently clung to some floating wreckage. Ensign George W. Woodard also had gone down with a sinking boat but had managed to crawl to the top of a barrel. The men on the raft had leaped to it at 7.45 A.M., while the *Ticonderoga* was dropping under their feet. The ship sank a few seconds afterwards.[8]

Just before this the U-152, after firing two shots at the captain's boat, drifting more than a mile from the spot, ran alongside it. These two shots were seen by Ensign Sanghove and Quartermaster Tappley and heard flying past by the men in the boat.

When the submarine approached the captain's boat, an officer inquired for the commander of the ship. He was told the commander was not on the boat, although at the time Lieutenant Commander Madison was lying unconscious on the bottom. One of the German seamen entered the lifeboat and made a line fast to the submarine. Two of the four American seamen in the boat were ordered on the deck of the U-152, which started off at rapid speed, towing the boat. After a few yards the line parted. There remained in the boat Lieutenant Commander Madison, fourteen soldiers and two enlisted men of the crew, Engineman Frank W. Musio and Seaman J. E. Leonard, seventeen in all.

Returning to the vicinity of the wreckage, the Germans fished out a few barrels of potatoes which had floated clear from the after deck of the *Ticonderoga*. They almost ran down Ensign Woodard, on one of the barrels, and then took him on board with the two seamen previously picked out

[8] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 108.

of the boat. At 9.20 A.M., Lieutenant Muller, who was in uniform and was mistaken for the captain of the *Ticonderoga*, was taken off some floating wreckage. The U-boat commander, later identified as Kapitanleutnant Franz, was standing amidships. He demanded, "Where's the chief gunner? Where's the chief gunner's mate?" Lieutenant Muller replied, "Dead." The executive officer, who knew a little German, gathered from the German's remarks that "Franz was under the impression the *Ticonderoga's* after gun had continued firing after the sheet had been hoisted."

Lieutenant Muller was ordered below and a few minutes later the U-152 approached the life raft. The German commander put the same questions to the men on it —"wanted the captain and the gunner; where bound for, and where from; threatening us." Ensign Ringelman answered several of the questions. Another question was for the chief engineer, and, upon being told the chief engineer had been killed, the submarine commander ordered on board Lieutenant Fulcher, who was also in uniform. He and Muller were the only ones among the survivors who wore the regulation clothing. Lieutenant Fulcher was unable to understand the questions fired at him in German and Chief Machinist's Mate Rudolph Alicke, a German by birth and whose residence was given on his enlistment papers as "Hamburg, Germany", was ordered to the submarine's deck as interpreter. Ensign Woodard and the two seamen taken off the boat were in the meanwhile transferred to the raft. When the interrogation of Fulcher was completed, Alicke also was ordered back to the raft. He turned to Lieutenant Fulcher, pleading, "Speak for me." The German commander interrupted, "Get back on the raft. What do you mean by fighting against us, against your country? Only God can save such as you now."

Several of the wounded men on the raft appealed to the German to take them on board. Lieutenant Fulcher gave their exact words subsequently: "Won't you please take us? We have no food or water; no chance." The plea was futile, the reply being, "We have room for no more", and at the same time the raft was cast adrift. Requests for medical assistance for the wounded men were ignored, and a plea for first-aid packages "received a very gruff answer." The U-152 moved out of sound of voice but within sight and remained in view "all day until after dark that night."

The captain's boat was about a mile to windward of the raft, but began to drift toward it slowly. At the same time the wind began to freshen with "a high sea running." About two o'clock in the afternoon, boat and raft drifted close together and Lieutenant Commander Madison, who had recovered consciousness, called across that the men he had on board were either wounded or knew nothing about handling a boat. He told Ensign Ringelman and several of the others to board him if they could. Finally the boat drifted alongside and five men jumped on board. They were Ensigns Ringelman and Sanghove, Chief Carpenter Willoughby, Quartermaster Tappley and Seaman Turner. They intended to tie a line to the raft, but the wind was so strong that "we couldn't do so."

Despite all their efforts, boat and raft drifted apart. On the latter were now twenty-two men; in the former "a few unconscious men and some that were not very badly hurt." None of the survivors were able to give the exact number, although it was known that Chief Machinist's Mate Alicke and Ensign Woodard were among them. A small sail was hoisted in the bow of the boat in an effort

to get back to the raft "in order to tow it, as they had no food on it." The boat tried for four hours in vain, wind and sea growing in violence all the time, until "after many futile attempts" the men had to give it up. The raft finally drifted away in the darkness and was never heard of afterwards.

The twenty-two in the boat spent the night struggling to keep the stern to the wind so it would not capsize. At the same time they kept the small sail hoisted so as to get away from the submarine, knowing that a rescue boat, happening along in that vicinity, would fall victim to the enemy. At dawn the U-152 was gone and the survivors took stock of provisions. They found they had "eight gallons of water, two cans of hardtack, one case of apricots and one case of pineapples." At first they thought of sailing northwest toward Newfoundland, but Lieutenant Commander Madison advised against it, pointing out that at that time of year they would be always battling northwest winds. They then gave up the idea and turned the bow east-southeast toward the distant coast of Spain. The weather was rough, on October 1, and twice the boat thought it spied distant ships. The rations were doled out, each man getting "one apricot and two spoonsful of juice twice a day." All day long they steered east-southeast and toward night the sea started to run very high. During the hours of darkness they battled to keep the boat from swamping. They "sailed day and night for four days and three nights." On the third day they made sixty miles, the sea having grown moderate. Lieutenant Commander Madison became feverish and, at times, delirious. Water from the scant supply was given him frequently to keep the fever down. The men in the boat, many of them suffering severe pains from their wounds, behaved admi-

rably, complaining only at times "about not having water." On Thursday, October 3, at 8 A.M., they "sighted a steamer heading west at a distance of five miles." They sought to attract its attention but it either ignored them or did not see them.

Rescue came at last at two o'clock that afternoon when another vessel was sighted dead ahead and, a short while afterwards, the twenty-two men were lifted upon the deck of the British steamer *Moorish Prince*. The Britisher had no surgeon on board, but a steward, "who knew his business very well," gave the men every comfort and attention possible. All of them were very weak and Lieutenant Commander Madison was "in an extremely bad condition." The *Moorish Prince* ran westward, until October 6, when the steamship *Grampian* was encountered and seventeen of the survivors were transferred to it "because better medical attention and better facilities could be had on board of her for the wounded." Five men remained on the *Moorish Prince* — Lieutenant Commander Madison and a soldier, both of whom were too severely wounded to be moved, and three soldiers to take care of them. The two ships brought the twenty-two survivors to the United States on October 10.[9] Survivors' stories told of the two officers taken prisoner. Word was awaited as to the raft — upon a chance that another vessel might have picked up additional men — but none came. Of the two hundred thirty-seven men on board the *Ticonderoga*, two hundred thirteen perished, the death list being divided, ten navy

[9] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, October 11, 1918. The fourteen soldiers who survived were Privates Gaetano Carano, Raymond H. Coleman, Nick Compana, Charles M. Feicht, Louis Gangwolf, Alexander N. Green, Lyman H. Hammond, John Michael, Thomas H. Morris, Harold Robinson, James D. Sumner, Elmer Volkert, Calvin C. Wright and Colonel (Christian name) Wykes.

officers and one hundred two navy enlisted men, and two army officers and ninety-nine enlisted men.

To return to the U-152 on that fatal September 30. Lieutenants Muller and Fulcher had been taken below separately and neither knew for four hours that the other was a prisoner. Their experiences were similar. Fulcher messed with the warrant officers; Muller ate in the wardroom. Both were questioned incessantly as to why the United States was in the war and the various atrocities attributed to the Germans seemed to be sore points with the crew. Each prisoner was allowed on deck frequently, but, when an engagement seemed imminent, was sent below. Much of what transpired above was, however, secured subsequently from officers and crew, particularly the various radio messages received in code from Germany. From September 30 until October 11, the U-152's course was southwest at a speed of four knots, but the position did not vary much as it was traveling in the Gulf Stream. A code message, received October 11, was read to the captives as being "the first act of our new Government." It read, "Engage men of war only; the merchant war has ended." That day the course was changed to southeast.

Two days later, on October 13, the U-152 intercepted the Norwegian three-masted bark *Stifinder*, of 1,746 gross tons, in 37° 22′ N., 53° 30′ W. At one-forty-five o'clock in the afternoon, three shots were fired over the bark, the U-boat being three miles astern. The crew hoisted the Norwegian flag and drew in the sails, while Tarwald Frehe, the chief mate, and eight men rowed to the submarine. Frehe was ordered on the deck while an inspection was made of his papers. The Germans seemed particularly interested in the fact that the bark's cargo included a quantity of turpentine. The Norwegian mate, who under-

stood a little German, heard one of the officers say to another, "This boat has turpentine and we have none in Germany." While the mate remained on deck, the U-152 towed the boat to the bark and tied up alongside. Frehe, who had asked for the return of his ship's papers, was thrust into one of the boats but later was allowed to go on board the *Stifinder* and gather up sufficient provisions to last "eleven men for about twenty days." Meanwhile, the Germans had boarded the bark, sending a man to the crow's nest as a lookout and stationing others as guards at the hatches. At 4 P.M., after the mate had secured a chart from the navigating officer of the U-boat, the Norwegian crew put off in two boats, one containing the mate and ten men, and the other, the captain and seven men. They rowed a few hundred yards and then came together for a conference, finally deciding to try for Nova Scotia, twelve hundred miles away. As the mate's boat was the fastest sailor, a rope was tied to the captain's boat and the two craft started away, losing sight of the *Stifinder* in the darkness, at 5 P.M., and while the submarine was still alongside. The bark, according to the captive American officers, was sunk the next afternoon.[10]

The boats kept together for several days but were finally separated in a gale. After fifteen days of exposure in their small boat, the mate and his ten men were picked up, on October 29, by sub-chaser Number 294 and taken into New York two days later. Hope was abandoned for the captain's boat but the belief that it was lost proved premature. The men in it had started to row toward Halifax when separated from the others, but shortly afterwards they capsized and lost most of their provisions. They managed to right the craft and, as the bad weather continued, decided to

[10] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 112.

make for Bermuda. Instead, after standing exposure for three full weeks, they arrived in a pitiable condition, on November 5, at Turks Island, British West Indies.[11]

After despatching the Norwegian bark, the U-152 remained in the vicinity and, on October 15, pursued and gunned the British steamer *Messina* in 37° 20′ N., 53° 30′ W. The Britisher sighted the U-boat on the port quarter and immediately brought it astern, working up full steam and zigzagging as it fled. With the range at eight thousand yards, the U-boat opened fire and, a few minutes later, the quarry replied with a 4.7-inch gun on the stern. One of the enemy shots struck the port side of the *Messina* abaft the bridge, fracturing two steel plates. None of the British fire was effective. The U-boat fired about one hundred shots of two rounds per minute and the *Messina*, fifteen rounds. After a pursuit of two hours, the U-152 gave it up, in 37° 37′ N., 52° 48′ W.

Lieutenants Muller and Fulcher, on the submarine, were told by their captors that a cruiser and destroyer were reported approaching, and the U-boat dove to a depth of fifty-five meters. The prisoners, five minutes later, heard nine depth charges explode, and said that the boat shook but was undamaged.

From this encounter, the U-152 turned southeastward and, on October 17, in 36° 05′ N., 49° 12′ W., made its last attack. It approached undetected to within a short distance of the British steamer *Briarleaf* and discharged a torpedo which did not explode. Again to quote the American prisoners, it "probably missed." The *Briarleaf* was not aware of the attempt to torpedo it, and was not even aware that a submarine was in the vicinity, until, at 4.10 P.M., the U-152 emerged six hundred yards off the star-

[11] Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, November 6, 1918.

board beam and opened fire with an explosive shell which burst and fell short. This was ten minutes after the discharge of the torpedo. The Britisher replied with one shot from the after gun, and also missed. Whereupon the submarine submerged and shortly after came up astern and renewed the attack. The fight was furious for thirty minutes, but the Britisher was unharmed and the submarine also escaped damage. The U-152 fired about one hundred fifty shots and the *Briarleaf* thirty-nine. The U-boat gave up the pursuit at 5.55 P.M. and submerged. During the course of the engagement, Captain G. E. Patterson, of the *Briarleaf*, caught a wireless call from the American steamer *Lucia*, which, on that same day, was successfully torpedoed by the U-155 about one hundred fifty miles away.

On October 20, the U-152 received a radio message, which, Lieutenants Muller and Fulcher were told, read, "All submarines return to Kiel." Obediently, the submarine turned homeward; rounded the Faroe Islands; entered the North Sea mine fields at 4 P.M., November 11; passed through them at 4 A.M., November 12; reached Skagerack that night and arrived at Kiel at 5 P.M., November 15. The captive American officers, freed upon their arrival in Germany, had the unusual experience of riding in the U-152, on November 22 to 24, when twenty-four submarines journeyed to Harwich, England, and surrendered. The U-152 led one column of this undersea flotilla and the U-155 led the other.[12]

From the standpoint of tonnage destroyed, the cruise of the U-152 was the least profitable of all six of the forays made upon the Atlantic coast. Likewise, it had never drawn near enough to the shore to fulfill its intended mission, the laying of mines off Atlantic City, and Currituck, Vir-

[12] Publication No. 1, Historical Section, U.S.N., p. 114.

ginia. Its total of two victims represented only 6,876 gross tons. But, from the standpoint of lives lost, the cruise of the U-152 was far more deadly than any or all that had gone before. The total death toll accredited to the five submarines which had preceded it into the western Atlantic was far below the figure set on that fatal September 30 when two hundred thirteen Americans went down with the *Ticonderoga.* This terrible achievement must ever overshadow even the 50,885 gross tons destroyed by the U-151 in May and June, 1918.

The U-152 was the last of the German raiders to foray into the western Atlantic. One other submarine was destined for the American coast but never arrived. It was the U-139, commanded by Arnauld de la Periere. Admiral Sims had cabled on September 9 that the U-139 had not left Kiel up until September 2. A few days later, it was known the enemy was en route out through the North Sea. On October 1, it sank, by gunfire, two vessels off Cape Finisterre on the Spanish coast. This location established the enemy as "not proceeding America at present." Nor did the U-139 ever get west of the thirty-first parallel, returning finally to Kiel, on November 15, in company with the U-152 and U-155, which it had joined in late October north of the British Isles.

# CHAPTER XXI

## CONCLUSION

VIGILANCE in the three naval districts guarding the ports of New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk was maintained up to the very last hour of the war. Submarine warnings, collisions, aerial accidents and various experiences, some disastrous and others not, with the mines strewn by the U-117 kept every patrol craft on the alert. Actual U-boat operations, after the month of August, were never nearer than five hundred miles from the middle Atlantic coast, but the threat of their extension to the waters bordering Long Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia ran up an extensive toll of indirect results. Many of the reports of submarines being sighted could be traced afterwards to American coast-defense submersibles, which, from September 1 until late in October, conducted regular patrols, generally with a decoy, in the shape of the four-masted schooner *Robert H. McCurdy*, hovering near by. This vessel, unarmed and manned by a crew of volunteers, sailed from the Delaware, on August 29, accompanied by the U.S. submarines O-3 and O-5. For more than two weeks this strange trio sailed the coastal waters, always waiting in vain for an enemy U-boat to attack the schooner. Returning to the Delaware, on September 17, the *Robert H. McCurdy* departed for a second trip, on October 2.

It was accompanied upon the second cruise by the U.S. submarine O-8. After eleven days of profitless cruising, the schooner and the submarine returned finally on October 13.

Other submersibles from the three districts were also at sea during the same time, some alone, some convoyed at a distance by a scout patrol boat or sub-chaser. Consequently, it is small wonder reports were made similar to that of the British steamer *Antilla*, which sighted a supposed U-boat in 39° 48′ N., 73° 08′ W., about fifty miles due east of Barnegat, on September 5, and was surprised to find that the presumed enemy did not pursue it, but, after remaining on the surface ten minutes, submerged. Several days later, the British steamer *Astronomer* also reported a submarine sighted in the same general locality, although a degree farther out to sea. Several times also seamen, landing from transoceanic cargo vessels, told of submarines which lurked off the coast with captive schooners as decoys. All of these were traceable to the *Robert H. McCurdy*, off the middle Atlantic shore, and the *Charles Wittemore*, of a similar type, operating from the Second Naval District, at Newport, Rhode Island.

Of a different nature was the case of the U.S. tanker *Sabine Sun*, which, at 8.30 A.M., September 11, sent out an "allo" from south of Diamond Shoal Light, below Cape Hatteras, stating that it was being gunned. An hour and one-half later, the tanker reported again, this time giving its position as 34° 51′ N., 75° 40′ W., and sending the following message: "Submarine on surface, 250 feet long, two guns. Sabine Sun fired three shots. Submarine submerged and headed out to sea." Nothing could have been more convincing, yet a subsequent investigation showed that the supposed U-boat was sub-chaser Number

340, en route from Norfolk to Charleston, and which reported the next day that it had been fired upon in the same locality where the *Sabine Sun* had its encounter.

Scarcely had this report been investigated when an apparently far more serious engagement occurred. At 11.30 P.M., September 14, the British steamship *Scotian* was gunned in 39° 25′ N., 72° 26′ W., reporting by wireless that it had heard six distinct reports and had seen five flashes at minute intervals. Two of the shots passed over the ship forward of the bridge, the whizz of the shells being distinctly audible to officers and passengers. The other shots fell short. The *Scotian* reached New York the next day, bringing in ninety-six wounded Canadian officers and a thrilling account of the attack. From subsequent developments, the Navy Department decided that there had been no submarine. It happened that the U.S.S. *Sagadahoc* reported at almost the same time from the same locality that it had fired five shots at a submarine, the distance being about three miles. With a fog on the sea, the encounter occurring at night and the distance being so great, it was determined that the *Sagadahoc* had mistaken the *Scotian* for an enemy U-boat. The chart evidence in the possession of the Navy Department also showed that it was practically impossible for an enemy U-boat to be in the area at that time.[1]

It was some time before the above solution was reached, however, and the effect of the *Scotian's* report was manifest the next day when shipping was drawn in close to shore, the rules having been somewhat relaxed after the departure of the U-117. As both the steamers *J. E. O'Neil* and *Pastores* reported by radio sighting a submarine on the same day, the former southwest of Cape Lookout Light,

[1] Letter, Historical Section, U.S.N., to author, January 5, 1921.

and the latter, in 37° 36′ N., 74° 10′ W., it began to appear as if there was indeed a new U-boat off the coast.

Then came the case of the U.S.A.C.T. *Nansemond* to strengthen the belief. The *Nansemond* arrived at New York, on September 23, Captain William MacLeod stating that, on September 19, while five hundred miles at sea, his vessel had fired thirty-four shots at a U-boat which had finally made off in a crippled condition. The captain and members of the crew were confident that the navy gun crew on board scored a "damaging hit." The deductions of the Navy Department on this supposed encounter are of great interest:

According to the report of the master and commander of the armed guard of the U.S.A.C.T. Nansemond on September 19, 1918, at 12.45 P.M., the U.S.A.C.T. Nansemond in Lat. 39° 05′ N., Long. 60° 00′ W., sighted a periscope. General quarters was sounded. The submarine was estimated to be about three miles distant, astern of the Nansemond. Fire was opened with the Nansemond's after six-inch battery. Apparently the second shot from No. 3 scored a hit, as dense black smoke and water rose in the air to a height of about sixty feet, in which splinters could be seen. The cheering of the entire crew gave strength to the belief that a hit had been scored. The submarine, however, was not materially damaged, coming to an awash condition, and standing away from the Nansemond and immediately submerging, so that only a small part of the conning tower was visible. Fire was continued until shots fell short with the guns at extreme elevation. "Cease firing" was sounded at 1.30 P.M., without the submarine having returned the fire. The master was not able to describe the submarine as to size, armament or manpower.

On September 13, 1918, U-155 had a running battle

with the British merchant ship Newby Hall in Lat. 42° 18′ N., Long. 58° 22′ W. On September 20, 1918, at 9.10 A.M., in Lat. 43° 31′ N., Long. 61° 53′ W., U-155 attacked and sunk the American trawler Kingfisher. U-155 is the only submarine which was anywhere near the vicinity of the Nansemond when she made her attack. Following the engagement with the Newby Hall on Sept. 13 and prior to the sinking of the Kingfisher on Sept. 20, there is a period of about seven days in which the U-155 was not definitely located, but it was supposed as it had been reported in advance, that one of her purposes was to lay mines off Halifax; that she performed this mission during these seven days. If this were done she could hardly have been the submarine attacked by the Nansemond. On the other hand, following the sinking of the Kingfisher on Sept. 20 there was a period of nine days during which her whereabouts are not known and it is possible that she may have made the Nova Scotia visit during this nine day period which would also indicate her to have been the submarine reported on Sept. 26, off Cape Race in Lat. 43° 15′ N., Long. 65° W. The distance between the position of the encounter of the Nansemond on the 19th and the location of the sinking of the Kingfisher on the 20th, is 280 miles, and the difference in time — Nansemond, 12.45 P.M., 19th, and Kingfisher, 9.10 A.M., 20th — would be about 21 hours. As the maximum speed of the U-155 is known to be about 15 knots per hour she could have made the 280 miles in the 21 hours. From reports of other submarines it would appear that such a speed was not usual when hunting for ships to prey upon. If, however, the submarine, knowing that her location was known, as the Nansemond sent out a radio giving it, shifted her location, as was frequently done by the submarines, and sailed northwest at a good speed, it is possible that the submarine attacked by the Nansemond on the

19th was U-155 and that she reached and sank the Kingfisher on the 20th. Of course, there is the possibility that the Nansemond fired on some other object or ship, mistaking it for a submarine although the officers and crew are absolutely sure it was a submarine. The distance is given as three miles. The submarine did not reply to fire of the Nansemond, and the commanding officer could give no details of description of the submarine.[2]

Apart from the reasoning advanced by the Navy Department, it will be recalled that the U-155, upon all occasions that it got near enough to an enemy, tried to gun it (Chapter XIX). Taking all the above into consideration, it is extremely unlikely that the *Nansemond* fought a U-boat, although what it did fire upon must remain a mystery. However, its report, as given September 23, upon arrival, was most convincing, and when, on September 23 also, the Five Fathom Bank Lightship, just off the Delaware Breakwater, reported a submarine seen near-by, the patrols began to concentrate in that area and two days later the U.S. destroyer *Patterson* and its hunt squadron reported contact at last with the enemy.

Sub-chaser 234, one of the hunt squadron, at midnight, on September 24, caught a sound through its detector which was believed unmistakably to be a submarine moving on a course about north. The location was about forty miles off the Delaware coast, in 38° 26′ N., 73° 46′ W. The sub-chaser at once bombed the locality heavily and shortly afterwards a slight oily slick was noticed on the surface. Meanwhile, the *Patterson* and the balance of the fleet had come up and the entire squadron lay to, with listening tubes down. All told, there were eight chasers and the destroyer at hand. The *Patterson*, which had been

[2] Letter, Historical Section, U.S.N., to author, February 5, 1921.

at anchor in the Delaware when the first alarm sounded, put to sea with a number of influenza cases on board and the epidemic broke out with virulence before the destroyer had been twelve hours on the station. All but six men were taken ill and, on September 26, relief arrived in the shape of the U.S. destroyer *Phillips*. The *Patterson* then returned to Cape May. The new flagship and the eight subchasers remained on the spot for three days without detecting another sign. The watch was abandoned only when it was decided that if there had been a submarine it was done for.[3]

After hostilities ended, the matter was threshed out at length. The Navy Department had no chart evidence of a submarine in that vicinity. All U-boats of which Admiral Sims had warned were located definitely elsewhere on that day, and the conclusion arrived at was that the *Patterson* hunt squadron had not made contact with the enemy. The incident of September 25 seemed to lay the submarine bogy in so far as affecting that particular stretch of coast. Subsequent reports of enemy craft sighted were circumstantial and traceable to mistaken identity.

The supposed presence of submarines had its effect also in increasing the vigilance and numbers of the aerial patrol, and five accidents, two of which were fatal, occurred along the middle Atlantic coast during this period. On September 14, Ensign Harry G. Catchpole, U.S.N.R.F., was killed in a fall while on patrol off Five Fathom Bank Lightship. On September 21, seaplane A3-1211 was forced to descend about one hundred miles off Atlantic City, but plane and crew were picked up by the cargo ship *Fresno*. On October 8, seaplane A-1210 was lost at sea while on patrol off Fenwick Island Lightship and the

[3] Manuscript narrative, Ensign Karl F. Knipe, U.S.N.R.F.

crew, Ensign Russell D. Tibbitts, U.S.N.R.F., Mechanic Herbert E. Groh and Engineer, 3rd Class, Frank C. Lynch, never heard of afterwards.[4] The same day, seaplane 1164 was forced down thirty miles off Atlantic City, but the mishap was seen and the crew rescued. The final accident occurred late in October when seaplane A-1159, with Ensign Charles N. Sanborn and Student Officer E. H. Millet, was reported lost at sea. This announcement was premature as both men were rescued, on November 1, by a naval patrol vessel.

During September and October there were an unusually large number of accidents growing out of the coastal convoying regulations, all indirect results of the threat of the enemy off the coast. On September 6, the United Fruit Company steamship *Almirante*, of 5,010 gross tons, was rammed and sunk by the U.S.S. *Hisko* five miles south by east of Brigantine Whistling Buoy, off the New Jersey coast. The crew was rescued by the *Hisko* and taken into New York. There went down with the *Almirante* fourteen sacks of letters from England, France and Columbia, twelve sacks from New York, sixteen hundred ordinary letters and eighty registered articles, all for Port Limon and San Jose, Costa Rica.[5]

Almost two weeks later, on September 18, scout patrol Number 907 caught fire while on patrol off the entrance to Narragansett Bay and burned to the water line, four naval men being slightly injured.[6]

Loss of life occurred when sub-chaser Number 60, running toward Barnegat without lights, at 3.00 A.M. on October 1, was cut down by the oil tanker *Fred W. Weller*,

[4] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, pp. 207–253.

[5] Official United States Bulletin, October 18, 1918.

[6] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 246.

while five miles off Atlantic Highlands, on the northern New Jersey coast. The tanker and the U.S.S. *Kemah* picked up all but two men. These, Machinist's Mate Walter H. Kluth and Seaman Martin A. Wilson, were killed, probably in the collision. A little later that same day, the British schooner *Mystery* went ashore off Coast Guard station Number 148, on the coast of Delaware, but was floated two days later.

The most serious collision off the coast during the entire period of the U-boat raids took place on October 4. The American steamship *Herman Frasch*, a small cargo carrier of 3,803 gross tons, and the navy cargo carrier *George G. Henry*, the latter just six days westward from an encounter with the U-152, crashed together at night, in 41° 06′ N., 64° 38′ W., or about one hundred fifty miles southeast of the Nova Scotian coast. Six officers and seventeen enlisted men of the navy lost their lives when the *Herman Frasch* sank after the collision.[7] The *George G. Henry*, with a hole in its bow above the water line, picked up forty-one survivors and stood by all night but without finding any others. When daylight came, the steamer abandoned the search and continued its journey.

Three days later another navy cargo carrier, the steamer *Westgate*, was sunk in collision with the U.S.S. *American* while in convoy and running without lights, in 40° 35′ N., 63° 48′ W., about five hundred miles off the coast. Seven

[7] Those who lost their lives on the S.S. *Herman Frasch* were Lieutenant Commander C. B. Stoddard, Lieutenants Herbert E. Olsen, William C. Stewart and Francis P. Smith; Ensigns Wheldon S. Arbogast and Robert E. Deakin; Machinist Charles W. Willey, and the following enlisted men: Louis H. Archilles, Jr., Frank G. Arrowood, Ervin T. Blix, Clifford H. Craig, Benjamin F. Fredenburg, Frederick H. Hansen, Lyman L. Hill, Earl R. Hunt, Leo Bernard Kilroy, Henry C. Klein, Jacob J. London, James F. Owens, Paul P. Randolph, Joe L. Snyder, Charles M. Stilwell, Joseph H. Vasensky, Oliver Miller and William A. Underwood.

seamen lost their lives.[8] The *American* picked up the remainder and proceeded to port.

Three other accidents occurred during the convoying from that time to the Armistice. On October 5, scout patrol Number 397, the *Mary Alice*, was sunk in Long Island Sound in collision with the U.S. submarine O-13. Rear Admiral Gill, U.S.N., who was on board as president of an inspection board, had a thrilling experience when the patrol boat went down and two enlisted men, First Class Yeoman Edward R. Metz and Boatswain's Mate, 1st Class, Elmer S. Duryea, were commended by Secretary Daniels for the heroism displayed in saving fellow members of the crew.[9] Scout patrol Number 1189 was destroyed by fire, on October 21, while on patrol in Narragansett Bay,[10] and, on October 29, the U.S.S. *Lake Bledsoe* went ashore off Barnegat, but was floated shortly afterwards.

Mines strewn by the U-117, in August, occupied more of the attention of the naval districts at New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk in the last months of the war than either the rumored presence of submarines or the frequent accidents. The mine-sweeping fleets, augmented by a number of newly built steel sweepers, were engaged almost constantly in keeping clear the main ship channels, yet, despite all precautions, the U-117 reaped a rich harvest long after it had departed from the coast. One of these deadly weapons was found, on September 7, floating off Fire Island and was towed into the inlet and examined. It weighed about two hundred pounds and was estimated to

[8] Those who lost their lives on the S.S. *Westgate* were all enlisted men, as follows: Earl F. Anderson, Clarence A. Conway, William D. Gauthier, Andrew D. Jones, Bernard B. Sederquist, Earl F. Smith and Homer E. Wallace.

[9] Official United States Bulletin, March 26, and 28, 1919.

[10] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 250.

have cost fifteen hundred dollars. No more were sighted until the end of the month, when the discovery of the engines of destruction in a new territory almost cost the American navy another capital ship.

On the morning of September 29, the U.S. battleship *Minnesota*, under convoy of the U.S. destroyer *Israel*, and on its way from Base 2 (York River) to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, struck a mine, at 3.15 A.M., in 38° 11′ 30″ N., 74° 41′ 5″ W., about twenty miles from Fenwick Island Shoal at the mouth of the Delaware. Excellent discipline prevailed on the big battleship throughout.[11] The mine had torn a hole in the ship's under-water body about thirty feet long and extending athwart ship from port side to keel, to starboard armor shelf and protective deck. Immediate measures were taken to keep the vessel buoyant, and all water-tight compartments were at once closed. Carpenter G. Murphy made his way into the lower compartments filled with gas, directing the shoring of bulkheads and decks with an efficiency which won him special commendation.[12] Lieutenant F. M. Smith, Marine Corps, was also commended for his heroic work in removing the sick to the upper decks, carrying them from the sick bay which was gas-filled.[13] Under the able seamanship of Captain J. V. Chase, U.S.N., the *Minnesota*, with its forward compartment flooded, proceeded at ten knots under its own steam to the Delaware and on up to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, arriving at 7.45 P.M., the same day. The *Teal* and *Kingfisher*, two of the new mine sweepers, swept the area at once but without any result.

On October 2, the steamship *Bendoran* reported a mine

[11] Hearing, Award of Medals in the Naval Service, pp. 21, 22.

[12] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 290.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 281.

far off Hatteras and the next day the steamers *Marta* and *Leersum* each reported one seen in the waters south of the entrance to the Chesapeake. It was apparent from all these locations that the U-117 had distributed its deadly machines over a stretch of more than four hundred miles, an exceedingly difficult problem for the mine-sweeping fleets.

The first disaster came on October 4. The Mallory Line steamer *San Saba*, of 2,458 gross tons, with a crew of thirty-seven men, struck a mine, at 12.45 A.M., fifteen miles southeast of Barnegat, and sank in fifteen fathoms of water. The *San Saba* was southbound with a general cargo for Tampa and Key West and went down in five minutes. The steamship *Lake Felicity*, bound for New York, passed the spot shortly afterwards and picked up four men and recovered one body from the floating wreckage. One of the four men died subsequently from exposure. The Norwegian steamer *Breifond* rescued the second officer from a lifebuoy, at four o'clock in the afternoon and, at 4.30 P.M., picked up two more of the crew from a life raft. These latter said two other members of the crew had shared the raft but had died from exposure at 6 A.M. Captain B. G Birdsall, Chief Engineer William J. McBride, Assistant Engineers Harry Cobb, Frank Miller and Ralph Richards, Steward E. E. Chambers and twenty-one of the crew were either drowned or killed in the explosion,[14] making the total death list thirty.

Several days later, the U.S.S. *Teal* swept up a mine in the vicinity and, on October 11, the Coast Guard cutter *Morrell* destroyed what remained of the *San Saba* as a menace to navigation.

Not all of the floating mines were accounted for, how-

[14] Schedule A, Marine and Seamen's Division, Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

ever, as the Cuban steamship *Chaparro*, of 2,873 gross tons, collided with one of them on October 27, eleven miles south by east of Barnegat Lighthouse and sank within five minutes. The crew had just time to launch two lifeboats but six men were unable to get clear and went to their deaths with the sinking ship. One boat, with eleven seamen and the captain, reached Beach Haven, New Jersey, at 7 A.M. the next day, and the other, with eleven survivors, arrived at North Beach, across the inlet from Barnegat, shortly afterwards.

The final sinking of the war off the Atlantic coast occurred just two days before the Armistice and was also due to one of the mines laid by the U-117. The victim was the U.S.S. *Saetia*, an army cargo carrier of 2,458 gross tons, which, due to a combination of bad weather, bad trim and a northeast gale, was six miles south by west of the proper approach line as given its skipper before leaving France. It was headed for the Delaware but instead struck a mine ten miles south-southeast of Fenwick Island Lightship, at 9.05 A.M., November 9. After the explosion, the ship careened violently, settling heavily at the stern. A second explosion occurred in the boilers, after which the water poured into the shaft alley in the stern until only the bow remained above the surface. Four boats got away with forty-seven men. Nineteen of the crew took to a life raft and the balance leaped overboard. Two of the boats reached Cape Henlopen after a hard battle and the crew of Coast Guard station Number 146 put out in their cutter to the rescue. The cutter picked up as many of those floating on the sea as it could carry and turned back but was swamped a mile from shore. All on board were rescued. Additional survivors were brought to land until fifty-seven had been accounted for. Later that night, a

patrol boat came across nine more men in a lifeboat and the steamship *Kennebec* rescued the nineteen on the life raft. Thirteen men were injured, the majority from being hurled against wreckage or rafts by the waves.[15]

After the Armistice it was necessary to send out numerous mine warnings, one being reported near Cape Hatteras, on November 26; another at the mouth of the Delaware, on about December 3; and others as late as January, 1919.

On January 3, 1919, the Office of Naval Operations issued a general warning to all merchant vessels, stating, "Until assurance can be given that the Atlantic coast of the United States and Canada have been cleared of mines, vessels within 100 fathom curve should use 'otters.' All vessels are hereby warned." The "otter gear" is a mechanical contrivance to sweep up mines and cut the moorings, and is attached to the prow of a ship.

The mine-sweeping operations were a long and a tedious process. On November 18, after the surrender of the German submarines, Admiral Sims was able to secure charts of all mine fields off this coast and the number of mines laid in every instance save those laid by the U-156. A second message, received November 27, added a few more locations. The fields were seven in number. The first one, around Fire Island, which had been laid by U-156, had been swept clear before the Armistice, eight mines being accounted for. The German report listed nine mines around Barnegat and eight were accounted for; seven south of Fenwick Island Shoal Lightship and seven were accounted for; eight south of Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship and seven were accounted for; eight adjoining the field south of Winter Quarter but none were found there;

[15] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 251.

six off Chesapeake Bay Buoy 2cB and seven were accounted for, and nine off Wimble Shoal Buoy and ten were accounted for. In addition, seven mines were destroyed off Overfalls Lightship which were not listed by the enemy. The above totals take into consideration those which destroyed the *San Diego*, *Herbert L. Pratt*, *San Saba*, *Chaparro*, *Mirlo* and *Saetia* and damaged the *Minnesota*. Outside of the reported fields six mines were destroyed, three of these being off Nova Scotia. The total for the entire coast was sixty-two. The mine-sweeping operations were adjudged completed on February 7, 1919, and all shipping so notified.

Barring the mine sweeping, the Atlantic coast returned to pre-war conditions with rapidity after November 11, 1918. The day following the signing of the Armistice all coastal cargo convoying was suspended and cargo ships were directed to sail independently. Two days later the air station patrols were reduced to cover the designated areas only once daily. On November 13, Secretary Daniels lifted the restrictions placed upon the publication of arrivals and departures of merchant vessels and permitted all other daily shipping news to be resumed. Demobilization of the district forces was carried on as rapidly as possible and, by the beginning of 1919, the section base organizations were being skeletonized and the submarine patrol vessels being returned to the owners.

Yet the last incident of the submarine raids on the American coast did not come until five months after the Armistice. It was the arrival, in April, 1919, of the U-117, which, surrendered at Harwich in the preceding December, was turned over to the American navy, and, manned by a navy crew, reached New York in time to be used, most fittingly, in the Victory Loan campaign of that month.

Afterwards the Bureau of Construction and Repair took the big mine-layer and studied it for suggestions in bettering the types of American submarines.

The war record of the U-117 was not completed until the sinking of the *Saetia* by one of its mines, on November 9. With the loss of the army cargo boat, the German mine layer, by torpedo, bomb and mine, is credited with destroying twenty-one ships, of a gross tonnage of 27,485. (see Table IV). Six of these were steamers, eleven were fishing schooners, one was a trawler and three were large-sized sailing vessels. With the exception of the toll of the U-152, the depredations of the U-117 cost more lives than the other U-boats. Including the men drowned or killed on mined vessels, the mortality from its activities totalled fifty-four, seven lost on the *Frederick R. Kellogg*, ten on the *Mirlo*, one on the *Bergsdalen*, thirty on the *San Saba* and six on the *Chaparro*.

The tonnage destroyed by the six U-boats which visited the American coast totalled 166,907. This figure includes losses by all methods — torpedoing, bombing, gunning, burning and mining. The number of vessels sunk, those salvaged being excluded, was ninety-one, divided as follows: Steamers, thirty-three, for 130,126 gross tons; sailing vessels (apart from fishing schooners), nineteen, for 24,421 gross tons; fishing schooners, thirty, for 2,857 gross tons; steam trawlers, three, for 754 gross tons; warships, one, for 5,700 gross tons, and miscellaneous — four coal barges and a lightship — five, for 3,049 gross tons. The losses fell heaviest upon vessels of American register, forty-five being destroyed, with a gross tonnage of 64,602. Great Britain lost eight ships, totalling 36,489 gross tons; Norway, fifteen ships, 35,387 gross tons; and Canada, fourteen ships, 7,176 gross tons. Seven other

nations shared in the losses, which are shown by register and class in Table VII.

During the period of the raid, the United States lost eleven ships through accident. Each of these was sunk as a result of U-boat activities off this coast, the causes being collision while running at night without lights to avoid submarines, or being mistaken for an enemy and destroyed by gunfire. Six of these eleven vessels were cargo boats and five were war vessels. Of the latter, one was a gunboat, one a submarine patrol boat and the other three submarine chasers. If their total tonnage of 30,655 is added to that actually accounted for by the U-boats, the total loss to shipping as a result of the raids reaches a figure of 197,761 gross tons.

There were 435 lives lost at sea directly traceable to the U-boat activities in American waters. Of these, 368 were killed or drowned on vessels actually destroyed by the enemy, this figure including small boats freighted with survivors which disappeared at sea. In addition, eighteen men were killed when the steamer *Felix Taussig* mistook the sub-chaser Number 209 for a submarine; nine naval aviators lost their lives while on coastal patrol and forty men were lost in collision or by grounding during the period of strict coastal convoying regulations.

The monetary loss is a figure which cannot be estimated. Forty-seven of the ships destroyed by the enemy were of register other than American. Cargo values cannot be computed with any degree of accuracy. Incidental losses such as personal belongings of the crews, mail sent to the bottom on the *Carolina* and the *Almirante*, etc., would have varying estimates. Time lost through delay to shipping, such as the navy batteries which were two weeks late getting to France through the destruction of the *Texel*, finds no

method of appraisal. Even the halibut, cod and swordfish sent to the bottom with the fishing schooners and trawlers on the Banks of New England and Canada leave no method of computation. War Risk Insurance covers the financial loss in part; how small a part is a matter which will never be decided.

It is needless to review what the U-boats accomplished. That has been described with the progress of the raids. What they failed to accomplish, however, had an important bearing upon the final decision in the World War. From May 1, 1918, to November 11, 1918, 1,142 ships carried 2,079,880 American soldiers to France.[16] Not once, in the course of the six months, was an eastbound transport attacked. Germany heralded the advent of its submarines on the American coast as a blow at the source of this country's contribution to the Allied cause. The blow was delivered at the supply source, not the man power. Two British transports, returning to the United States for more troops, were sunk. The balance of the losses was divided between cargo boats, coastal passenger boats, sailing vessels, fishing schooners, barges and an armored cruiser. The avowed purposes of the raids, aside from striking at the source of supply, were to cause the withdrawal of American warships from European waters and strike terror along the coast. The navy did not recall a single ship, not even a submarine chaser. The terror along the coast existed chiefly in the minds of the writers who penned the editorials in German newspapers of the period. The operations of the enemy disclosed, instead, the determination of those at home, the bravery of those at sea. The history of the six raids is a chronicle of heroism from the *Carolina* to the *Saetia*. The cherished traditions of the

[16] Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1919, p. 206.

American navy were lived up to and beyond by the men of the *Schurz*, the *Minnesota*, the *San Diego*, the sub-chaser Number 209 and the ill-fated *Ticonderoga*. The merchant marine — American and Allied — showed rare courage in every battle, whether with a submarine or with the sea.

THE END

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(After the first raid, the navy censorship frowned upon the individual initiative of the newspapers and the material in one was practically a duplicate of what was in the others. This condition arose from all newspapers having to rely almost entirely upon the news services, whose despatches were closely censored. At that, occasionally some things appeared which slipped through the censorship.)

TABLE I

U-151
VESSELS SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED

| Name & Register | Class | Gross Tonnage | How Destroyed | Date | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hattie Dunn (American) | Schooner | 435 | Bombed | May 25 | 37° 24′ N., 75° 05′ W. |
| Hauppauge (American) | Schooner | 1446 | Bombed (Sal.) | May 25 | 37° 27′ N., 75° 09′ W. |
| Edna (American) | Schooner | 325 | Bombed (Sal.) | May 25 | 37° 30′ N., 74° 52′ W. |
| Winneconne (American) | Steamer | 1869 | Bombed | June 2 | 39° 26′ N., 72° 50′ W. |
| Isabel B. Wiley (Amer.) | Schooner | 776 | Bombed | June 2 | 39° 10′ N., 73° 07′ W. |
| Jacob M. Haskell (Amer.) | Schooner | 1778 | Bombed | June 2 | 50 mi. E. by S. Barnegat Light |
| Edward H. Cole (Amer.) | Schooner | 1791 | Bombed | June 2 | 50 mi. S. E. Barnegat Light |
| Texel (American) | Steamer | 3210 | Bombed | June 2 | 38° 58′ N., 73° 13′ W. |
| Carolina (American) | Steamer | 5093 | Gunned | June 2 | 38° 57′ N., 73° 06′ W. |
| Herbert L. Pratt (Amer.) | Tanker | 5372 | Mined (Sal.) | June 3 | 2½ mi. off Overfalls Light |
| Samuel C. Mengel (Amer.) | Schooner | 915 | Bombed | June 3 | 38° 08′ N., 73° 35′ W. |
| Edward R. Baird, Jr. (Amer.) | Schooner | 279 | Bombed | June 4 | 37° 35′ N., 74° 40′ W. |
| Eidsvold (Norwegian) | Steamer | 1570 | Gunned | June 4 | 37° 12′ N., 73° 55′ W. |
| Harpathian (British) | Steamer | 4588 | Torpedoed | June 5 | 36° 30′ N., 75° 00′ W. |
| Vinland (Norwegian) | Steamer | 1143 | Bombed | June 5 | 36° 32′ N , 73° 58′ W. |
| Pinar del Rio (Amer.) | Steamer | 2504 | Gunned | June 8 | 36° 16′ N., 73° 50′ W. |
| Vindeggan (Norwegian) | Steamer | 3179 | Bombed | June 10 | 36° 25′ N., 73° 20′ W. |
| Henrik Lund (Norwegian) | Steamer | 4322 | Bombed | June 10 | 36° 30′ N., 71° 29′ W. |
| Samoa (Norwegian) | Bark | 1138 | Gunned | June 14 | 37° 30′ N., 72° 10′ W. |
| Kringsjaa (Norwegian) | Bark | 1750 | Gunned | June 14 | 38° 02′ N., 71° 40′ W. |
| Dwinsk (British) | Steamer | 8173 | Torpedoed | June 18 | 38° 30′ N , 61° 15′ W. |
| Chilier (Belgian) | Steamer | 2966 | Bombed | June 22 | 39° 30′ N., 53° 40′ W. |
| Augwald (Norwegian) | Steamer | 3406 | Gunned | June 23 | 38° 30′ N., 53° 42′ W. |

| | Vessels | Gross Tonnage |
|---|---|---|
| Total successfully attacked | 23 | 58,028 |
| Salvaged | 3 | 7,143 |
| Total destroyed | 20 | 50,885 |

U-156

TABLE II VESSELS SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED

| Name & Register | Class | Gross Tonnage | How Destroyed | Date | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tortuguero (British) | Steamer | 4175 | Torpedoed | June 26 | 55° 50′ N., 15° 30′ W. |
| Marosa (Norwegian) | Bark | 1987 | Bombed | July 7 | 40° 00′ N., 50° 35′ W. |
| Manx King (Norwegian) | Bark | 1729 | Bombed | July 8 | 40° 00′ N., 52° 00′ W. |
| San Diego (U.S.N.) | Cruiser | 5700a | Mined | July 19 | 10 mi. S. Fire Island |
| Perth Amboy (American) | Tug | 435 | Gunned (Sal.) | July 21 | 3 mi. off Orleans, Cape Cod |
| Lansford (American) | Barge | 830 | Gunned | July 21 | 3 mi. off Orleans, Cape Cod |
| No. 403 (American) | Barge | 422 | Gunned | July 21 | 3 mi. off Orleans, Cape Cod |
| No. 740 (American) | Barge | 680 | Gunned | July 21 | 3 mi. off Orleans, Cape Cod |
| No. 766 (American) | Barge | 527 | Gunned | July 21 | 3 mi. off Orleans, Cape Cod |
| Robert & Richard (Amer.) | Fish. Sch. | 140 | Bombed | July 22 | 60 mi. S. E. Cape Porpoise, Me. |
| Dornfontein (Canadian) | Schooner | 766 | Burned | Aug. 2 | 44° 17′ N., 67° 00′ W. |
| Muriel (American) | Fish. Sch. | 120 | Bombed | Aug. 3 | 45 mi. W. Seal Island, N. S. |
| Rob Roy (American) | Fish. Sch. | 112 | Bombed | Aug. 3 | 35 mi. W. Seal Island, N. S. |
| Sydney B. Atwood (Amer.) | Fish. Sch. | 100 | Bombed | Aug. 3 | 30 mi. W. Seal Island, N. S. |
| Annie Perry (American) | Fish. Sch. | 116 | Bombed | Aug. 3 | 30 mi. W. Seal Island, N. S. |
| Nelson A. (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 72 | Bombed | Aug. 4 | 25 mi. S. E. Shelburne, N. S. |
| Agnes G. Holland (Can.) | Fish. Sch. | 100 | Bombed | Aug. 5 | 15 mi. S. E. Lahave Banks, N. S. |
| Gladys M. Hollett (Can.) | Fish. Sch. | 203 | Bombed (Sal.) | Aug. 5 | 15 mi. S. E. Lahave Banks, N. S. |
| Luz Blanca (Canadian) | Tanker | 4868 | Torpedoed | Aug. 5 | 43° 48′ N., 63° 40′ W. |
| Sydland (Swedish) | Steamer | 3031 | Bombed | Aug. 8 | 41° 30′ N., 65° 22′ W. |
| Pennistone (British) | Steamer | 4139 | Torpedoed | Aug. 11 | 39° 50′ N., 67° 25′ W. |
| San José (Norwegian) | Steamer | 1586 | Bombed | Aug. 17 | 42° 10′ N., 64° 42′ W. |
| Triumph (Canadian) | Trawler | 239 | Bombed | Aug. 20 | 60 mi. S. W. Cranberry Is. N. S. |
| Lucille M. Schnare (Can.) | Fish. Sch. | 121 | Bombed | Aug. 20 | 52 mi. S. W. Cape Canso, N. S. |
| Francis J. O'Hara (Amer.) | Fish. Sch. | 117 | Bombed | Aug. 20 | 52 mi. S. W. Cape Canso, N. S. |
| A. Piatt Andrew (Amer.) | Fish. Sch. | 141 | Bombed | Aug. 20 | 52 mi. S. W. Cape Canso, N. S. |
| Uda A. Saunders (Can.) | Fish. Sch. | 124 | Bombed | Aug. 20 | 44° 31′ N., 60° 30′ W. |
| Pasadena (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 119 | Bombed | Aug 20 | 55 mi. S. S. E. Cape Canso, N. S. |
| Sylvania (American) | Fish. Sch. | 136 | Bombed | Aug. 21 | 90 mi. S. E. by E. Cape Canso, N. S. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Notre Dame de Lagarde (Fr.) | Fish. Sch. | 145 | Bombed | Aug. 22 | 45° 32′ N., 58° 57′ W. |
| Eric (British) | Steamer | 583 | Bombed | Aug. 25 | 70 mi. S. E. by E. Gallantry Light |
| E. B. Walters (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 126 | Bombed | Aug. 25 | 46° 33′ N., 57° 33′ W. |
| C. M. Walters (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 107 | Bombed | Aug. 25 | 46° 33′ N., 57° 33′ W. |
| Verna B. Adams (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 132 | Bombed | Aug. 25 | 46° 33′ N., 57° 33′ W. |
| J. J. Flaherty (American) | Fish. Sch. | 162 | Bombed | Aug. 25 | 46° 33′ N., 57° 33′ W. |
| Gloaming (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 130 | Bombed | Aug. 26 | 46° 02′ N., 57° 35′ W. |

(a) Estimated on ratio — 12,000 displacement = 5,000 gross tons.

| | Vessels | Gross Tonnage |
|---|---|---|
| Total successfully attacked | 36 | 34,220 |
| Salvaged | 2 | 638 |
| Total destroyed | 34 | 33,582 |

U-140

TABLE III

VESSELS DESTROYED

| Name & Register | Class | Gross Tonnage | How Destroyed | Date | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Porto (Portuguese) | Bark | 1079 | Bombed | July 27 | 38° 25′ N., 61° 46′ W. |
| Tokuyama Maru (Japanese) | Steamer | 7029 | Torpedoed | Aug. 1 | 39° 12′ N., 70° 23′ W. |
| O. B. Jennings (American) | Steamer | 10289 | Gunned | Aug. 4 | 38° 40′ N., 73° 58′ W. |
| Stanley M. Seaman (Amer.) | Schooner | 1060 | Bombed | Aug. 5 | 34° 59′ N., 73° 18′ W. |
| Lightship 71 (American) | C. G. Vessel | 590 | Gunned | Aug. 6 | 35° 05′ N., 75° 10′ W. |
| Merak (American) | Steamer | 3024 | Bombed | Aug. 6 | 34° 57′ N., 75° 40′ W. |
| Diomed (British) | Steamer | 7523 | Gunned | Aug. 21 | 40° 43′ N., 65° 15′ W. |

| | Vessels | Gross Tonnage |
|---|---|---|
| Total destroyed | 7 | 30,594 |

TABLE IV

U-117

VESSELS SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED

| Name & Register | Class | Gross Tonnage | How Destroyed | Date | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aleda May (American) | Fish. Sch. | 31 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Progress (American) | Fish. Sch. | 34 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Reliance (American) | Fish. Sch. | 19 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Wm. H. Starbuck (American) | Fish. Sch. | 53 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Cruiser (American) | Fish. Sch. | 28 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Old Time (American) | Fish. Sch. | 18 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Katie L. Palmer (American) | Fish. Sch. | 31 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Mary E. Sennett (American) | Fish. Sch. | 27 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Earl & Nettie (American) | Fish. Sch. | 24 | Bombed | Aug. 10 | 41° 45′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Sommerstadt (Norwegian) | Steamer | 3875 | Torpedoed | Aug. 12 | 40° 10′ N., 72° 45′ W. |
| Frederick R. Kellogg (Amer.) | Tanker | 7127 | Torp'd (Sal.) | Aug. 13 | 12 mi. N. Barnegat Light |
| Dorothy B. Barrett (Amer.) | Schooner | 2088 | Gunned | Aug. 14 | 38° 54′ N., 74° 24′ W. |
| Madrugada (American) | Schooner | 1613 | Gunned | Aug. 15 | 37° 50′ N., 74° 55′ W. |
| Mirlo (British) | Tanker | 6978 | Mined | Aug. 16 | 35° 30′ N., 75° 18′ W. |
| Nordhav (Norwegian) | Bark | 2846 | Bombed | Aug. 17 | 35° 42′ N., 74° 05′ W. |
| Bianca (Canadian) | Schooner | 408 | Bombed (Sal.) | Aug. 24 | 43° 13′ N., 61° 05′ W. |
| Rush (American) | Trawler | 162 | Bombed | Aug. 26 | 44° 30′ N., 58° 02′ W. |
| Bergsdalen (Norwegian) | Steamer | 2550 | Torpedoed | Aug. 27 | 45° 10′ N., 55° 10′ W. |
| Elsie Porter (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 136 | Bombed | Aug. 30 | 50° 30′ N., 47° 00′ W. |
| Potentate (Canadian) | Fish. Sch. | 136 | Bombed | Aug. 30 | 50° 30′ N., 47° 00′ W. |
| San Saba (American) | Steamer | 2458 | Mined | Oct. 4 | 39° 40′ N., 73° 55′ W. |
| Chaparro (Cuban) | Steamer | 1505 | Mined | Oct. 27 | 10 mi. from Barnegat, N. J. |
| Saetia (American) | Steamer | 2873 | Mined | Nov. 9 | 10 mi. S. S. E. Fenwick Isl. Lt. |

| | Vessels | Gross Tonnage |
|---|---|---|
| Total successfully attacked | 23 | 35,020 |
| Salvaged | 2 | 7,535 |
| Total destroyed | 21 | 27,485 |

TABLE V

U-155
VESSELS DESTROYED

| Name & Register | Class | Gross Tonnage | How Destroyed | Date | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gamo (Portuguese) | Schooner | 315 | Bombed | Aug. 31 | 46° 00′ N., 32° 00′ W. |
| Shortind (Norwegian) | Steamer | 2560 | Torpedoed | Sept. 2 | 45° 15′ N., 30° 00′ W. |
| Leixoes (Portuguese) | Steamer | 3345 | Torpedoed | Sept. 12 | 42° 45′ N., 51° 37′ W. |
| Kingfisher (American) | Trawler | 353 | Bombed | Sept. 20 | 43° 31′ N., 61° 53′ W. |
| Alberto Treves (Italian) | Steamer | 3838 | Torpedoed | Oct. 3 | 38° 20′ N., 67° 10′ W. |
| Industrial (British) | Schooner | 330 | Bombed | Oct. 4 | 37° 57′ N., 66° 41′ W. |
| Lucia (American) | Steamer | 6744 | Torpedoed | Oct. 17 | 38° 05′ N., 50° 50′ W. |

| | Vessels | Gross Tonnage |
|---|---|---|
| Total destroyed | 7 | 17,485 |

TABLE VI

U-152
VESSELS SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED

| Name & Register | Class | Gross Tonnage | How Destroyed | Date | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constanza (Danish) | Schooner | 199 | Bombed (Sal.) | Sept. 11 | 62° 30′ N., 00° 35′ W. |
| Ticonderoga (American) | Steamer | 5130 | Gunned | Sept. 30 | 43° 05′ N , 38° 43′ W. |
| Stifinder (Norwegian) | Bark | 1746 | Bombed | Oct. 13 | 37° 22′ N , 53° 30′ W. |

| | Vessels | Gross Tonnage |
|---|---|---|
| Total successfully attacked | 3 | 7,075 |
| Salvaged | 1 | 199 |
| Total destroyed | 2 | 6,876 |

TABLE VII

TONNAGE DESTROYED BY U-BOATS
(VESSELS SALVAGED EXCLUDED)
AMERICAN COASTAL RAIDS
May 25 to November 9, 1918

| REGISTER | CLASS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Steamer | | Sailing | | Fish. Sch. | | Trawler | | Warship | | Miscell. | | Total | |
| | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons |
| American | 10 | 43,194 | 9 | 10,735 | 18 | 1,409 | 2 | 515 | 1 | 5,700 | 5 | 3,049 | 45 | 64,602 |
| British | 7 | 36,159 | 1 | 330 | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 8 | 36,489 |
| Norwegian | 9 | 24,191 | 6 | 11,196 | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 15 | 35,387 |
| Canadian | 1 | 4,868 | 1 | 766 | 11 | 1,303 | 1 | 239 | . | .... | . | .... | 14 | 7,176 |
| Japanese | 1 | 7,029 | . | ..... | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 1 | 7,029 |
| Portuguese | 1 | 3,345 | 2 | 1,394 | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 3 | 4,739 |
| Italian | 1 | 3,838 | . | ..... | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 1 | 3,838 |
| Swedish | 1 | 3,031 | . | ..... | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 1 | 3,031 |
| Belgian | 1 | 2,966 | . | ..... | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | ... | 1 | 2,966 |
| Cuban | 1 | 1,505 | . | ..... | .. | .... | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 1 | 1,505 |
| French | .. | ..... | . | ..... | 1 | 145 | . | ... | . | .... | . | .... | 1 | 145 |
| TOTALS | 33 | 130,126 | 19 | 24,421 | 30 | 2,857 | 3 | 754 | 1 | 5,700 | 5 | 3,049 | 91 | 166,907 |

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